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This dissertation studies the design of auction markets where bidders are un-
certain of their own values at the time of bidding. A bidder’s value may depend
on other bidders’ private information, on total quantity of items allocated in the
auction, or on the auctioneer’s private information.
Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to auction theory and summarizes
the main contribution of each following chapter. Chapter 2 of this dissertation ex-
tends the theoretical study of position auctions to an interdependent values model
in which each bidder’s value depends on its opponents’ information as well as its
own information. I characterize the equilibria of three standard position auctions
under this information structure, including the Generalized Second Price (GSP)
auctions, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions, and the Generalized English Auc-
tions (GEA). I first show that both GSP and VCG auctions are neither efficient nor
optimal under interdependent values. Then I propose a modification of these two
auctions by allowing bidders to condition their bids on positions to implement ef-
ficiency. I show that the modified auctions proposed in this chapter are not only
efficient, but also maximize the search engine’s revenue.
While the uncertainty of each bidder about its own value comes from the
presence of common component in bidders ex-post values in an interdependent values
model, bidders can be uncertain about their values when their values depend on the
entire allocation of the auction and when their values depend on the auctioneer’s
private information. Chapter 3 of this dissertation studies the design of efficient
auctions and optimal auctions in a license auction market where bidders care about
the total quantity of items allocated in the auction. I show that the standard
uniform-price auction and the ascending clock auction are inefficient when the total
supply needs to be endogenously determined within the auction. Then I construct
a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction and a Walrasian clock auction that can
implement efficiency in a dominant strategy equilibrium under surplus-maximizing
reserve prices and achieve optimal revenue under revenue-maximizing reserve prices.
Chapter 4 of this dissertation analyzes an auctioneer’s optimal information
provision strategy in a procurement auction in which the auctioneer has private
preference over bidders’ non-price characteristics and bidders invest in cost-reducing
investments before entering the auction. I show that providing more information
about the auctioneer’s valuation over bidders’ non-price characteristics encourages
those favored bidders to invest more and expand the distribution of values in the
auction. Concealment is the optimal information provision policy when there are
two suppliers.
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Auctions have been used since antiquity for selling a variety of objects. The
earliest record of auction appears as early as 500 B.C. (Krishna 2002 [1]). Some most
commonly used auctions include auctions for selling treasury bills, mineral rights,
art and antiques, agricultural produce and livestock, used cars, luxury wines, etc. In
addition to selling items, auctions can also be used for purchasing a variety of items.
For example, government usually use procurement auctions to allocate construction
contracts, and firms often use auctions for buying inputs, subcontracting tasks, and
acquiring another firm in takeover battles. In most recent decades, auctions of rights
to use the electromagnetic spectrum for telecommunication are used widely in many
countries.
Since the auctioneer is uncertain about bidders’ valuations of the item being
sold, a common aspect of auctions is that they elicit information, in the form of
bids, from potential buyers regarding their willingness to pay or from potential sell-
ers regarding their willingness to sell, and the outcome - that is, who wins what
and pays how much - is determined solely on the basis of the received information
(Krishna 2002 [1]). Therefore, auctions provide a simple and well-defined economic
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environment of incomplete information game and a valuable testing-ground for eco-
nomic theory. In the benchmark model of independent private values, each bidder
knows the value of object to itself at the time of bidding. The auctioneer does not
have private information, and other bidder’s information does not affect a particular
bidder’s value.
The design of auction depends on specifics of the auction market, including
nature and quantity of items, information structure among bidders, existence of
budget constraints, fairness considerations, etc. Depending on the nature of items
being sold, auctions can be categorized into single-unit auctions, multiple identi-
cal unit auctions, and multiple heterogeneous unit auctions. The most commonly
used single-unit auction formats include first-price sealed-bid auctions, second-price
sealed-bid auctions, open ascending price (English) auctions, and open descending
price (Dutch) auctions. Under the context of multiple identical unit auctions, some
commonly used sealed-bid auction formats include discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auc-
tions, uniform-price auctions, Vickrey auctions, and dynamic aution formats include
Dutch auctions, English auctions, and Ausubel auctions. There is a growing recent
literature on auctions for multiple heterogenous items, and some auction formats
that have been designed by auction theorists include simultaneous ascending auc-
tions, ascending proxy auctions, and combinatorial auctions. This dissertation stud-
ies auction design in three different types of auction markets: multiple heterogenous
items, multiple identical items, and single item auctions.
From the perspective of an auction designer, some of the most important
criteria in auction design are listed below:
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1. Efficiency: The objects end up in the hands of the bidders who value them
most, i.e., the total surplus generated in the auction is maximized.
2. Revenue: The auction raises high expected revenue for the seller.
3. Simplicity: The allocation and payment rules are straightforward and easy to
understand for the bidders.
4. Transparency: The allocation and payment rules are transparent to all par-
ticipants.
5. Speed of the auction: The auction can conclude in a short period of time.
6. Facilitate bidder participation: The auction can attract sufficient number of
bidders to participate.
7. Collusion-proof: The auction is not highly vulnerable to collusion.
This dissertation explores auction design in three different markets using efficiency
and revenue maximization as the two main objectives. Each chapter examines an
important departure from the standard pure private value model and explores how
to use auction design to implement the goals of efficiency and revenue-maximization
under this departure. The departure from pure private value model comes from
the fact that each bidder’s value depends on other bidders’ private information in
Chapter 2, on total supply in the auction in Chapter 3, and on the auctioneer’s
private information in Chapter 4. In the following subsection, I will provide a brief
overview of motivation and a summary of main results and contributions of each
chapter.
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1.2 Summary of Contributions
Existing theoretical literature models position auctions either under complete
information or with incomplete information assuming pure private values. Since
advertisers bidding for the same keyword in sponsored search auctions are often
oligopoly competitors operating in the same industry, each bidders value from re-
ceiving a click of its online advertisement can depend on other bidders private in-
formation as well as its own information, which is better described by the interde-
pendent values model introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2] for single-unit
auctions.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation extends the theoretical study of position auc-
tions to an interdependent values model in which each bidder’s value depends on its
opponents’ information as well as its own information. Position auctions are used
by major search engines to allocate multiple advertising positions on search result
pages. In this chapter, I examine efficiency and revenues of three position auction
formats: Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auctions, VCG-like auctions and Gener-
alized English Auctions (GEA). I find that both the GSP auction and the VCG-like
auction with one-dimensional bidding language can be inefficient under interdepen-
dent values, which contrasts previous literature that favors the GSP auction for its
simplicity. I next show this inefficiency problem can be fully resolved by adopting
a multi-dimensional bidding language that allows bidders to bid differently across
positions. Moreover, the dynamic GEA that implicitly adopts a multi-dimensional
bidding language always implements efficiency in an ex-post equilibrium. Then I
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provide a revenue ranking of the three efficient position auctions and character-
ize the optimal position auction under interdependent values. I find that under
independent signals and a set of regularity conditions, the three efficient position
auctions also implement the optimal revenue subject to no reserve price. The main
results of this chapter imply that there is a trade-off between simplicity versus effi-
ciency and revenue in auction design: using a simple bidding language can come at
a loss of efficiency and revenue. This trade-off depends critically on the information
structure.
In auctions for selling operating licenses in some downstream market, the
quantity of licenses allocated in the auction determines the structure of downstream
market and therefore enters each bidder’s value in the auction. How to design an
auction to maximize total surplus of auction participants is an interesting problem,
as there exists a trade-off of selling more licenses and preserving the values of winning
a license for the winners.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation studies the design of efficient auctions and opti-
mal auctions in a license auction market where bidders care about the total quan-
tity of items allocated in the auction. I first characterize the VCG mechanism in
this environment and show that a sequence of reserve prices that specify minimum
acceptable bid for every additional unit to be allocated are needed to determine
supply endogenously in any efficient auction. Then I characterize the equilibria of
the uniform-price auction and the ascending clock auction after introducing such
reserve prices and show that both auctions are inefficient under any reserve prices.
I next construct a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction that allows bidders to
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condition their bids on total supply to implement efficiency. On the other hand,
I show that a Walrasian clock auction can implement the efficient outcome in a
dominant strategy equilibrium through a tatonnement process. I next character-
ize the optimal auction under the presence of quantity externalities and show that
the optimal reserve price is strictly higher than the efficient reserve price for every
additional unit. Moreover, both the efficient and the optimal reserve prices under
the presence of quantity externalities are higher than their counterparts in markets
without quantity externalities.
In the standard model of procurement auctions, the suppliers provide identical
products and are exogenously differentiated in costs. In practice, suppliers are often
horizontally differentiated in non-price characteristics and can engage in pre-auction
cost-reducing investments. When the auctioneer has private valuation over bidders’
non-price characteristics, whether to disclose this valuation will affect bidders’ in-
vestment incentives and endogenously determine the profile of bidders’ values in the
auction.
Chapter 4 of this dissertation analyzes an auctioneer’s optimal information
provision strategy in a procurement auction in which bidders invest in cost-reducing
investments before entering the auction. In this chapter, I analyze the equilibrium
investment strategies of bidders under three different information provision schemes:
public disclosure, private disclosure, and concealment of preferences over bidders.
I find that pre-auction investments are strategic substitutes among bidders, and
providing more information about the auctioneer’s preference encourages those more
favored bidders to invest more, which results in a more dispersed distribution of
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costs among bidders in the auction. Then I compare the expected revenues in a
second-score auction under these three information provision schemes. I find that
concealment is the optimal information scheme when there are only two bidders,
while the revenue ranking can be reversed when the number of bidders is sufficiently
large.
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Chapter 2: Position Auctions with Interdependent Values
2.1 Introduction
Position auctions are used by many search engines to allocate a list of adver-
tising positions on search result pages. When an Internet user enters a keyword or
phrase on a search engine, the list of advertisements generated by that search is
the result of a position auction. Because of consumers’ sequential search habits1,
advertising links placed on the top of web page receive more clicks than those placed
on the bottom of web page (Brooks 2004 [5]), representing a typical set of vertically
differentiated items. Each advertising link’s click probability can be measured by
click-through-rate (CTR), which is given by the average number of clicks the link
receives per unit time.
There are three different designs of position auction that have been analyzed in
the literature, including the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, and the Generalized English Auction (Edelman et
1Consumers tend to search from top to bottom when reading a list and may end search at any
time, so the top links are more likely to be clicked than the bottom links. This search behavior
can be viewed as a rule of thumb, or as a rational behavior given positive search cost and correct
expectation about advertisers’ relevance ((Athey and Ellison 2011 [3]); (Chen and He 2011 [4])).
8
al. 2007 [6]). Variants of the Generalized Second Price auction have been exten-
sively used by major search engines including Google and Yahoo!2. In the standard
model of GSP auction with pay-per-click payment rule described in Edelman et al.
(2007) [6], advertisers submit one-dimensional per-click bids that can be applied
to any position. The positions are allocated according to the ranking of bids, and
each bidder who wins a position pays the bid of the bidder who is placed one po-
sition below for each click. The total revenue generated by an advertising position
depends on the advertiser’s per-click payment and the click-through-rate (CTR) of
the position.
The GSP auction3 is favored by many previous studies for its efficiency and
revenue properties under complete information as well as its simplicity in bidding
language and payment rule: one-dimensional bids are used to determine the allo-
cation of multiple positions, and payment for each position depends only on the
highest losing bid for that specific position. Besides its simplicity, the GSP auction
always implements the efficient allocation and yields weakly higher revenue than
2The Generalized Second Price auction has several variations in its form. One important
variation is to adopt a vector of “quality scores” computed based on click-through-rate history
to adjust bids and rank advertisers in the order of adjusted bids instead of raw bids. Another
variation is to adopt a pay-per-impression scheme instead of a pay-per-click scheme. Under the
pay-per-click scheme, an advertiser will be charged every time a user clicks on its advertisement.
Under the pay-per-impression scheme, an advertiser will be charged every time a user sees the
search result page that contains its advertisement regardless of whether the user clicks on the
advertisement or not. Google currently uses the pay-per-click GSP auction with quality scores.
3Following Edelman et al. (2007) [6], the GSP auction in this paper refers to the auction with
pay-per-click GSP payment rule and leaves aside the quality scores.
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the VCG auction under complete information (Edelman et al. 2007 [6]; Milgrom
2010 [7]). These desirable properties of the GSP auction depend critically on the
complete information assumption. The justification of complete information in the
literature comes from the claim that advertisers can learn about their own values as
well as each other’s values from information revealed in previous rounds of auction.
However, this claim implicitly assumes that advertisers’ values do not evolve over
time intervals between bidding, so the information revealed in previous rounds fully
reveals advertisers’ values for the current round.
In practice, considerable uncertainty exists in the environment of sponsored
search auctions. For example, consider the keyword “iphone.” Each advertiser’s
value from receiving a click of the online advertisement depends on how likely con-
sumers are going to purchase a new iphone upon click, which can be affected sig-
nificantly by product upgrading and new releases in the iphone market. Consider
the time when Apple releases a new version of iphone, then each advertiser’s value
changes continuously over time after the first day of release, and it is not practical
to precisely predict consumer demand or advertisers’ values in advance. Consider
another keyword for example, “hotel in DC,” then each advertiser’s value per click
depends on how likely consumers are going to book a hotel after clicking on its
advertisement, which can be affected by a variety of factors including weather, day
of the week, time of the year, special events in DC, etc. Therefore, advertisers’
values evolve continuously for many keywords that are related to markets with fre-
quent demand shocks. The evolution in advertisers’ values as result of shocks is
also pointed out in Fershtman and Pavan (2016) [8] and Abhishek and Hosanagar
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(2012) [9]. On the other hand, it is not practical for advertisers to update bids in a
continuous manner given the fact that each advertiser is interested in a large set of
keywords. The stochasticity in consumer demand and the existence of time interval
between bid updating imply that information revealed from previous rounds in the
auction does not provide complete information about an advertiser’s own value or
its opponents values at the current round of bidding.
Another important fact not captured by prior literature is that advertisers
bidding for a position under the same keyword are often oligopoly competitors op-
erating in the same industry. Compared to traditional advertising, a main advantage
of sponsored advertising is that it allows advertisers to effectively target consumers.
This advantage naturally comes with the fact that advertisers under the same key-
word are selling identical or imperfectly substitutable products or services in the
market related to the search keyword. Since each advertiser’s value per click evolves
continuously under demand shocks, it is reasonable to assume that there is some
common component in bidders’ ex-post values that is driven by demand shocks in
the same market. For example, when Apple releases a new version of iphone, con-
sumers are more likely to buy a new iphone after click on an advertisement, and all
advertisers are subject to the same demand shock. While consumer demand cannot
be precisely predicted, each advertiser can still have some imprecise estimation of
its value per click. Suppose a given advertiser receives a private signal that contains
information about how likely consumers are going to purchase a new iphone after
the release. Then the private signals of other advertisers would be informative about
the first advertiser’s ex-post value per click, given the fact that consumer demand
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drives a common component in all advertisers’ ex-post values. Since the advertisers’
private signals contain information about consumer demand in the same market,
it is also reasonable to assume the signals are affiliated in distribution. Therefore,
the information structure in position auctions is better described by the interde-
pendent values model introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2] for single-unit
auctions, in which one bidder’s value can depend on other bidders’ private infor-
mation, and bidders’ private information are affiliated. However, the performance
of the GSP auction, the VCG auction and the Generalized English Auction is not
well-understood when bidders have interdependent values. This paper fills the gap
in the literature and extends the study of position auctions into a broader class of
information structure.
In this paper, I model a single-round position auction under the symmetric
interdependent values setup in Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2]. Since each bidder’s
ex-post value depends on its opponents’ private information, bidders can be uncer-
tain about their ex-post values at the time of bidding, and a generalized version of
the “winner’s curse” in Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2] is present: the expected value
per click conditional on winning a superior position is lower than that conditional
on winning an inferior position. Winning a top position conveys some bad news, as
it implies overestimation of ex-post value from receiving a click. The main analysis
of this paper explores how the incomplete information and the presence of the gen-
eralized “winner’s curse” under interdependent values affect efficiency and revenues
of GSP auctions, VCG-like auctions4, and Generalized English Auctions.
4Although the VCG mechanism is not defined under interdependent values, I define a VCG-
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Under this symmetric interdependent values model, I first show that both the
GSP auction and the VCG-like auction can be inefficient, which contrasts with pre-
vious literature that favors the GSP auction for its simplicity. Then I propose a
modification of the GSP auction and the VCG-like auction by adopting a multi-
dimensional bidding language that allows each bidder to bid differently across po-
sitions (i.e., using a multi-dimensional bidding language) to improve efficiency. I
call these two modified auctions K-dimensional GSP auctions and K-dimensional
VCG auctions, respectively. I characterize the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in these two modified auctions and show that efficiency can be fully im-
plemented in both auctions after adopting this multi-dimensional bidding language.
On the other hand, the Generalized English Auction that implicitly adopts a multi-
dimensional bidding language always implements the efficient allocation in an ex-
post equilibrium. Moreover, the K-dimensional GSP auction and the K-dimensional
VCG auction are always revenue equivalent, while the dynamic Generalized English
Auction yields higher revenue under affiliated signals. In the special case of indepen-
dent signals, all three efficient auctions are revenue equivalent. I also characterize the
optimal position auction that generates the highest expected revenue subject to no
reserve price as a direct revelation mechanism and show that under certain regularity
conditions, this optimal auction is equivalent to the Generalized-VCG mechanism
that assigns all positions efficiently in an ex-post equilibrium. When bidders have in-
like auction called the one-dimensional VCG auction that adopts a VCG-like payment rule under
interdependent values. This one-dimensional VCG auction is analogous to the second-price auction
in Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2]’s study of single-unit auctions under interdependent values.
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dependent signals, the optimal revenue subject to no reserve price can be practically
implemented by the K-dimensional GSP auction, the K-dimensional VCG auction,
and the Generalized English Auction under mild regularity conditions. Therefore,
when bidders have interdependent values, modifying the bidding language from one-
dimensional to multi-dimensional in position auctions not only improves efficiency,
but also improves revenue under certain conditions.
The inefficiency of the GSP auction and the VCG-like auction comes from the
fact that both auctions use a simple one-dimensional bidding language that restricts
bidders to submit the same bid for all positions, while the expected payoff of winning
a superior position can be lower than that of an inferior position in both auctions
under interdependent values. As long as there are more than one positions, the
bid-shading incentive is stronger for bidders with higher signals, since they are more
likely to win the superior position, while bidders who receive lower signals are more
concerned with winning any position instead of winning a top position. The dif-
ferentiated bid-shading incentives across bidders drive the inefficiency in both GSP
auctions and VCG-like auctions. By allowing bidders to submit multi-dimensional
bids that express willingness to pay per click separately for each position, bidders can
easily incorporate the difference in expected payoffs from winning different positions
into their bids. Therefore, the differentiated bid-shading incentives across bidders
are replaced by each bidder’s differentiated bid-shading incentives across positions.
This explains the efficiency of K-dimensional GSP and VCG auctions. Similarly,
in the dynamic Generalized English Auction, bidders not only update beliefs about
their expected values per click from the history of drop-out prices, but also update
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beliefs about which position they are going to win by dropping out at the current
clock price during the dynamic process. The Generalized English Auction implicitly
adopts a multi-dimensional bidding language, which is the main force that drives
its efficiency.
Compared to the two static auctions, the dynamic Generalized English Auc-
tion not only has an advantage in terms of naturally adopting a multi-dimensional
bidding language, but also generates higher expected revenues under affiliated sig-
nals. This revenue dominance result comes from the fact that dynamic auctions
outperform static auctions in revenue by eliciting more information about bidders’
signals through the drop-out process. On the other hand, the revenue equivalence
between the K-dimensional GSP and the K-dimensional VCG auctions comes from
the fact that both auctions use variations of a “second-price” payment rule in which
a given bidder’s bid only affects its allocation but not its payment. Bidders are
able to incorporate the difference in payment rules into their bidding strategies,
which drives the revenue equivalence result between these two static auctions un-
der the general assumption of affiliated signals. The revenue equivalence of all
three auctions under independent signals is consistent with the well-known revenue
equivalence theorem. Under independent signals, the expected revenue of the three
efficient position auctions is also equivalent to the optimal revenue implementable
in any Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism subject
to no reserve price under certain regularity conditions. This result comes from the
fact that when the rank ordering of bidders’ values is aligned with the rank order-
ing of bidders’ marginal revenues given any realization of signals, the auctioneer’s
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objective of maximizing total surplus is aligned with the objective of maximizing
revenue.
The main contribution of this paper is the follows. First, I extend the study
of position auctions into interdependent values and prove the inefficiency of stan-
dard auction formats that include GSP auctions and VCG-like auctions. Second, I
identify the source of this inefficiency and propose a modification of standard posi-
tion auction formats that implements full efficiency. Third, I provide a comparison
across three different position auction formats in both efficiency and revenue and
provide a discussion on the optimal auction under this broad class of information
structure. This paper not only provides guidance on the design of sponsored search
auctions used by search engines, but also provides implications on allocating spon-
sored advertisement space in a wide range of two-sided platforms, such as Facebook,
Amazon, and Yelp. The main results of this paper imply that there is a trade-off
between simplicity versus efficiency and revenue in auction design: simplicity can
come at a loss of efficiency and revenue. This trade-off depends critically on the
information structure.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the earliest position auction literature including Edel-
man et al. (2007) [6] and Varian (2007) [10]. Edelman et al. (2007) [6] characterize
the set of locally-envy free equilibria of the GSP auction under complete informa-
tion, and show that the GSP auction has a locally-envy free equilibrium that yields
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the same payoff outcome as the dominant strategy equilibrium of the VCG auction.
Moreover, this equilibrium gives the bidder-optimal payoff among all locally-envy
free equilibria. In a complementary article, Varian (2007) [10] characterizes the en-
tire set of Nash equilibria in the GSP auction under complete information. Milgrom
(2010) [7] shows that the GSP auction can be viewed as a simplified mechanism that
restricts each bidder to submit the same bid for all positions. This simplification in
bidding language eliminates the lowest revenue equilibrium and leaves only higher
revenue equilibria under complete information. Dutting et al. (2011) [11] points
out that Milgrom (2010) [7]’s result depends critically on the complete information
assumption. This paper provides theoretical support for Dutting et al. (2011) [11]’s
discussion of the trade-off between simplicity and expressiveness in mechanism de-
sign by showing that the GSP auction with one-dimensional bidding language can
be suboptimal in both efficiency and revenue under interdependent values, in sharp
contrast to the results in Edelman et al. (2007) [6], Varian (2007) [10] and Milgrom
(2010) [7] that favor the GSP auction under complete information. Moreover, the
cost of conciseness in the design of GSP auction is also pointed out in the computer
science literature. Abrams et al. (2007) [12] show that an equilibrium can fail to
exist in the GSP auction with pay-per-click payment scheme when each bidder has
a vector of different values for obtaining different slots. Benisch et al. (2008) [13]
show that the GSP auction can be arbitrarily inefficient under some distributions of
the advertisers’ preferences when advertisers have private information and describe
a technique that computes an upper bound on the expected efficiency of the GSP
auction for a known distribution of advertisers’ preferences. This paper comple-
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ments these computer science studies by providing some insights on the trade-off
between simplicity and efficiency from an economic perspective.
In an incomplete information setting, Edelman et al. (2007) [6] model an
ascending auction called the Generalized English Auction (GEA) that implements
the same payoff outcome as the dominant strategy equilibrium of the VCG auc-
tion under independent private values. However, the GEA is the dynamic format
of the VCG auction, rather than the dynamic format of the GSP auction. Little
was known about equilibria of the GSP auction under incomplete information until
Gomes and Sweeney (2014) [14] first characterized the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
of the GSP auction in an independent private values model and showed this unique
equilibrium can be inefficient under some click-through rate profiles. This paper ex-
tends Gomes and Sweeney (2014) [14]’s study by introducing interdependent values
into the model, identifying the source of inefficiency in the GSP auction, as well
as comparing the performance of the GSP auction to other auction formats. An
implication of Gomes and Sweeney (2014) [14]’s inefficiency result is that the VCG
auction performs better than the GSP auction under incomplete information when
bidders have independent private values. Ashlagi (2007) [15] points out that the
VCG auction is the unique truth-revealing position auction under an anonymous
allocation rule with symmetric independent private values. Under complete infor-
mation, Varian and Harris (2014) [16] show that the VCG auction performs better
than the GSP auction under “broad match” of keywords and under unknown click-
through rates. This paper extends the comparison between GSP auctions and VCG
auctions to interdependent values.
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This paper is closely related to the literature on auctions and mechanism
design under interdependent values. Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2] characterize
the equilibria of second-price auctions, first-price auctions and English auctions and
compare the expected revenues of these auctions under symmetric interdependent
values. A number of other articles examine the existence of efficient mechanisms
under interdependent values without symmetry assumption (Jehiel and Moldovanu,
2001 [17]; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000 [18]; Perry and Reny, 2002 [19]; Ausubel,
1999 [20]; Ausubel and Cramton, 2004 [21]). This paper extends the literature on
auction design under interdependent values into multi-unit position auctions.
This paper complements the recent position auctions literature5 that intro-
duces some realistic assumptions into Edelman et al. (2007) [6]’s model. Some stud-
ies endogenize advertisers’ values by incorporating consumer search into the model
and show that firms are ranked in the order of relevance and consumers search
sequentially in equilibrium (Athey and Ellison, 2011 [3]; Chen and He, 2011 [4];
Kominers, 2009 [23]). Several other studies introduce allocative externalities among
bidders by allowing click-through rate of each position to depend on the allocation of
advertisers6 (Deng and Yu, 2009 [32]; Farboodi and Jafaian, 2013 [33]; Hummel and
McAfee, 2014 [34]; Izmalkov et al., 2016 [35]; Lu and Riis, 2016 [36]). There are also
5Most recent advances in this literature are summarized in Qin et al. (2015) [22].
6There is a similar line of research in the computer science literature (Aggarwal et al., 2008 [24];
Constantin et al., 2011 [25]; Ghosh and Mahdian, 2008 [26]; Kempe and Mahdian, 2008 [27]). Other
computer science literature on similar topics such as algorithm design in adword auctions, forward-
looking bidders and prophet inequality include Mehta et al. (2005) [28], Bu et al. (2007) [29], and
Alaei et al. (2012 [30]; 2013 [31]).
19
studies quantify the efficiency loss that may arise in the GSP auction under different
modeling assumptions, including correlated private values, allocative externalities,
uncertain click-through rate profiles, etc. (Lucier and Leme, 2011 [37]; Roughgar-
den and Tardos, 2015 [38]; Caragiannis et al., 2015 [39]). This paper differs from
the aforementioned studies by keeping Edelman et al. (2007) [6]’s assumption of
exogenous click-through rates while introducing informational interdependency in
bidders’ values, which to my knowledge has not been done by previous studies.
Finally, this study is related to the strand of literature on mechanism design.
Myerson (1981) [40] characterizes the optimal mechanism for single-unit auctions
with independent private values. Ausubel and Cramton (1999) [41] find that in auc-
tion markets with perfect resale, it is optimal to allocate items efficiently. Edelman
and Schwarz (2010) [42] generalize Myerson (1981) [40]’s optimal mechanism design
to position auctions with independent private values and show that this optimal
revenue can be implemented by a Generalized English Auction with an optimal re-
serve price. Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2013) [43] and [44]Li (2017) extend
the characterization of optimal single-unit auction to interdependent values. Ulku
(2013) [45] characterize the optimal mechanism for allocating a set of heterogamous
items under interdependent values. The last part of this paper provides a corollary
of Ulku (2013) [45] under the special environment of position auctions.
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2.3 Model
A search engine wishes to sell K positions to N > K bidders7, each with
single-unit demand for an advertising position on the search result page of the
same keyword. Bidders are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Positions are indexed
by k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K} according to their ranks on the web page and are vertically
differentiated in their commonly known qualities measured by click-through-rates
(CTR): (α1, α2, · · · , αK)8, in which α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αK . Each bidder receives a
private signal xi ∈ [0, x̄] that affects her value from getting a click of her adver-
tisement. The signals are distributed over [0, x̄]N according to a commonly-known
joint distribution function F (x1, x2, · · · , xN), with density f(x1, x2, · · · , xN). The
value per click9 of each bidder vi(., .) depends on her private signal xi as well as her
opponents’ signals x−i ∈ [0, x̄]N−1.
For every bidder i, vi(., .) satisfies the following assumptions
10:
A1 (Value Symmetry): For all bidder i, there is a function vi : [0, x̄]
N → R such
that each bidder i’s ex-post value per click is given by vi(xi, x−i), given any signal
7In this paper, I use masculine pronoun for the auctioneer (search engine) and feminine pronouns
for the bidders (advertisers).
8Following Edelman et al. (2007) [6], the CTR of position k is measured by the expected
number of clicks per period received by the advertiser whose advertisement is placed on position
k. The CTR of each position does not depend on the identity of bidder placed on that position or
any other position.
9Following Edelman et al. (2007) [6], I assume each bidder’s value from getting a click does not
depend on the position of her advertisement.
10Assumptions A1-A5 follows from Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2].
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profile (x1, x2, · · · , xN). The value function vi(xi, x−i) is symmetric across bidders.
Moreover, the function vi(xi, x−i) is symmetric in its last N − 1 arguments, which
implies that each bidder’s value vi(xi, x−i) is preserved under any permutation of
opponents’ signals x−i.
A2 (Value Monotonicity): For all i, vi(xi, x−i) is nonnegative, continuous and






≥ 0, ∀j 6= i (2.1)
Bidders have non-trivially interdependent values if ∂vi(xi,x−i)
∂xj
6= 0 for j 6= i.






Under assumptions A1-A3, the ranking of signals is aligned with the ranking of
values. The bidder who receives the k-th highest signal also has the k-th highest
ex-post value.
I assume the joint density function f(x1, x2, · · · , xN) satisfies the following
assumptions:
A4 (Signal Symmetry): f(x1, x2, · · · , xN) is a symmetric function of its arguments.
A5 (Signal Affiliation): The variables x1, x2, · · · , xN are affiliated. For all x, x′ ∈
[0, x̄]N ,
f(x ∨ x′)f(x ∧ x′) ≥ f(x)f(x′) (2.3)
This model introduces the information structure of interdependent values into
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position auctions. I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in this paper11. Given
symmetry of the model, it suffices to study the equilibrium bidding strategy of an
arbitrary bidder i. A critical object in Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2] is the first
order statistic Y1, which is the random variable denoting the highest signal received
by bidder i’s opponents. The following definition generalizes the first-order statistic
notion to position auctions:
Definition 2.1. For any arbitrary bidder i, let X be the random variable represent-
ing bidder i’s own signal xi. For all k ∈ [1, K], let Yk be the k-th order statistic
representing the k-th highest signal received by bidder i’s opponents. Let Gk(yk|xi)
be the conditional distribution of statistic Yk given X = xi, and let gk(yk|xi) be
the associated density function. Let vk(xi, yk) be bidder i’s expected value of a click
conditional on i’s signal xi and the k-th order statistic that takes value yk:
vk(xi, yk) = E
[
v(xi, x−i)
∣∣X = xi, Yk = yk] (2.4)
For an arbitrary bidder i, the realization of Yk is the minimum value that the
signal of bidder i can take such that bidder i should win a position no lower than
the k-th highest position in any efficient allocation.
Definition 2.2. A position auction is efficient if it always assigns positions in the
rank ordering of bidders’ ex-post values, given any number of positions K, with
11It will be shown that symmetry is a necessary condition for any equilibrium to be efficient
in both one-dimensional assortative position auctions and K-dimensional assortative position auc-
tions (Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.4), so restricting attention to symmetric equilibria does not lose
generality in the efficiency analysis.
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any CTR profile (α1, α2, · · · , αK). Under assumptions A1-A3, a position auction
is efficient if it always assigns positions in the rank ordering of bidder’s private
signals.
The “winner’s curse” concept in Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2] can be extended
to this model of position auctions with interdependent values in the following sense:
at any monotonic bidding equilibrium, winning a higher ranked position conveys
worse information about bidder i’s expected value than winning a lower ranked
position. For all k, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, if k < j, then vk(xi, xi) ≤ vj(xi, xi). The
inequality is strict under non-trivially interdependent values.
2.4 Inefficiency of One-dimensional Position Auctions
A unique feature of position auctions is that each bidder’s value from getting
a click does not depend on the position of her advertisement12. Based on this
assumption, the commonly-used GSP auction adopts a simple bidding language
that only requires each bidder to submit a one-dimensional bid based on her value
per click from any position and computes her bid profile by scaling her bid by the
click-through rates of the K positions, instead of asking each bidder to bid for each
position separately.
In this section, I analyze the efficiency of GSP auctions and VCG-like auctions
with this one-dimensional bidding language and show that both auctions can be
12Goldman and Rao (2014) [46] use experimental data to test this assumption and get supportive
result.
24
inefficient when there are at least two positions under certain CTR profiles. I begin
the analysis by characterizing the allocation rule and payment rule in GSP auctions
and VCG-like auctions.
2.4.1 One-dimensional Position Auctions
A position auction (µ̃, p̃) that adopts one-dimensional bids (b1, b2, · · · , bN) ∈
RN , in which bi ∈ R represents bidder i’s bid per click for any position, is called a
one-dimensional position auction. The allocation rule µ̃i(b1, b2, · · · , bN) =(
µ̃
(1)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN), µ̃
(2)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN), · · · , µ̃
(K)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN)
)
is a vector of K
functions, in which µ̃
(k)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN) : RN → [0, 1] maps a profile of bids (b1, b2, · · · , bN)
to the probability that bidder i wins position k. The payment rule p̃i(b1, b2, · · · , bN) =(
p̃
(1)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN), p̃
(2)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN), · · · , p̃
(K)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN)
)
is a vector of K
functions, in which p̃
(k)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN) : RN → R maps a profile of bids to the
payment of bidder i for position k.
For an arbitrary bidder i, given her opponents’ bids b−i, define b̂
k(b−i) as the
k-th highest bid in b−i, which implies b̂
1(b−i) ≥ b̂2(b−i) ≥ · · · ≥ b̂K(b−i). For any
k ≥ 1, if there are n ≥ 2 equivalent k-th highest bids in b−i, then b̂k(b−i), b̂k+1(b−i),
..., b̂k+n−1(b−i) are assigned randomly for those n equivalent bids. A one-dimensional
position auction is assortative if it assigns the k-th highest position to the bidder
who submits the k-th highest bid.
Definition 2.3. In a one-dimensional position auction (µ̃, p̃), the allocation rule µ̃




i (bi, b−i) =

1 if b̂k(b−i) ≤ bi < b̂k−1(b−i)
0 else
(2.5)
Any tie is broken randomly.
Definition 2.4. The one-dimensional GSP auction is characterized by the one-
dimensional assortative allocation rule and the GSP payment rule given below. For
all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},
p̃
G,(k)




k(b−i) ≤ bi < b̂k−1(b−i)
0 else
(2.6)
Next, I define a VCG-like position auction format called one-dimensional VCG
auction that is analogous to the second-price auction under the context of interde-
pendent values single-unit auction in Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2].
Definition 2.5. The one-dimensional VCG auction is characterized by the one-
dimensional assortative allocation rule and a VCG-like payment rule given below.
For all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},
p̃
V,(k)
i (bi, b−i) =

∑K
j=k(αj − αj+1)b̂j(b−i) if b̂k(b−i) ≤ bi < b̂k−1(b−i)
0 else
(2.7)
Although the single-unit second-price auction analyzed by Milgrom and Weber
(1982) [2] admits a Bayesian equilibrium that always implements efficient allocation
under assumptions A1-A3, I will show that an analogous result does not exist in
the one-dimensional VCG auction with multiple positions and non-trivially interde-
pendent values.
26
2.4.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
I start the efficiency analysis by providing a necessary and sufficient condition
for existence of an efficient Bayesian equilibrium in any one-dimensional assortative
position auction.
Lemma 2.1. A one-dimensional position auction (µ̃, p̃) with assortative allocation
rule is efficient if and only if there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which each
bidder’s bidding strategy β(xi) is strictly increasing in xi, for any number of positions
K, with any CTR profile (α1, α2, · · · , αK).
Proof. See Appendix.
Next, I develop the main result of section 2.4: both the one-dimensional GSP
auction and the one-dimensional VCG auction can be inefficient when bidders have
interdependent values. Note that it is sufficient to show inefficiency can occur with
K = 2 positions. For both of the one-dimensional GSP auction (G) and the one-
dimensional VCG auction (V), I first provide a necessary condition for any mono-
tonic bidding strategy βL(xi) to be a Bayesian equilibrium of the auction L ∈ {G, V }
with two positions, and then finish the analysis by showing that the unique βL(xi)
characterized by this equilibrium condition cannot be monotonic under some CTR
profiles.
Lemma 2.2. In the one-dimensional GSP auction with two positions, if an efficient
Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy βG(xi) exists, then β
G(xi) is characterized as
below:
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Lemma 2.3. In the one-dimensional VCG auction with two positions, if an efficient
Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy βV (xi) exists, then β
V (xi) is characterized as
below:
For all xi ∈ [0, x̄],
βV (xi) =
g1(xi|xi)(α1 − α2)v1(xi, xi) + g2(xi|xi)α2v2(xi, xi)
g1(xi|xi)(α1 − α2) + g2(xi|xi)α2
(2.9)
Proof. See Appendix.
To better understand the characterization of equilibria in Lemma 2.2 and
Lemma 2.3, let ΠL1 (xi, y1, y2) and Π
L
2 (xi, y1, y2) denote the expected payoffs from
winning position 1 and 2 in auction L ∈ {G, V } respectively, given the realizations
of X = xi, Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2. The equilibrium bidding strategy β
G(xi) characterized
in Lemma 2.2 is derived from the following equilibrium condition:
g1(xi|xi)
[
















Similarly, the equilibrium bidding strategy βV (xi) characterized in Lemma 2.3
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Note that in the special case of independent private values where vk(xi, xi) = xi
for all k, the equilibrium of the one-dimensional VCG auction is given by βV (xi) =
xi, consistent with the dominant strategy equilibrium in the VCG auction under
independent private values. In the special case of α2 = 0, the equilibrium β
V (xi) =
v1(xi, xi) is consistent with the symmetric equilibrium of the second-price auction
in Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2]. In the special case of α1 = α2, the equilibrium
βV (xi) = v
2(xi, xi) is consistent with the equilibrium of the uniform-price auction
with single-unit demands in Ausubel et al. (2014) [47].
Equations (2.10) and (2.11) imply that in both one-dimensional GSP auctions
and one-dimensional VCG auctions with two positions, for an arbitrary bidder i with
signal xi, the net impact of winning position 1 instead of position 2 on the margin of
Y1 = xi and winning position 2 instead of nothing on the margin of Y2 = xi weighted
by corresponding probability masses must equal zero at any efficient equilibrium.




∣∣∣X = xi, Y1 = xi]+g2(xi|xi)E[ΠL2 ∣∣∣X = xi, Y2 = xi] = 0, L ∈ {G, V }
(2.12)
The intuition behind this equilibrium condition is that in a one-dimensional
assortative position auction, for any bidder i, increasing bid increases the probability
of winning position 1 instead of position 2 and the probability of winning position 2
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instead of nothing at the same time, so each bidder’s optimal strategy βL(xi) must
balance the trade-offs between every pair of adjacent positions at corresponding
margins. I next show that the unique βL(xi) satisfying this equilibrium condition
cannot be monotonic under some CTR profile, for both L = G, V .
2.4.3 Efficiency Analysis
The following two propositions present the main result of section 2.4:
Proposition 2.1. For any value function vi(xi, x−i) satisfying assumptions A1-
A3, there exists some number of positions K with some CTR profile under which
no efficient Bayesian equilibrium exists in the one-dimensional GSP auction.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2.2. For any non-trivially interdependent value function vi(xi, x−i)
satisfying assumptions A1-A3 and ∂vi(xi,x−i)
∂xj
6= 0 for j 6= i, there exists some number
of positions K with some CTR profile under which no efficient Bayesian equilibrium
exists in the one-dimensional VCG auction.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2 is that in both one-
dimensional GSP auctions and one-dimensional VCG auctions with two positions,
there exists some CTR profile under which the superior position is less desirable than
the inferior position given expected payoffs, which leads to differential bid-shading
incentives across bidders and results in non-existence of monotonic equilibrium bid-
ding strategy. The following analysis elaborates this intuition in each auction.
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The source of inefficiency of one-dimensional GSP auctions comes from the
single-dimensionality of its bidding language and its payment rule. In a one-dimensional
GSP auction with two positions, when the click rate of the second position is close
to that of the first position, a bidder receives similar number of clicks from winning
either position but pays a much higher price for each click from winning the first











g2|1(y2|xi, xi)dy2 < 0
(2.13)
The inequality follows from the fact that βG(y2) < β
G(xi) for all y2 ∈ [0, xi) given
any strictly increasing function βG(.). Therefore, at any monotonic equilibrium, the
second position is more desirable than the first position conditional on Y1 = xi for
any bidder i when α2 is sufficiently close to α1. Under the one-dimensional bidding
language, each bidder is forced to submit the same bid for both positions, so the
equilibrium bid must balance net trade-offs between all pairs of adjacent positions
weighted by corresponding probability masses gk(xi|xi) that varies with signal xi,
as shown in equation (2.12). Because the weight attached to E[ΠG1 − ΠG2 |X =
xi, Y1 = xi] is higher for bidders with higher signals xi compared to those with lower
signals, the bid-shading incentive is stronger for the former. This differentiated bid-
shading incentive across bidders’ signals can lead to violation of monotonicity of the
unique equilibrium bidding strategy βG(xi) characterized in Lemma 2.2. Therefore,
a symmetric and strictly increasing equilibrium bidding strategy does not exist under
certain CTR profiles. According to Lemma 2.1, there exists no efficient equilibrium
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in the one-dimensional GSP auction under some CTR profile.
The result of Proposition 2.1 is consistent with the main result of Gomes
and Sweeney (2014) [14], who solve the Volterra equation that characterizes the
equilibrium of the one-dimensional GSP auction under independent private values
and show it can be non-monotonic under some CTR profile. They also show non-
monotonicity tends to occur when the click-through rate of the inferior position is
close to that of the superior position when there are two positions. Proposition
2.1 introduces interdependent values into their model and identifies an additional
source of non-existence of monotonic equilibrium: the non-existence of monotonic
equilibrium not only comes from the GSP payment rule, but also comes from the
single-dimensionality of bidding language in the GSP auction. Proposition 2.2 pro-
vides further support for this argument by showing that with the one-dimensional
bidding language, modifying the GSP payment rule to the more complicated VCG-
like payment rule does not resolve the inefficiency problem under interdependent
values, as differentiated bid-shading incentives across bidders still exist in the one-
dimensional VCG auction.
The source of inefficiency of one-dimensional VCG auctions comes from its
one-dimensional bidding language and the presence of the generalized “winner’s
curse” under interdependent values. Similar to the one-dimensional GSP auction,
the weight attached to trade-offs between each pair of adjacent positions gk(xi|xi)
varies in xi in the one-dimensional VCG auction. Under the VCG-like payment
rule, it is optimal for each bidder to bid her true expected value per click condi-
tional on Y2 = xi if the probability of winning the first position is zero so that
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only the trade-off between winning the second position and nothing needs to be
considered. However, for any bidder who receives a signal xi > 0, there is positive
probability of winning the first position at any monotonic equilibrium. With non-
trivially interdependent values, the expected value vk(xi, xi) differs across positions,
with v1(xi, xi) < v
2(xi, xi) under the generalized “winner’s curse.” Therefore, every
bidder with xi > 0 shades bid below v
2(xi, xi). Bidders with higher signals have
stronger bid-shading incentive, since they need to weigh the impact of the general-
ized “winner’s curse” more significantly given that they are more likely to win the
first position when other bidders bid monotonically. This differentiated bid-shading
incentive can lead to non-monotonicity of the unique equilibrium bidding strategy
βV (xi) characterized in Lemma 2.3, which implies that the one-dimensional VCG
auction must also be inefficient under some CTR profile when there are two posi-
tions. Moreover, the non-existence of monotonic equilibrium in the one-dimensional
VCG auction also tend to occur when α2 is close to α1, as the bid-shading incentive
under the generalized “winner’s curse” is amplified when the quality of the superior
position is not significantly better than the quality of the inferior position.
To summarize this section, it can be concluded that a common source of inef-
ficiency of the one-dimensional GSP auction and the one-dimensional VCG auction
comes from the fact that both auctions use a simple one-dimensional bidding lan-
guage to determine the allocation of multiple differentiated positions. Restricting
bidders to one-dimensional bids requires the equilibrium bid to balance the net trade-
offs between all pairs of adjacent positions on different margins, which is impossible
for any monotonic bidding strategy under certain CTR profiles. It is natural to
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conjecture that allowing bidders to submit different bids for each position such that
the equilibrium bid for each position k balances only the trade-off between position
k and position k + 1 conditional on Yk = xi may resolve the inefficiency problem.
The next section confirms this conjecture.
2.5 Efficiency of K-dimensional Position Auctions
In this section, I propose a modification of the one-dimensional GSP auction
and the one-dimensional VCG auction by allowing each bidder to submit K separate
bids (i.e., a K-dimensional bid) and show that both auctions have unique efficient
Bayesian equilibria given any number of positions K with any CTR profile after this
modification. Moreover, the Generalized English Auction that implicitly adopts a K-
dimensional bidding language has a unique efficient ex-post equilibrium. The main
result of this section shows that adopting a multi-dimensional bidding language can
fully implement efficiency in position auctions under interdependent values.
2.5.1 K-dimensional Position Auctions
I first construct a class of position auctions that adopts a K-dimensional bid-
ding language and a K-dimensional assortative allocation rule that corresponds to
the assortative allocation rule in one-dimensional position auctions. A position auc-
tion (µ, p) that adopts K-dimensional bids (b1, b2, · · · , bN) ∈ RK × RN , in which
bi ∈ RK represents bidder i’s bid per click for every position k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},





i (b1, b2, · · · , bN), µ
(2)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN), · · · , µ
(K)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN)
)
is a vector of K
functions, in which µ
(k)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN) : RK × RN → [0, 1] maps a profile of bids
(b1, b2, · · · , bN) to the probability that bidder i wins position k. The payment rule




i (b1, b2, · · · , bN), p
(2)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN), · · · , p
(K)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN)
)
is a vector of K functions, in which p
(k)
i (b1, b2, · · · , bN) : RK×RN → R maps a profile
of bids to the payment of bidder i for position k.
For any position k, define Sk(b1, b2, · · · , bN) as the set of bidders who should
win some position strictly above the k-th highest position at bidding profile (b1, b2, · · · , bN)
according to the allocation rule of the auction:
Sk(b1, b2, · · · , bN) =
{
j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣ ∃ k′ < k s.t. µ(k′)j (bj, b−j) = 1} (2.14)





as the highest bid for position k among bidder i’s opponents who
do not win any position above k. A K-dimensional position auction is assortative if
its allocation rule is characterized by the following definition:
Definition 2.6. In a K-dimensional position auction (µ, p), the allocation rule µ is
assortative if for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},
µ
(k)
i (bi, b−i) =








Any tie is broken randomly.
In an assortative K-dimensional position auction (µ, p), each bidder submits a
vector of K bids (b1i , b
2
i , · · · , bKi ) simultaneously in a sealed-bid format. The auction-
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eer collects all bids at once and assigns the first position to the bidder who submits
the highest bid for position 1, the second position to the bidder who submits the
highest bid for position 2, among those who do not win position 1, etc. Once a
bidder is assigned a position k, her bids for lower positions bji with j > k will not
be considered in the allocation of lower positions and will be equated to zero.
I next construct two assortative K-dimensional position auctions that can
be viewed as modified one-dimensional GSP auction and modified one-dimensional
VCG auction, respectively. I call these auctions K-dimensional GSP auction and
K-dimensional VCG auction.
Definition 2.7. The K-dimensional GSP auction is characterized by the assor-
tative K-dimensional allocation rule and the following payment rule: for all k ∈
{1, 2, · · · , K},
p
G,(k)













Definition 2.8. The K-dimensional VCG auction can be characterized by the as-
sortative K-dimensional allocation rule and the following payment rule: for all
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},
p
V,(k)
i (bi, b−i) =

∑K











In addition to the class of static K-dimensional position auctions proposed
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above, the dynamic Generalized English Auction (GEA) in Edelman et al. (2007) [6]
also adopts a K-dimensional bidding language. The rule of the Generalized English
Auction is given as follows. There is a continuously ascending clock showing the
current price. Initially, all advertisers are in the auction. An advertiser can drop
out at any time, and her bid is the price on the clock when she drops out. The
auction ends when there is only one bidder left. This last bidder wins the first
position, and her per click payment equals to the next-to-last bidder’s drop-out
price. The next-to-last bidder wins the second position, and her per click payment
equals to the third highest bid, etc. Any tie is broken randomly when bidders drop
out simultaneously. All drop-out prices are observable, so each bidder’s bidding
strategy will be different every time a bidder drops out. This dynamic process
implicitly allows for a K-dimensional bidding language.
2.5.2 Characterization of Equilibria and Efficiency Analysis
To begin the efficiency analysis of K-dimensional position auctions, I first pro-
vide a necessary and sufficient condition for any K-dimensional assortative position
auction to be efficient:
Lemma 2.4. A K-dimensional position auction (µ, p) with assortative allocation
rule is efficient if and only if given any number of positions K, there exists a symmet-
ric equilibrium in which each bidder’s bidding strategy
(




k(xi) > 0 for every position k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, under any CTR profile
(α1, α2, · · · , αK).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Next, I develop the main result of section 2.5: the K-dimensional GSP auction,
the K-dimensional VCG auction, and the Generalized English Auction are always
efficient given any value function satisfying assumptions A1-A3, for any number
of positions K, with any CTR profile. I first characterize the unique symmetric
equilibria of the K-dimensional GSP Auction, the K-dimensional VCG auction and
the Generalized English Auction. It will be shown that the equilibria of all three
auctions satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition in Lemma 2.4.
2.5.2.1 Equilibrium of K-dimensional GSP Auction
The unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy in the K-dimensional
GSP auction is given in Proposition 2.3:
Proposition 2.3. Define the K-dimensional bidding strategy β(xi) =
(

















∣∣X = xi, Yk = xi)]
(2.19)
for any position k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K − 1}.
Let b∗i = β(xi) =
(
β1(xi), β2(xi), · · · , βK(xi)
)
for each bidder i, then the n-tuple
of strategies (b∗1, b
∗




Proposition 2.3 shows that the equilibrium bid for the last position K in the
K-dimensional GSP auction is the expected value per click conditional on receiving
a signal just high enough to win the last position, Yk = xi. On the other hand,
the equilibrium bid for any position above the last position in the K-dimensional
GSP auction is the expected value per click subtracted by the expected payoff from
winning the next position divided by αk, conditional on Yk = xi. The subtracted
term can be interpreted as the per-click opportunity cost of winning position k.
Since βK(xi) = v












βk+1(xi)gk+1(xi|xi, xi) > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K−1}
(2.20)
The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy βk(xi) for every position k is strictly
increasing in xi. According to Lemma 2.4, the K-dimensional GSP auction is always
efficient.
Corollary 2.1. The K-dimensional GSP auction always implements the ex-post
efficient allocation in a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium given any value function
vi(xi, x−i) satisfying assumptions A1-A3, for any number of positions K, with any
CTR profile (α1, α2, · · · , αK).
To better understand the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.3, let
ΠGk (xi, y1, · · · , yN−1) denote the payoff of winning position k given realizations X =

























∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}
(2.21)
which implies that at the symmetric equilibrium of the K-dimensional GSP auction,
each bidder should be indifferent between winning position k and position k + 1
conditional on Yk = xi, at which value her signal is just high enough to win position
k, for any position k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}.
2.5.2.2 Equilibrium of K-dimensional VCG Auction
The unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy in the K-dimensional
VCG auction is given by Proposition 2.4:
Proposition 2.4. Let βk(xi) = v
k(xi, xi) for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}. Let b∗i =
β(xi) = (β1(xi), β2(xi), · · · , βK(xi)), then the n-tuple of strategies (b∗1, b∗2, · · · , b∗N) is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the K-dimensional VCG auction.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since vk(xi, xi) is strictly increasing in xi for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, the K-
dimensional VCG auction is always efficient.
Corollary 2.2. The K-dimensional VCG auction always implements the ex-post
efficient allocation in a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium given any value function
40
vi(xi, x−i) satisfying assumptions A1-A3, for any number of positions K, with any
CTR profile (α1, α2, · · · , αK).
To better understand the equilibrium bidding strategy characterized in Propo-
sition 2.4, let ΠVk (xi, y1, · · · , yN−1) denote the payoff of winning position k given
realizations X = xi, Y1 = y1, · · · , YN−1 = yN−1 in the K-dimensional VCG auction.
The equilibrium bidding strategy
(












= 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K} (2.22)
which implies that at the equilibrium of K-dimensional VCG auction, each bidder
with signal xi is indifferent between winning position k and position k + 1 when
Yk = xi, for all position k. Comparing equation (2.21) and equation (2.22), it
follows that the equilibria of K-dimensional GSP auction and K-dimensional VCG




∣∣∣X = xi, Yk = xi] = 0, ∀ k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, ∀ L ∈ {G, V } (2.23)
Equation (2.23) shows that with K-dimensional bidding language, each bid-
der submits K separate bids such that the bid for position k balances only the
trade-off between position k and position k + 1 conditional on Yk = xi, in contrast
to the equilibrium condition in one-dimensional position auctions characterized by
equation (2.12). The differentiated bid-shading incentive across bidders’ signals in
the one-dimensional auctions is replaced by the differentiated bid-shading incen-
tive across positions in the K-dimensional auctions, which resolves the inefficiency
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problem.
The next example provides an illustration of the Bayesian equilibrium bidding
strategies in the K-dimensional VCG auction and K-dimensional GSP auction.
Example 2.1. Consider the K-dimensional VCG auction and K-dimensional GSP
auction with K = 2 positions and N = 3 bidders, with click-through-rates normalized
to (1, α2). The bidders’ private signals are independently and identically drawn from
the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Bidder i’s value per click vi is a function of her
own signal xi and her opponents’ signals xj, xk:

























in the K-dimensional GSP auction, under different




} and α2 ∈ {0.75, 0.25}.
Figure 2.1 provides two main insights. First, comparing the equilibria under




given the same α2 illustrates the impact of increasing degree of
interdependency among bidders’ values on the equilibria of the two auctions. Since
βL1 (xi) ≤ βL2 (xi) for both auctions L ∈ {G, V } under any α2, the equilibrium bid of
any bidder for position 1 is weakly lower than that for position 2 in both auctions.
The difference
(
βL2 (xi) − βL1 (xi)
)
is increasing in xi in the K-dimensional GSP
auction, while stays constant in xi in the K-dimensional VCG auction. Moreover,(
βL2 (xi) − βL1 (xi)
)
is greater in both auctions when λ is lower, which means the
degree of bid-shading for position 1 is more significant in both auctions when the
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in K-dimensional VCG and GSP Auction
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degree of interdependency in values is stronger and the impact of the generalized
“winner’s curse” is more significant.
Second, comparing the equilibria under α2 = 0.75 to α2 = 0.25 under the same
value of λ shows the impact of increasing difference in click-through rates between
the superior position and the inferior position on the equilibria of the two auctions.




increases in α2 as well as





by α2 and stays constant in xi in the K-dimensional VCG auction. Therefore, the
bid-shading incentive for position 1 is greater when the click-through rates of two
positions are closer in the K-dimensional GSP auction, while the equilibrium bids
are unaffected by click-through rates in the K-dimensional VCG auction.
2.5.2.3 Equilibrium of Generalized English Auction
The next result of this section characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium
of the Generalized English Auction (GEA) under interdependent values and shows
this dynamic auction that implicitly adopts a K-dimensional bidding language is
also efficient.
At any time in the auction, let n denote the number of bidders who are still
active in the auction, and (N − n) denote the number of bidders who have dropped
out. Let (pN , pN−1 · · · , pn+1) denote the drop-out prices of the (N − n) bidders,
in which pN is the bid of the first drop out bidder, and pn+1 is the bid of the last
drop out bidder at current time, so pN ≤ pN−1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn+1. When there are n
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remaining bidders in the auction, the equilibrium strategy for bidder i specifies her
optimal drop out price given her private signal xi and a history of drop out prices
(pN , pN−1, · · · , pn+1). Define
v(k)(xi, yk, yk+1, · · · , yN−1) = E
[
vi
∣∣∣X = xi, Yk = yk, Yk+1 = yk+1, · · · , YN−1 = yN−1]
(2.25)
as bidder i’s expected value conditional on her own signal X = xi and the realiza-
tion of all of the (N − k) lowest signals among opponents’ signals, Yk = yk, Yk+1 =
yk+1, · · · , YN−1 = yN−1. The unique symmetric equilibrium of the GEA under in-
terdependent values is characterized in Proposition 2.5:
Proposition 2.5. Define strategy b∗ = (b∗N , b
∗
N−1, · · · , b∗2) as follows:
b∗N(xi) = v
(K)(xi, xi, · · · , xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N −K)
)
b∗n(xi|pN , · · · , pn+1) =
v(K)(xi, xi, · · · , xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−K)
, yn, yn+1, · · · , yN−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N − n) lowest signals
) if (K + 1) ≤ n ≤ (N − 1)
v(n−1)(xi, xi, yn, yn+1, · · · , yN−1︸ ︷︷ ︸




v(n−1)(xi, xi, yn, yn+1, · · · , yN−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N − n) lowest signals
)− pn+1
]
if n ≤ K
(2.26)




b∗n+1(yn|pN , · · · , pn+2) = pn+1
(2.27)
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The N-tupple bidding strategy (b∗, ..., b∗) is an ex-post equilibrium of the Gen-
eralized English Auction under interdependent values.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since the equilibrium bidding strategy b∗n(xi) at any stage of the GEA is in-
creasing in xi, the GEA is also efficient.
Corollary 2.3. The Generalized English Auction always implements the ex-post
efficient allocation in an ex-post equilibrium, given any value function vi(xi, x−i)
satisfying assumptions A1-A3, for any number of positions K, with any CTR profile
(α1, α2, · · · , αK).
To better understand the equilibrium of GEA, let ΠEk (xi, y1, y2, · · · , yN−1) be
the payoff from winning position k conditional on X = xi, Y1 = y1, · · · , YN−1 =













∣∣∣X = xi, Yk = xi, Yk+1 = yk+1, · · · , YN = yN] = 0, if n = k + 1 ≤ K
(2.28)
which implies that the optimal drop-out price at any time of the auction must
balance the trade-off between winning position k and position k + 1 conditional
on Yk = xi, given the profile of revealed signals from the history of drop-out prices.
When there are more bidders than positions left in the auction, each bidder’s optimal
drop-out strategy specifies the price at which she is indifferent between winning the
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lowest position and winning nothing. When there are (weakly) fewer bidders than
positions left in the auction, each bidder’s optimal drop-out strategy specifies the
price at which she is indifferent between winning the next position higher than
the current lowest position and winning the current lowest position at the most
recent drop-out price. Comparing the characterization of equilibrium in (2.28) to
the characterization of equilibrium in (2.23), it can be shown that the equilibrium
condition of GEA is similar to the equilibrium condition of the K-dimensional GSP
auction and the K-dimensional VCG auction, while the only difference comes from
that each remaining bidder can update her belief from revealed signals of drop-out
bidders in GEA.
2.6 Revenue of K-dimensional Position Auctions
In this section, I compare the expected revenues of the three efficient K-
dimensional position auctions analyzed in section 2.5 and characterize the optimal
design of position auction under interdependent values as a direct revelation mecha-
nism. Then I compare the expected revenues of the three efficient position auctions
to the optimal revenue subject to no reserve price.
2.6.1 Revenue Ranking
The following proposition gives the revenue ranking of the K-dimensional GSP
auction, the K-dimensional VCG auction and the GEA.
Proposition 2.6. The expected revenue of the Generalized English Auction is higher
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than the expected revenue of the K-dimensional VCG auction, which in turn equals
to the expected revenue of the K-dimensional GSP auction, for any value function
vi(xi, x−i) and distribution of signals F (x1, x2, · · · , xN) satisfying assumptions A1-
A5.
RGEA ≥ RK−V CG = RK−GSP (2.29)
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind revenue equivalence of the K-dimensional GSP auction
and the K-dimensional VCG auction is the following. Both auctions are sealed-
bid auctions, so no information is elicited before final allocation and payments are
determined. Both auctions adopt the same K-dimensional assortative allocation rule
and some variation of a “second-price” payment rule under which each bidder’s bid
only affect her allocation but not her payment. In the proof of Proposition 2.6, it
is shown that although each bidder’s payment in the two auctions depends on her
opponents’ bids in different ways, bidders are able to incorporate different payment
rules into their bidding strategies so that the expected payment for a bidder with
the same signal xi is the same in the two auctions.
The intuition behind the revenue ranking of the GEA and the K-dimensional
VCG auction comes from the Linkage Principle in Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2].
With affiliated signals, the dynamic auction performs better than static auctions
since part of the signals are elicited during the drop-out process. On the other
hand, with independent signals, the GEA is revenue equivalent to the other two
static K-dimensional position auctions, which gives the following corollary:
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Corollary 2.4. When bidders’ signals are independently and identically distributed,
the Generalized English Auction, the K-dimensional VCG auction and the K-dimensional
GSP auction yield the same expected revenue, for any value function vi(xi, x−i) that
satisfies assumptions A1-A3.
Corollary 2.4 is consistent with the Revenue Equivalence Theorem in auction
theory. When bidders have independent signals, the K-dimensional GSP auction, the
K-dimensional VCG auction and the Generalized English Auction always implement
the same allocation and yield zero expected payoff to the bidder with lowest signal.
The revenue equivalence follows as a result.
2.6.2 Revenue Comparison with the Optimal Position Auction
I next characterize the optimal position auction under interdependent values
subject to no reserve price as a corollary of Ulku (2013) [45]’s result13 and then com-
pare expected revenues of the K-dimensional GSP auction, the K-dimensional VCG
auction and the Generalized English Auction to the optimal revenue implementable
in position auctions subject to no reserve price.
13Ulku (2013) [45] characterizes the optimal mechanism for allocating a set of heterogeneous
items under interdependent values. This paper provides a corollary of Ulku (2013) [45] in the
special environment of position auctions and provides a discussion on the connection between
efficient and optimal mechanisms under this context.
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2.6.2.1 Mechanism Design and Solution Concepts
Under the revelation principle, I characterize the optimal position auction as
a direct mechanism, in which bidders report private signals directly, while the value
function v(xi, x−i) and signal distribution F (x1, x2, · · · , xN) are common knowl-
edge. To make the expected revenue of the optimal position auction comparable to
expected revenues of the three practical auctions analyzed in section 5, I restrict
attention to the optimal position auction subject to no reserve price. A position
auction mechanism (µ, p) consists of an allocation rule µi(x) and a payment rule











tor of probabilities that bidder i wins position 1, 2, · · · , K given reported signals
x ∈ [0, x̄]N , and pi(x) is the expected payment of bidder i given reported signals
x ∈ [0, x̄]N . In a deterministic mechanism, µ(k)i (x) ∈ {0, 1} for all k and pi(x) is the
actual payment.
Given a CTR profile (α1, α2, · · · , αK) and allocation rule µ, the expected click-























as the allocation rule in the analysis. I use (q, p) and (µ, p) to refer to the same




i (x). The feasibility condition of
the allocation rule in a position auction mechanism is defined below:
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i (x) ≤ 1, ∀ i (2.31)





all i for some allocation rule µ(x) satisfying condition (2.31).





qi(xi, x−i)vi(xi, x−i)− pi(xi, x−i)
]
f−i|i(x−i|xi)dx−i (2.32)
where ui(xi, x−i) = qi(xi, x−i)vi(xi, x−i)−pi(xi, x−i) is the ex-post utility of bidder i
given the signal profile (xi, x−i). I now give the definition of two solution concepts:
Definition 2.10. A position auction mechanism (q, p) is Bayesian incentive com-
patible (IC) and individually rational (IR) if for every bidder i, for any true signal
















Definition 2.11. A position auction mechanism (q, p) is ex-post incentive compat-
ible (IC) and individually rational (IR) if for every bidder i, for any true signal
profile (xi, x−i) and any report x
′
i,
ui(xi, x−i) ≥ qi(x
′
i, x−i)vi(xi, x−i)− pi(x
′
i, x−i)
ui(xi, x−i) ≥ 0
(2.34)
In the following analysis, I characterize the optimal position auction subject
to no reserve price among all ex-post IC and IR mechanisms under affiliated signals,
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and show that under certain regularity conditions, this optimal auction is equivalent
to the Generalized-VCG mechanism that assigns all positions efficiently, Moreover,
the optimal auction yields higher revenue than the GEA, the K-dimensional GSP
auction and the K-dimensional VCG auction. Then I show that in the special case
of independent signals, this mechanism is also optimal subject to no reserve price
among all Bayesian IC and IR mechanisms, and implements equivalent revenue as
the GEA, the K-dimensional GSP auction, and the K-dimensional VCG auction
under the same set of regularity conditions.
2.6.2.2 Characterization of the Optimal Position Auction
I first characterize the optimal mechanism subject to no reserve price among
ex-post IC and IR mechanisms under interdependent values with affiliated signals.
Given any profile of signals x, define bidder i’s marginal revenue MRi(xi, x−i)
as






For any bidder i, given a vector of opponents’ reported signals x−i, define X̂
k(x−i)
as the minimum value that bidder i’s signal can take such that bidder i has the k-th




∣∣∣MRi(xi, x−i) ≥ kmaxj 6=i{MRj(xj, xi, x−ij)} } (2.36)




is value of the k-th highest marginal revenue
among bidder i’s opponents given report x, and x−ij is the vector of signals reported
by bidders other than i and j. The following two regularity conditions are provided
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such that the optimal position auction subject to no reserve price assigns positions
in the rank ordering of MRi(x) given report x.
R1 (Value Regularity): Given any profile of signals x, for any two bidders i, j,
If xi > xj, then vi(xi, xj, x−ij) > vj(xj, xi, x−ij) (2.37)
Note that R1 is directly implied by assumptions A1-A3.
R2 (MR Monotonicity): Given any report of signals x, for all bidder i,
∂MRi(xi, x−i)
∂xi
> 0, ∀x−i (2.38)
I next provide a corollary of Ulku (2013) [45] by characterizing the optimal
position auction subject to no reserve price among all ex-post IC and IR mechanisms
under R1 and R2.
Corollary 2.5. Under regularity conditions R1 and R2, suppose the expected CTR
is given by
q∗i (xi, x−i) =

αk if X̂
k(x−i) ≤ xi < X̂k−1(x−i)
0 if xi < X̂
K(x−i)
(2.39)
Any tie is broken randomly. Suppose also that the payment rule is given by







Then (q∗, p∗) is an optimal position auction among all the ex-post IC and IR mech-
anisms subject to no reserve price.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Note that in the special case of independent signals, each bidder’s marginal
revenue is given by






as Fi(xi|x−i) = Fi(xi) and fi(xi|x−i) = fi(xi) under independent signals. The next
proposition shows that under R1 and R2, conditional on having no reserve price,
the optimal position auction (q∗, p∗) characterized in corollary 2.6 is also optimal
among all Bayesian IC and IR mechanisms when signals are independent.
Proposition 2.7. Under regularity conditions R1 and R2, if signals are indepen-
dent, then (q∗, p∗) is an optimal position auction among all the Bayesian IC and IR
mechanisms subject to no reserve price.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since all ex-post IC and IR mechanisms are also Bayesian IC and IR mecha-
nisms, the optimality of (q∗, p∗) under independent signals is stronger.
2.6.2.3 Revenue Comparison
I next show the optimal position auction subject to no reserve price character-
ized in Corollary 2.7 is equivalent to the Generalized-VCG mechanism proposed by
Ausubel (1999) [20], then compare the expected revenue of the Generalized-VCG
mechanism to the expected revenues of the GEA, the K-dimensional GSP auction
and the K-dimensional VCG auction.
For an arbitrary bidder i, given a vector of opponents’ bids x−i, let x̂
k(x−i) be
the minimum value that bidder i’s signal can take such that bidder i has at least
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∣∣∣ vi(xi, x−i) ≥ kmaxj 6=i{vj(xj, xi, x−ij)} } (2.42)




is the k-th highest value received by bidder i’s
opponents given report x, and x−ij is the vector of signals reported by bidders other
than i and j.
Define the Generalized-VCG mechanism in the context of position auctions as
follows:
qVi (xi, x−i) =

αk if x̂
k(x−i) ≤ xi < x̂k−1(x−i)
0 if xi < x̂
K(x−i)
pVi (xi, x−i) =

∑K
j=k(αj − αj+1)vi(x̂j(x−i), x−i) if x̂k(x−i) ≤ xi < x̂k−1(x−i)
0 if xi < x̂
K(x−i)
(2.43)
Any tie is broken randomly.
Proposition 2.8 shows that the optimal position auction subject to no re-
serve price (q∗, p∗) among all ex-post IC and IR mechanisms is equivalent to the
Generalized-VCG mechanism when an additional regularity condition described be-
low is satisfied:
R3 (MR regularity): For all i, j, given any report x,
if xi > xj, then MRi(xi, xj, x−ij) > MRj(xj, xi, x−ij) (2.44)
Proposition 2.8. Under regularity conditions R1, R2 and R3, the optimal posi-
tion auction subject to no reserve price among all ex-post IC and IR mechanisms is
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equivalent to the Generalized-VCG mechanism that assigns all positions efficiently.
This optimal revenue is weakly higher than the expected revenue of the GEA, which is
in turn weakly higher than the expected revenues of the K-dimensional GSP auction
and the K-dimensional VCG auction.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the revenue ranking in Proposition 2.8 comes from that
in the Generalized-VCG mechanism, the payment of each bidder depends on the
entire reported signal profile from opposing bidders, while the payment of each
bidder only depends on a subset of opponents’ signals in the GEA, and depends on
none of opponents’ signals in the K-dimensional GSP auction and the K-dimensional
VCG auction. Under the logic of the Linkage Principle, when signals are affiliated,
the expected revenue of an auction is greater when each bidder’s payment depends
on more of its opponents’ signals. Therefore, the Generalized-VCG mechanism
dominates the K-dimensional GSP auction and the K-dimensional VCG auction in
both revenue and incentive compatibility, as the latter two are Bayesian incentive
compatible but not ex-post incentive compatible.
On the other hand, revenue equivalence holds among the Generalized-VCG
mechanism, the GEA, the K-dimensional GSP auction and the K-dimensional VCG
auction under independent signals:
Corollary 2.6. When bidders have independent signals, under regularity conditions
R1, R2 and R3, the optimal position auction subject to no reserve price among
all Bayesian IC and IR mechanisms is equivalent to the Generalized-VCG mecha-
56
nism that assigns all positions efficiently. Moreover, this optimal revenue can be
practically implemented by the GEA, the K-dimensional GSP auction, and the K-
dimensional VCG auction.
The main insight from Corollary 2.6 is that under independent signals and
regularity conditions R1, R2 and R3, the three K-dimensional position auctions
analyzed in section 2.5 dominates the one-dimensional position auctions analyzed
in section 2.4 in both efficiency and revenue.
2.7 Conclusions
Given the performance of GSP auction under complete information analyzed
in previous literature, it is an important question to ask whether the desirable prop-
erties of GSP auction are preserved under other information structures. This paper
shows that efficiency is not preserved in the GSP auction when bidders have interde-
pendent values, which is a more realistic information structure given the oligopolistic
competition feature among advertisers bidding for the same keyword and the un-
certainty in consumer demand that all advertisers face as a result of continuous
demand shocks. This inefficiency result extends Gomes and Sweeney (2014) [14]’s
result into a broader range of information structure and provides a sharp contrast
to previous studies that favor the GSP auction under complete information, imply-
ing that the GSP auction can be a suboptimal mechanism when the information
structure deviates from complete information.
In addition to proving inefficiency of the GSP auction, this paper proves that
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the VCG auction can also be inefficient under interdependent values and shows
that the inefficiency of both GSP auction and VCG auction comes from the one-
dimensional bidding language. The one-dimensional bidding language restricts each
bidder to submit the same bid for all positions and forces each bidder to balance the
net trade-offs between all pairs of adjacent positions on corresponding margins in
equilibrium. Since a superior position can be less desirable than an inferior position
under some CTR profile given the expected payoffs in the GSP auction, bidders
with higher signals have stronger bid-shading incentives than bidders with lower
signals. As a result, bidders with higher values may lose to bidders with lower
values under this differentiated bid-shading incentive. When bidders’ values are
non-trivially interdependent, winning a superior position conveys worse news about
expected value than winning an inferior position under the generalized “winner’s
curse,” which causes differential bid-shading incentive across bidders and leads to
inefficiency in the one-dimensional VCG auction as well. On the other hand, the
dynamic Generalized English Auction that implicitly adopts a multi-dimensional
bidding language does not have this inefficiency problem, as bidders are able to
incorporate the differential bid-shading incentives into their bidding strategies across
positions.
The main conclusion of this paper is that when bidders have interdependent
values, adopting a multi-dimensional bidding language that allows bidders to bid
differently across positions not only improves efficiency, but also improves revenue.
This conclusion implies that there exists a trade-off between simplicity versus ef-
ficiency and revenue in auction design. Moreover, comparing the equilibrium of
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one-dimensional auction to its K-dimensional counterparts shows that the complex-
ity in bidding strategy is reduced under K-dimensional auctions, which implies that
there also exists a trade-off between simplicity in auction design and simplicity in
bidding strategy. This insight can also be implied from the observation that under
both one-dimensional and K-dimensional bidding language, the equilibrium bidding
strategy in the VCG auction is much simpler than the equilibrium bidding strategy
in the GSP auction, although the VCG payment rule is more complicated compared
to the GSP payment rule. These implications provide some insights to the discus-
sion on the cost of simplicity in mechanism design in both economics and computer
science literature.
This paper provides some guidance on the design of auctions for allocating
sponsored advertising spaces on a wide range of online platforms, including search
engines such as Google and Yahoo!, online shopping platforms such as Amazon
and eBay, online rating and booking platforms such as Yelp and TripAdvisor, and
social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. All of these two-sided
platforms share the common characteristics that advertisers competing for the same
advertising space are likely selling substitutable products or services and therefore
are subject to demand shocks in the same market. When interdependency is likely
to present in bidders’ values, it may worth to use the more complicated, multi-
dimensional bidding language in order to guarantee efficiency and improve revenue.
This paper points to two future research directions. First, this paper follows
previous literature on position auctions and assumes bidders have single-unit de-
mands. However, bidders may have multi-unit demands in real position auctions.
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For example, an advertiser may demand consecutive slots on the first search result
page or demand a slot on each of the first three search result pages under a keyword.
One natural extension of this paper is to allow bidders to have multi-unit demands
and explore how introducing multi-unit demands affects the efficiency and revenue
properties of the auctions studied in this paper. Second, it would be interesting
to conduct an experimental study to test the theoretical predictions in this paper
and quantify the change in efficiency and revenue that results from modifying the
bidding language from one-dimensional to K-dimensional in position auctions.
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Chapter 3: Auctions with Quantity Externalities and Endogenous
Supply
3.1 Introduction
Auctions are used to sell operating permits in many industries, including
telecommunication, energy and electricity power. A common characteristic in these
industries is that, the total number of licenses allocated in the auction will determine
the total number of competitors in the downstream market associated to the auc-
tion and therefore enter each bidder’s value of obtaining a license. Moreover, each
bidder’s value of obtaining a license is decreasing in the total number of licenses
allocated in the auction. For example, consider auctions for allocating operating
permit in a regulated industry where each firm must acquire a license to enter the
market. The number of licenses allocated in the auction determines the number of
competitors in the downstream market, so each bidder’s value of winning a license
depends on how many licenses are allocated in total. Selling more licenses will lead
to more intensive competition in the downstream market and will reduces the value
of winning a license to each bidder. By winning a license, each bidder may impose
some negative externalities on other winning bidders. The negative externalities on
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other winning bidders comes from the greater quantity of licenses supplied in the
auction and therefore is called quantity externalities.
Under the presence of quantity externalities, there exists a trade-off between
selling more licenses and preserving bidders’ values from winning each license from
the perspective of surplus maximization1 of all participants in auction. Selling all
the licenses up to the capacity constraint may not be surplus-maximizing, as the
winners’ values are decreasing in total supply. Given the presence of this trade-off,
how to design an auction to determine both total supply and allocation to maximize
producer surplus is an interesting problem for practitioners. In this paper, I analyze
a license auction in which each bidder’s value of obtaining a license is a function
of its own private cost and total number of licenses allocated in the auction. The
main objective of this paper is to design an efficient auction that determines both
total supply and allocation to maximize producer surplus based on the bidding
profile. I also provide a discussion of auction design under other objectives, including
maximizing revenue and maximizing a weighted average of consumer surplus and
producer surplus.
I first characterize the VCG mechanism that requires each bidder to report
1This paper focuses on maximizing total surplus generated in the auction market, which is
equivalent to maximizing producer surplus in the downstream market. Since the auctioneer does
not have value over licenses, the term “total surplus” in the auction market is equivalent to “total
producer surplus” in the downstream market. I will refer to it as “producer surplus” in the
remaining of this chapter. The term “efficiency” refers to maximizing producer surplus in the
downstream market. I will include a discussion on auction design when consumer surplus in
downstream market is also considered in the end of this chapter.
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private cost directly and shows that a sequence of reserve prices are needed to de-
termine supply endogenously in any surplus-maximizing auction. That is, there is a
minimum acceptable bid for every additional unit to be sold in the auction. A k-th
unit will not be sold if the price of the k-th unit fails to meet the minimum accept-
able bid for that unit. Then I show that uniform-price auctions and ascending clock
auctions are inefficient after introducing such reserve price. The inefficiency in both
auctions come from that introducing a sequence of reserve prices to endogenously de-
termine supply will differentiate the expected values conditional on winning among
bidders, as a high-cost bidder will win a license only when the competition in auction
is weak, auction clearing price is low and total supply is low. Therefore, a higher
cost bidder will have a higher expected value conditional on winning compared to a
lower cost bidder. Moreover, there exists a continuum of bidders whose optimal bids
massed at the point of every reserve price, leading to a pooling equilibrium. After
showing the inefficiency of uniform-price auctions and ascending clock auctions, I
construct a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction that allows bidders to condi-
tion their bids on total supply and show this auction can implement the efficient
allocation in a dominant strategy equilibrium. Moreover, I construct a Walrasian
Clock auction that can dynamically implement the efficient allocation in a domi-
nant strategy equilibrium. I also characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism
and compare the optimal reserve prices to the efficient reserve prices.
The main contribution of this paper is the follows. First, I characterize the
feature of efficient auctions and optimal auctions under the presence of quantity ex-
ternalities. Second, I prove the inefficiency of uniform-price auctions and ascending
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clock auctions after introducing such reserve prices and construct two alternative
auctions to implement the efficient allocation. Third, I provide a comparison be-
tween optimal reserve prices and efficient reserve prices and provide some guidance
to the design of practical license auctions that may involve quantity externalities
among bidders.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the strand of literature on auctions with allocative
externalities, in which each bidder cares about other bidders’ allocation. Jehiel
et al. (1996) [48] construct a revenue-maximizing auction mechanism when a sale
creates negative externalities on losing bidders, and the magnitude of those exter-
nalities depends on the identity of winner. In a subsequent paper, Jehiel et al.
(1999) [49] characterize the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism under the setting
when each buyer’s multi-dimensional type specifies the payoffs for every possible
allocation in the auction. Varma (2002) [50] analyzes equilibrium bidding strategy
in the open ascending-bid auction with identity-dependent externalities and shows
that ascending clock auction yields higher revenue compared to sealed-bid auctions,
since bidders can better avoid pay-off reducing externalities in a dynamic auction
that reveals more information about the identity of potential winner. This paper
considers a different type of allocative externalities that is caused by implementing
a different market structure through auction in the post-auction market.
The interplay between license auctions and post-auction market competition
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has been extensively studied in the literature. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000a) [51]
derive equilibria for a second-price auction in which the payoff to each losing bidder
is a function of the winner’s type and its own type and point out various effect
caused by both positive and negative externalities. Moldovanu and Sela (2003) [52]
study an auction for allocating a cost-reducing patent, in which each firm’s value
of obtaining the patent depends on other firms’ pre-auction production costs. They
show that standard auctions, including first-price auctions and second-price auc-
tions, lead to inefficient allocation when firms do not know each other’s production
cost at the time of bidding. Zhong (2005) [53] analyzes a license auction in which
potential firms first compete for one license then the license winner competes with
one incumbent in the market. He identifies the impact of disclosing the winning bid
to the incumbent after auction on both Cournot and Bertrand markets and shows
that price disclosure will increase revenue in Cournot market while decrease rev-
enue in Bertrand markets. Georee (2003) [54] studies bidders’ incentive of signaling
through bidding for gaining advantage in post-auction competition in different auc-
tion formats. He shows that the equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards
in second-price auctions as bidders wish to exaggerate their competitiveness in the
downstream market, while this signaling phenomenon is less prominent in first-price
auctions and English auctions as the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice.
All of these papers assume the total quantity of license is fixed to be one, so the im-
pact of auction on post-auction market comes from the dependency of post-auction
market outcome on the type of winning bidder. This paper complements these pa-
pers by analyzing a license auction with post-auction market competition, where
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the impact of auction on post-auction comes from the dependency of post-auction
market structure on the quantity of licenses allocated in the auction.
The presence of quantity externalities in auction markets has also been dis-
cussed in several previous papers. Katz and Shapiro (1986) [55] characterize an up-
stream research lab’s optimal pricing strategy when selling licenses to downstream
oligopolistic firms when each firm’s willingness to pay for a license depends only
upon how many of its rivals are obtaining licenses. They analyze a class of licensing
mechanisms in which the licensor announces it will sell no more than some fixed
number of licenses, each subject to a minimum bid, and characterize the optimal
licensing strategy among this class of mechanisms. In Katz and Shapiro (1986) [55],
firms are identical and do not have private information, so each firm’s value of a
license depends only on the quantity supplied in the auction. Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2000b) [56] analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in
a model with multiple incumbents and multiple potential entrants. In their model,
each firm’s value of a license depends on the number of incumbents, the number of
new entrants, and whether the firm is an incumbent or an entrant. They focus on
how auction format affects the incumbents’ incentives to preempt entry by bidding
for new licenses and show that the relation between number of available licenses and
the number of incumbents plays a major role. Rodriguez (1997) [57] studies entry
preemption in sequential license auctions and also shows that entry preemption in
equilibrium depends critically on the number of incumbents. This paper is closely
related to these studies by also analyzing a license auction where each firm cares
about how many licenses are allocated in the auction, while extending the afore-
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mentioned studies by allowing each firm’s value of getting an license depends not
only on the quantity supplied in the auction, but also on the firm’s private produc-
tion costs. It will be shown that the optimal mechanism uses a sequence of reserve
prices to determine supply endogenously, which falls within the class of licensing
mechanisms discussed in Katz and Shapiro (1986) [55]. Gebhardt and Wambach
(2008) [58] also considers a license auction in which each winner’s payoff depends on
the total quantity supplied and the bidder’s private cost. They propose a jumping
English auction that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus
by choosing both supply and allocation within the auction. This paper considers a
similar model with the objective of maximizing producer surplus and constructs a
Walrasian clock auction to implement the efficient allocation. Ranger (2004) [59]
studies a capacity auction that allocates capacity constraints to bidders who com-
pete in a Cournot game in a downstream market. He constructs a modified version
of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) [60]’s generalized ascending proxy auction that al-
lows bidders to bid over entire allocations and shows this auction can implement the
efficient allocation. This paper is also closely related to Ranger (2004) [59] but con-
siders another type of quantity externalities that comes from the market structure
instead of capacity constraints imposed on each oligopolistic firm.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on auctions with endogenous sup-
ply. Hansen (1988) [61] studies a procurement auction in which sellers competing to
sell to a market with negatively sloped demand curve, and the total quantity to be
supplied in the procured contract depends on the final price in the auction. They
show that an open auction yields higher revenue than a sealed-bid auction. Ozcan
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(2004) [62] models a two-stage sequential auction that mimics the license auction
for the Turkish Global Mobile Telecommunications in 2000: the first license is sold
through a standard first-price auction, then the auctioneer uses the price of the first
license to be the reserve price for the second license in a subsequent auction. The
main result in Ozcan (2004) [62] shows that this auction yields less revenue than a
sealed-bid second-price auction for selling a monopoly license. Lengwiler (1999) [63]
analyzes a multi-unit auction when the auctioneer can produce arbitrary quantities
at constant unit cost and can adjust supply as a function of bidding. He shows that
both pay-as-bid auctions and uniform-price auctions are inefficient. Izmalkov et al.
(2016) [35] considers a position auction model in which the click-through rate of each
advertiser depends on both the ranking of advertisement and the total number of ad-
vertisements placed on the website. They constructed both the efficient auction and
the optimal auction as direct revelation mechanisms and shows that supply should
be determined endogenously in both auctions. This paper is closely related to this
strand of literature and incorporate the quantity externalities within bidders’ values
of obtaining a license. I construct the efficient and optimal auction as both direct
and indirect revelation mechanisms and characterize the corresponding efficient and
optimal reserve prices that should be used to determine supply endogenously.
3.3 Model
An auctioneer wishes to sell up to K identical licenses through auction. There
is a set of N firms, each demanding one unit of the licenses to enter a regulated
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market. There are two periods. In the first period, Firms bid for licenses in an
auction. In the second period, winning firms operate in some downstream market of
an indivisible good. Each firm’s value of obtaining a license in the auction depends
on its expected profit in the post-auction downstream market. Suppose all firms
have identical capacity constraint and each firm with a license will produce 1 unit of
an indivisible good in the downstream market. The market inverse demand schedule
is P (n), in which n is the total supply that equals to the number of winning firms
in the auction. For simplicity, assume the demand schedule P (n) in this discrete
model has similar property to a linear demand curve: P (n)− P (n+ 1) = δ > 0 for
all n2. Therefore, P (1) > P (2) > P (3) > · · · > P (K).
The firms are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Each firm has a private cost
ci of producing the indivisible good in the downstream market. The firms’ costs
are independently and identically distributed over [c, c̄]N according to distribution
function F (c), with density f(c). Therefore, each firm’s value of obtaining a license
given n licenses are sold in the auction is given by
π(ci, n) = P (n)− ci (3.1)
The auctioneer can freely choose to sell any number of licenses up to K licenses.
Since P (n) is lower when there are more firms winning a license, each firm’s value of
obtaining a license is endogenously determined by the number of licenses allocated
in the auction. For simplicity, assume P (K) ≥ c̄, so that every bidder has positive
2The results of this paper will not change significantly if I relax this assumption and only assume
n[P (n)− P (n+ 1)] is increasing in n. For notational simplicity, I assume P (n)− P (n+ 1) = δ for
all n.
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value of winning one license when no more than K licenses are allocated in the
auction.
It is well-known that the uniform-price auction implements the efficient alloca-
tion in multi-unit auctions with fixed supply and single-unit demands. However, how
to design an auction to implement the efficient allocation that maximizes producer
surplus in the downstream market is a non-trivial problem, as both the efficient
number of licenses to allocate in the auction and the associated set of winning bid-
ders depend on bidders’ private costs (c1, c2, · · · , cN). Given any vector of bidders’
costs c ≡ (c1, c2, · · · , cN), let c(n) denote the n-th lowest value among ci and break
ties evenly, then c(1) ≤ c(2) ≤ c(3) ≤ · · · ≤ c(N). The producer surplus determined in
the auction by selling n licenses to a set of Sn ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , N} bidders is given by




Given any level of total supply n, the producer surplus of selling n licenses is max-
imized by selling to the n lowest-cost bidders, and the maximized total surplus of
selling n licenses is given by




The producer surplus is maximized when the total supply in the auction n∗ =
argmaxn TS
∗(c, n). To find the efficient supply level, observe that given a vector of
costs c, the marginal benefit contributed to the producer surplus by selling the n-th
license is given by
MB(c, n) = P (n)− c(n) (3.4)
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since the bidder with the n-th lowest type would not have won a license when the
total supply is (n−1). On the other hand, selling one more license reduces the value
of winning for the (n− 1) lowest-cost bidders who would still have won a license at
the total supply of (n− 1), which implies that the marginal cost of selling the n-th
license is given by
MC(n) = (n− 1)[P (n− 1)− P (n)] = (n− 1)δ (3.5)
The n-th license should be sold in an efficient auction if and only if MB(c, n) >
MC(n), which depends on the realization of c(n). Since
MB(c, n) > MB(c, n+ 1) for all n
MC(n) < MC(n+ 1) for all n
(3.6)
The maximized producer surplus PS∗(c, n) with supply n is maximized at n = n∗
such that
MB(c, n∗) ≥MC(n∗)
MB(c, n∗ + 1) < MC(n∗ + 1)
(3.7)
Definition 3.1. A license auction is efficient if for any realization of bidders’ costs
c ≡ (c1, c2, · · · , cN), it always allocate to the lowest-cost n∗ bidders, in which
n∗ = max{n|MB(c, n) ≥MC(n), n ≤ K} (3.8)
To make the problem more interesting, assume that for all n ≥ 2, there exists
an interval (cen, c̄] such that
P (n)− ci < (n− 1)δ for all ci ∈ (cen, c̄] (3.9)
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That is, for all possible supply level n ≥ 2, there exists a continnum of types (cen, c̄]
such that if c(n) falls into this interval, it is not efficient to allocate the n-th license.
cen = P (n) − (n − 1)δ is the maximum acceptable value that the n-th lowest cost
can take for n licenses to be allocated. I call each cen the “efficient reserve cost” for
the n-th unit.
Corollary 3.1. The efficient reserve costs (ce1, c
e
2, · · · , ceK) in which cen specifies the
highest possible value that the n-th lowest bidder’s cost c(n) can take for an n-th
license to be sold in an efficient auction are characterized below:
ce1 = c̄
cen = P (n)− (n− 1)δ for all n ∈ {2, · · · , K}
(3.10)
3.4 An Efficient Direct Mechanism
In this section, I show that an efficient direct revelation mechanism exists
in this environment: the VCG mechanism implements the efficient allocation in
a dominant strategy equilibrium. Since each bidder’s value of obtaining a license
depends only on its own private cost but not on other bidders’ costs, the VCG
mechanism can be directly applied. The VCG mechanism is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2. In a VCG mechanism, each bidder is asked to report his private
cost ci. Given any profile of reported costs ĉ, rank the reports in an ascending order:
ĉ(1) ≤ ĉ(2) ≤ · · · ≤ ĉ(N), then allocate licenses according to the following algorithm:
(R1) Allocate one license to the bidder with the lowest reported cost ĉ(1) and continue
to (R2).
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(R2) Allocate one license to the bidder with the second lowest reported cost ĉ(2) and
continue to (R3) if P (2)− ĉ(2) ≥ δ. Restrict total supply to one license otherwise.
(R3) Allocate one license to the bidder with the third lowest reported cost ĉ(3) and
continue to (R4) if P (3)− ĉ(3) ≥ 2δ. Restrict total supply to two licenses otherwise.
· · ·
(RK) Allocate one license to the bidder with the K-th lowest reported cost ĉ(K) if
P (K)− ĉ(K) ≥ (K − 1)δ. Restrict total supply to (K − 1) licenses otherwise.
For any total supply n, the payment of each bidder who wins one out of n
licenses is defined below:
pn(ĉ) = max
{
P (n)− ĉ(n+1), (n− 1)δ
}
The payment rule in the VCG mechanism for any total supply n > 1 depends
on what is the social opportunity cost of providing one out of n licenses to bidder
i whose reported cost ranks in the lowest n reported costs among all bidders. The
fact that n is the efficient supply given report ĉ implies
P (n)− ĉ(n) ≥ (n− 1)δ,
P (n− 1)− ĉ(n) > (n− 2)δ,
P (n− 1)− ĉ(n−1) > (n− 2)δ
(3.11)
Therefore, if any of the n lowest reported cost bidders is absent in the auction, it
is still efficient to sell at least (n− 1) licenses, as the marginal benefit of selling the
(n−1)-th license after removing any one of the lowest n cost bidders will still exceed
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the marginal cost. On the other hand,
P (n+ 1)− ĉ(n+1) < nδ,
P (n+ 1)− ĉ(n+2) < nδ
(3.12)
Therefore, if any of the n lowest reported cost bidders is absent in the auction, it
is still efficient to sell no more than n licenses, since the marginal benefit of selling
the (n + 1)-th license after removing any one of the n lowest cost bidders will still
be lower than the marginal cost.
In summary, it is never efficient to allocate fewer than (n− 1) licenses or more
than n licenses if one of the winning bidders does not participate in the mechanism.
Whether to allocate n licenses or (n− 1) licenses when one of the winning bidders
is absent depends on the lowest reported cost among losing bidders ĉn+1.
If P (n)− ĉ(n+1) ≥ (n− 1)δ, then it is still efficient to sell n licenses when any
of the n lowest cost winning bidders is absent, and the total externalities a winning
bidder imposes on its opponents is the value of winning one out of n licenses by the
lowest cost rejected bidder.
If P (n) − ĉ(n+1) < (n − 1)δ, then it is efficient to restrict supply to (n − 1)
licenses when any of the n lowest cost winning bidders is absent, and the total
externalities a winning bidder imposes on its opponents is the change in values of
obtaining a license by all the other (n− 1) winners when one fewer license is sold.




3.5 Practical Implementation of Efficient Auctions
The VCG mechanism implies that in any indirect mechanism where bidders
submit bids rather than report costs directly to the auctioneer, the efficient level of
supply should be determined based on the bidding profile. A natural instrument to
implement this goal is to use a sequence of reserve prices to endogenously determine
the desired level of supply: For every possible level of supply n = 1, 2, · · · , K, set
a reserve price rn ≥ 0 such that the n-th license will be allocated if and only if the
n-th highest bid is no lower than rn.
In any efficient auction, since the seller has no value over licenses and the
marginal cost of selling the first license is zero, the reserve price of the first unit r1
should always be set to zero. On the other hand, since the marginal cost of selling an
additional license is strictly positive and strictly increasing in the number of licenses
already sold, the reserve price of each additional unit must be positive and strictly
higher than that of the previous unit, i.e., 0 < rn < rn+1 for all n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K}.
According to the assumption in section 3.3, since for every possible supply level
n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K}, there exists a continnum of costs (cen, c̄] such that it is not efficient
to allocate the n-th license when c(n) ∈ (cen, c̄], we must have rn binding for all types
in (cen, c̄], for all n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K}.
Lemma 3.1. In any efficient auction that adopts a sequence of reserve prices
(r1, r2, · · · , rK) where rn specifies the minimum acceptable bid for the n-th license to
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be allocated, the reserve prices must satisfy
0 = r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · < rK (3.13)
and (r2, r3, · · · , rK) are binding for a continuum of types.
In this section, I analyze the equilibria of uniform-price auctions and ascend-
ing clock auctions after introducing a sequence of reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) that
specifies the minimum acceptable bid for every additional unit. I prove that ineffi-
ciency occurs in both auctions under any reserve prices that satisfy r1 < r2 < · · · <
rK , in which at least one rn is binding for some types. Furthermore, the nature
of inefficiency is similar across uniform-price and ascending clock auctions: pooling
occurs for a positive measure of types among bidders. This inefficiency result im-
plies that equilibrium bidding strategies change dramatically in multi-unit auctions
and ascending clock auctions with reserve prices when bidders care about the total
quantity of items allocated in the auction. Introducing an effective reserve price
for every additional unit to be sold in the auction will distort efficiency in both
uniform-price auctions and ascending clock auctions.
I next construct two alternative auction designs to maximize producer surplus
with efficient reserve prices that corresponds to the efficient reserve costs charac-
terized in Corollary 3.1, including a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction that
allows bidders to condition their bids on total supply in the auction, and a Wal-
rasian Clock auction that adjusts the clock price based on whether there is excess
supply in the auction at each efficient reserve price. I will show that both auctions
can implement the efficient allocation in a dominant strategy equilibrium.
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3.5.1 Uniform-Price Auction with Endogenous Supply
Consider a uniform-price auction with endogenous supply up to K licenses
defined below:
Definition 3.3. In a uniform-price auction with endogenous supply, the auctioneer
announces a sequence of reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) at the beginning of auction,
where r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · < rK. For any feasible level of supply n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},
rn denotes the minimum acceptable bid for the n-th unit: an n-th license is allocated
only if the n-th highest bid is no lower than rn. After observing the reserve prices,
all bidders submit sealed bids simultaneously. The auctioneer ranks all bids from top
to bottom. Let b(n) denote the n-th highest bid in the bidding profile and break ties
randomly, then b(1) ≥ b(2) ≥ · · · ≥ b(N). The licenses are allocated according to the
following algorithm:
(R1) Allocate a license to the bidder who submits the highest bid b(1) and proceed
to step (R2).
(R2) If b(2) ≥ r2, allocate a second license to the bidder who submits the second
highest bid b(2) and proceed to step (R3). If b(2) < r2, restrict supply to one license
and charge the winner max{r1, b(2)}.
· · ·
(Rn) If b(n) ≥ rn, allocate an n-th license to the bidder who submits the n-th highest
bid b(n) and proceed to step (Rn+1). If b(n) < rn, restrict supply to (n− 1) licenses
and charge all winners a uniform price of max{rn−1, b(n)}.
· · ·
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(RK) If b(K) ≥ rK, allocate a K-th license to the bidder who submits the K-th
highest bid b(K). If b(K) < rK, restrict supply to (K − 1) licenses and charge all
winners a uniform price of max{rK−1, b(K)}.
I will next show that the uniform-price auction is inefficient after introducing
any supply-determining reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) that satisfies r1 < r2 < · · · <
rK , and at least one rn is binding for a continnum of types. Note that it is sufficient
to prove inefficiency occurs when the total supply is at most 2 licenses. The next
lemma shows that when the total supply is at most K = 2 licenses, there exists
no symmetric separating monotonic equilibrium in the uniform-price auction with
endogenous supply.
Lemma 3.2. In a uniform-price auction with endogenous supply of up to K = 2
licenses and reserve prices (r1, r2) where r1 = 0, r2 > 0, and r2 > P (2) − c̄, there
exists no symmetric separating monotonic equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result of Lemma 3.2 comes from the fact that bidders with different costs
have different expected value conditional on winning. With r2 > 0, any bid bi < r2
only affects the probability of winning when the total supply is 1 and does not
affect the probability of winning when the total supply is 2. Suppose a monotonic
separating equilibrium exists. Conditional on the total supply being restricted to 1,
it is optimal to bid the true value of obtaining a license P (1)−ci when ci > P (1)−r2.
On the other hand, any bid bi ≥ r2 only affects the probability of winning when the
total supply is 2 and does not affect the probability of winning when total supply
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is 1, as that event happens only when the lowest-cost opponent bids below r2 and
does not depend on bidder i’s bid. Conditional on the total supply being equal to 2,
it is optimal to bid the true value of obtaining a license P (2)− ci for a bidder with
ci ≤ P (2) − r2. Since P (2) − r2 < min
{
P (1) − r2, c̄
}
, no separating equilibrium
bidding strategy for bidders with costs ci ∈
(
P (2) − r2,min{P (1) − r2, c̄}
]
can
make β(ci) satisfy monotonicity condition, which contradicts the assumption that a
monotonic separating equilibrium exists.
The intuition of this result comes from that high-cost bidders will win a license
only if total supply is 1 and therefore bid more aggressively than low-cost bidders
who are more likely to win a license but must take into account that winning when
total supply being equals to 2 is also possible.
The next lemma examines the equilibrium bidding strategy for bidders with
costs ci ∈
(
P (2) − r2,min{P (1) − r2, c̄}
]
and shows that all but two possible bids
are dominated for these bidders. Therefore, pooling must occur for these bidders in
any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 3.3. In a uniform-price auction with total supply K ≤ 2 and reserve prices
(r1, r2) where r1 = 0, r2 > 0 and r2 > P (2)− c̄, for bidders with costs ci ∈
(
P (2)−
r2,min{P (1) − r2, c̄}
]
, any bid bi > r2 and bi < r2 − ε for some arbitrarily small ε
are dominated. Pooling must occur in any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.





, winning is desirable only if the total supply is 1, while winning
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when total supply is 2 yields a negative payoff. Since increasing bid when bi ≥ r2 only
increases probability of winning when total supply is 2 and does not affect probability
of winning when total supply is 1, bidding strictly higher than r2 is dominated by
bidding r2. Since decreasing bid when bi < r2 only decreases probability of winning
when total supply is 1 and does not affect probability of winning when total supply
is 2, bidding strictly lower than r2 − ε is dominated by bidding r2 − ε, in which ε is
arbitrarily small.
The next lemma builds upon the results of Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 and
shows that there exists some ĉ ∈
(
P (2)−r2,min{P (1)−r2, c̄}
]
such that all bidders
with costs ci ∈
(
P (2)− r2, ĉ
]






Lemma 3.4. In a uniform-price auction with endogenous supply of up to K = 2
licenses and reserve prices (r1, r2) where r1 = 0, r2 > 0 and r2 > P (2) − c̄, pooling
occurs for bidders with costs ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2,min{P (1)− r2, c̄}
]
. There exists some
type ĉ ∈
(
P (2)−r2,min{P (1)−r2, c̄}
]
s.t. a bidder with cost ĉ is indifferent between
bidding r2 and r2− ε for some arbitrarily small ε. The Bayesian equilibrium bidding
strategy is characterized below:
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When r2 > P (1)− c̄:
β(ci) =

P (1)− ci for ci ∈
(
P (1)− r2, c̄
]
r2 − ε for ci ∈
[
ĉ, P (1)− r2
]
r2 for ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2, ĉ
]
P (2)− ci for ci ∈
[
c, P (2)− r2
]
(3.14)
When P (1)− c̄ > r2 > P (2)− c̄:
β(ci) =





r2 for ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2, ĉ
]
P (2)− ci for ci ∈
[




The following proposition generalizes the results from Lemma 3.2 to Lemma
3.4 into uniform-price auctions with endogenous supply of at most K licenses for
any integer K ≥ 2.
Proposition 3.1. In a uniform-price auction with endogenous supply of up to K
licenses and reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) where r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · < rK, if
rñ > P (ñ) − c̄ for some ñ, then pooling occurs for bidders with costs ci ∈
[
P (n) −
rn, P (n− 1)− rn
]
for all n ∈ {ñ, ñ+ 1, · · · , K}3.
Suppose ñ = 2, then the unique symmetric Bayesian pure strategy equilib-
rium bidding strategy in a uniform-price auction with endogenous supply of up to K
3If ñ = 1 or 2, then pooling occurs for bidders with ci ∈
[





P (n)− rn, P (n− 1)− rn
]
for all n ∈ {3, 4, · · · ,K}
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licenses is characterized below:
When r2 > P (1)− c̄:
β(ci) =

P (1)− ci for ci ∈
(
P (1)− r2, c̄
]
r2 − ε for ci ∈
[
ĉ2, P (1)− r2
]
r2 for ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2, ĉ2
]
P (2)− ci for ci ∈
(
P (2)− r3, P (2)− r2
]
r3 − ε for ci ∈
[
ĉ3, P (2)− r3
]
r3 for ci ∈
[
P (3)− r3, ĉ3
]
P (3)− ci for ci ∈
(
P (3)− r4, P (3)− r3
]
· · ·
P (K)− ci for ci ∈
[




When P (1)− c̄ > r2 > P (2)− c̄:
β(ci) =





r2 for ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2, ĉ2
]
P (2)− ci for ci ∈
(
P (2)− r3, P (2)− r2
]
r3 − ε for ci ∈
[
ĉ3, P (2)− r3
]
r3 for ci ∈
[
P (3)− r3, ĉ3
]
P (3)− ci for ci ∈
(
P (3)− r4, P (3)− r3
]
· · ·
P (K)− ci for ci ∈
[
c, P (K)− rK
]
(3.17)
where ĉn is the type that is indifferent between bidding rn and rn − ε.
Therefore, pooling occurs for a positive measure of types in the unique sym-
metric pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium given any reserve prices that satisfy
r1 < r2 < · · · < rK and at least one rn is binding for a continnum of bidders. Accord-
ing to Lemma 3.1, any efficient reserve prices must satisfy 0 = r1 < r2 < · · · < rK
and at least one rn binding for some bidders, which implies that a uniform-price
auction with endogenous supply is always inefficient under any reserve prices.
Corollary 3.3. A uniform-price auction with endogenous supply of up to K licenses
is inefficient given any reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK), for any possible supply level
K ≥ 2.
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3.5.2 Ascending Clock Auction with Endogenous Supply
In this section, I analyze the ascending clock auction with a sequence of posted
reserve prices that endogenously determine a total supply of at most K licenses and
show that this auction also fails to implement efficiency with any reserve prices that
satisfy r1 < r2 < · · · < rK and at least one rn is binding for some bidders.
Consider an ascending clock auction defined as follows:
Definition 3.4. In an ascending clock auction with endogenous supply, there is a
continuously ascending clock showing the current price. All bidders are in the auction
at beginning. A bidder can drop out at any time, and his bid is the clock price when he
drops out. A sequence of reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) where 0 = r1 < r2 < · · · rK is
announced before auction starts, in which each rn represents the minimum acceptable
bid for the n-th unit to be allocated.
At any time in the auction, let k denote the number of bidders who are still active
in the auction, and (N−k) denote the number of bidders who have dropped out. Let
(pN , pN−1, · · · , pk+1) denote the drop-out prices of the (N − k) bidders, in which pN
is the bid of the first drop-out bidder, and pk+1 is the bid of the last drop-out bidder
at that time, so pN ≤ pN−1 ≤ · · · ≤ pk+1.
(RK): Set the total supply equals to the maximum possible supply K at the begin-
ning. Keep the total supply to be K until the (N − K + 1)-th bidder drops out at
price pK, which leaves k = (K − 1) bidders in the auction.
• If pK ≥ rK, then stop the auction and sell one license to each of the K bidders,
including the bidder who drops out at pK. Charge all bidders a uniform price of
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max{rK , pK+1}, in which pK+1 is the drop-out price of the (N−K)-th drop-out
bidder.
• If pK < rK, then proceed to (RK-1) and decrease the total supply to K − 1.
(RK-1): Set total supply to be K−1 and keep increasing clock price. Keep the total
supply to be K − 1 until the (N −K + 2)-th bidder drops out at some higher price
pK−1 > pK, which reduces the number of active bidders from (K − 1) to (K − 2) in
the auction.
• If pK−1 ≥ rK−1, then stop the auction and sell one license to each of the K−1
bidders, including the bidder who drops out at pK−1. Charge all bidders a
uniform price of max{rK−1, pK}.
• If pK−1 < rK−1, then proceed to (RK-2) and decrease the total supply to K−2.
Repeat this algorithm and keep decreasing supply until reaching some integer n such
that pn ≥ rn at the time when the number of active bidders k drops from n to (n−1).
Then allocate a license to each of the n bidders who are still in the auction at the
price of pn − ε and charge all bidders a uniform price of max{rn, pn+1}. If p2 < r2
at the time when the number of active bidders drops from 2 to 1 in the auction,
allocate 1 license to the only active bidder and charge a price of p2.
The following proposition shows that the ascending clock auction with endoge-
nous supply is also inefficient.
Proposition 3.2. Let pk(ci|p) denote the optimal drop-out price for bidder i when
there are k bidders left in the auction and the current price is p. Suppose r2 >
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P (2)− c̄. A symmetric pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium in the ascending auction
with endogenous supply is given below:
When the current clock price p ∈ [0, r2),
• If P (1)− r2 < c̄, then
pk(ci|p < r2) =

P (1)− ci for ci ∈
(




c, P (2)− r2
]
r2 − ε for ci ∈
[
ĉk2, P (1)− r2
]
r2 for ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2, ĉk2
]
(3.18)
in which ĉk2 is the value of ci such that a bidder with cost ĉ
k
2 is indifferent
between dropping out at r2 − ε and r2 given that there are k ≥ 2 bidders left
in the auction and current clock price p < r2.
• If P (1)− r2 ≥ c̄, then
pk(ci|p < r2) =

P (1)− ci for ci ∈
[
c, P (2)− r2
]




r2 for ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2, ĉk2
]
(3.19)
For all n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K − 1}, when the current clock price p ∈ [rn, rn+1),
pk(ci|rn ≤ p < rn+1) =

P (n)− ci for ci ∈
[




c, P (n+ 1)− rn+1
]
rn+1 − ε for ci ∈
[
ĉkn+1, P (n)− rn+1
]
rn+1 for ci ∈
[




in which ĉkn+1 is the value of ci at which a bidder is indifferent between dropping out
at rn+1 − ε and rn+1 given that there are k bidders left in the auction under current
clock price p ∈ [rn, rn+1).
When the current clock price p ≥ rK,
pk(ci|p ≥ rK) = P (K)− ci for ci ∈ [c, P (K)− rk] (3.21)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.2 implies that the ascending clock auction is inefficient given
any sequence of reserve prices r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · < rK where at least one rn is
binding for some bidders. Therefore, it is impossible to implement efficiency using
an ascending clock auction. The pooling equilibrium implies that there is positive
probability that more than n bidders left in the auction when p < rn − ε, and all
remaining bidders drop out simultaneously when the clock price reaches p = rn − ε
for every possible level of supply n where rn is binding.
Corollary 3.4. The ascending clock auction with endogeneous supply of up to K
licenses is inefficient given any sequence of reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK), for any
potential supply level K ≥ 2.
The inefficiency of both uniform-price auctions and ascending clock auctions
comes from that simply introducing a sequence of reserve prices to determine total
supply makes the total supply depends on the market clearing price in the auction:
the total supply is greater when the market clearing price is higher. Since bidders’
values of winning a license also depend on the total supply, each bidder’s bidding
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strategy will be determined by his expectation of total supply at the market clearing
price conditional on winning a license at that price.
In the uniform-price auction, bidders with high costs bid more aggressively,
since they will win a license only when their opponents also have high costs so that
the total supply is low and value of winning a license is high. On the other hand,
bidders with low costs bid less aggressively, since they need to consider the situation
of winning when their opponents also have low costs so that the total supply is high
and value of winning a license is low. For example, a bidder with cost ci > P (1)−r1
can win only if all opponents have costs above ci and the total supply is 1, while a
bidder with costs close to c may win a license under any possible level of total supply
n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, so the expected value conditional on winning is much lower for
bidders with low costs compared to bidders with high costs. Furthermore, for each
threshold price rn at which the total supply increases from (n−1) to n if the market
clearing price reaches rn, there exists a positive measure of costs s.t. bidders with
costs falls in this range will gain a positive payoff from winning when total supply
is (n− 1) and gain a negative payoff from winning when total supply is n. Pooling
is the only possible equilibrium for these bidders.
In the ascending clock auction, bidders’ optimal drop-out strategy depends on
the current clock price. For all n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K}, the total supply increases from
(n−1) to n and each bidder’s value of winning drops from P (n−1)−ci to P (n)−ci
every time the clock price reaches a threshold level rn. At any clock price, each
bidder goes through a mental calculation of thinking about whether winning yields
a positive payoff if the auction is about to end at that price. A bidder will drop out
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only if the payoff of winning a license with payment and supply level determined by
the current clock price becomes non-positive. When the clock price is low, the value
of winning a license is high if the auction ends at the current clock price as the supply
will be low, so bidders are willing to stay longer in the auction. When the clock price
is very close to rn, there is a continuum of types ci ∈
[
P (n)− rn, P (n− 1)− rn
]
s.t.
bidders with those types no longer want to stay in the auction if the total supply
increases to n from (n−1). Those bidders with costs close to P (n−1)−rn will drop
out at rn− ε to avoid the loss from winning one out of n licenses after price reaches
rn. On the other hand, bidders with costs close to P (n) − rn will drop out at rn
given that there is positive probability that more than (k − n) bidders drop out at
rn− ε so that the auction ends before price reaches rn with a total supply of (n− 1)
licenses, giving them a strictly positive payoff. Therefore, there always exists some
type ĉkn such that a bidder with cost ĉ
k
n is indifferent between dropping out at rn
and rn − ε. All bidders with costs ci ∈ [ĉkn, P (n− 1)− rn] drops out simultaneously
at rn− ε, and all bidders with costs ci ∈ [P (n)− rn, ĉkn] drops out simultaneously at
rn.
3.5.3 Multi-dimensional Uniform-price Auction
The inefficiency result of the standard uniform-price auction and ascending
clock auction comes from the fact that each bidder is uncertain about his ex-post
value of winning a license when the final supply is endogenously determined in the
auction. In this section, I construct a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction that
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allows bidders to condition their bids on the total supply in the auction. I will
show that this auction can implement the efficient allocation in a dominant strategy
equilibrium with a sequence of reserve prices that corresponds to the efficient reserve
costs defined in Corollary 3.1.
Consider a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction defined as follows.
Definition 3.5. In a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction, the auctioneer an-
nounces a sequence of reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) where r1 < r2 < r3 · · · < rK at
the beginning of the auction. Each bidder submits a vector of bids (b1i , b
2
i , · · · , bKi ), in
which bni denotes the bid conditional on total supply to be S = n. For each possible
supply level n, let Sn denote the set of winners in round (Rn) or before (Rn). The
allocation rule and payment rule are described as follows.
(R1) Rank all bids conditional on S = 1. If the highest bid among {b1i }i∈N is
greater than r1, allocate one license to the bidder who submits the highest bid among
{b1i }i∈N . Otherwise, do not sell any license.
(R2) Rank all bids conditional on S = 2 among the remaining bidders N \ S1. If
the highest bid among {b2i }i∈N\S1 is greater than r2, then allocate a second license to
that bidder and continue to (R3). Otherwise, restrict supply to be 1 and charge the
winner the greater of the highest losing bid among {b1i }i∈N and r1.
(R3) Ranks all bids conditional on S = 3 among the remaining bidders N \ S2. If
the highest bid among {b3i }i∈N\S2 is greater than r3, then allocate a third license to
that bidder and continue to (R3). Otherwise, restrict supply to be 2 and charge both
winners the greater of the highest losing bid among {b2i }i∈N\S1 and r2.
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· · ·
(RK) Rank all bids conditional on S = K among the remaining bidders N\SK−1. If
the highest bid among {bKi }i∈N\SK−1 is greater than rK, then allocate a K-th license
to that bidder. Otherwise, restrict supply to be (K − 1) and charge all winners the
greater of the highest losing bid among {bK−1i }i∈N\SK−2 and rK−1.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the multi-dimensional
uniform-price auction with reserve price r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · < rK .
Proposition 3.3. In a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction with reserve prices
(r1, r2, · · · , rK), in which r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · < rK, a symmetric dominant strategy
equilibrium is characterized below:
For all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},
βn(ci) =

P (n)− ci, for ci ∈
[
c, P (n)− rn
]
0, for ci ∈
(
P (n)− rn, c̄
] (3.22)
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 3.5. With a sequence of reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) where rn = (n−
1)δ for all n, the multi-dimensional uniform-price auction implements the efficient
allocation in a dominant strategy equilibrium and is outcome equivalent to the VCG
mechanism.
The efficiency of the multi-dimensional uniform-price auction comes from the
fact that by allowing bidders to submit different bids conditional on different supply,
each bidder can easily incorporate the difference in expected values conditional on
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winning at different supply levels into their bids. For every possible supply level
n, conditional on the total supply to be S = n, it is a dominant strategy for each
bidder to bid P (n)− ci if P (n)− ci ≥ rn and bid 0 if P (n)− ci < rn. Conditional on
bidding bni > rn, the probability for total supply to be S = n does not depend on each
bidder’s own bids, but only depends on each bidder’s opponents’ bids. Therefore,
the fact that supply is endogenously determined within the auction does not distort
each bidder’s incentive to bid their true values conditional on each supply level in
the multi-dimensional uniform-price auction. Given that it is a dominant strategy
for each bidder to bid true value conditional on S = n, the efficient reserve prices
should be ren = P (n) − cen = (n − 1)δ for all n. Under this sequence of reserve
prices, the multi-dimensional uniform-price auction always implements the efficient
allocation.
3.5.4 Walrasian Clock Auction
In this subsection, I construct a Walrasian Clock auction in which the clock
price can either go up or go down according to whether there is excess demand or
excess supply in the auction. I will show that efficiency can be implemented by this
auction through a tatonnement process.
Consider a Walrasian clock auction with endogenous supply of up to K licenses
defined as follows:
Definition 3.6. In a Walrasian clock auction, there is a clock showing the current
price. At any time of the auction, each bidder states whether he is “in” or “out”
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of the auction given the current clock price. Denote the number of active bidders at
clock price p as k(p), then k(p) represents the aggregate demand at price p.
At the beginning of auction, the auctioneer announces a sequence of reserve
prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) where r1 < r2 < · · · < rK. Starting from supply level n = K,
run the following algorithm:
(RK) The auctioneer sets the total supply equals to K and set the clock price p
equals to rK. Each bidder states whether he is “in” or “out” of the auction. Compare
the total demand k(rK) to total supply K:
• If k(rK) ≥ K, there is excess demand at the clock price rK. The auctioneer
will announce supply to be fixed at K and run an ascending clock auction from
clock price rK.
• If k(rK) < K, there is excess supply at rK. The auctioneer will reduce supply
to be K − 1 and reducing the clock price to rK−1. The auction continues to
(RK-1).
(RK-1) The auctioneer sets the total supply equals to K− 1 and set the clock price
p equals to rK−1.each bidder states whether he is “in” or “out” of the auction. The
bidders who stated “in” the auction at price of rK in the previous round (RK) are
required to remain in the auction at price rK−1, so we must have k(rK−1) ≥ k(rK).
Compare the total demand k(rK−1) to total supply (K − 1):
• If k(rK−1) ≥ K − 1, there is excess demand at the clock price rK−1. The auc-
tioneer will announce supply to be fixed at (K − 1) and then run an ascending
clock auction from clock price rK−1.
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• If k(rK−1) < K− 1, there is excess supply at rK−1. The auctioneer will reduce
supply to be K−2 and reducing the clock price to rK−2. The auction continues
to (RK-2).
· · ·
(Rn) The auctioneer sets the total supply equals to n and set the clock price p equals
to rn. Each bidder states whether he is “in” or “out” of the auction. Those who
stated “in” in round (Rn+1) must remain in round (Rn). Compare the total demand
k(rn) to total supply n:
• If k(rn) ≥ n, there is excess demand at the clock price rn. The auctioneer will
announce supply to be fixed at n and then run an ascending clock auction from
clock price rn.
• If k(rn) < n, there is excess supply at rn. The auctioneer will reduce supply
to be (n − 1) and reducing the clock price to rn−1. The auction continues to
(Rn-1).
Repeat this algorithm until getting k(rn) ≥ n for some integer n and run an ascend-
ing clock auction of n items starting from price p = rn. In round (R1), if k(r1) > 1,
then run an ascending clock auction that starts from p = r1. If k(r1) = 1, then
allocate 1 license to the only active bidder at r1. If k(r1) = 0, then the seller does
not sell any license.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the Walrasian clock auc-
tion:
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Proposition 3.4. For all possible supply levels n ∈ {K,K − 1, · · · , 2, 1}, the dom-
inant strategy equilibrium in round (Rn) is characterized as follows.
1. When clock price p = rn at the beginning of (Rn), it is a dominant strategy
equilibrium for each bidder i to state “in” if P (n)− ci ≥ rn and state “out” if
P (n)− ci < rn. Only bidders with costs ci ≤ P (n)− rn will be in the auction.
2. If k(rn) ≥ n and the auction transforms into an ascending clock auction with
n items, it is a dominant strategy equilibrium for each bidder who stated “in”
at price rn to drop out at his true value of winning one out of n licenses,
β(ci) = P (n)− ci.
3. If k(rn) < n and the auction proceeds to round (Rn-1), the equilibrium strategy
in (Rn) with all n replaced by (n − 1) is a dominant strategy equilibrium in
round (Rn-1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Given the equilibrium characterized above, it is straightforward to see that
with reserve prices ren = P (n)− cen = (n− 1)δ for all n, the Walrasian clock auction
implements the VCG outcome in a dominant strategy equilibrium:
Corollary 3.6. With a sequence of reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) where rn = (n−
1)δ for all n, the Walrasian clock auction dynamically implements the efficient al-
location in a dominant strategy equilibrium and is outcome equivalent to the VCG
mechanism and the multi-dimensional uniform-price auction.
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3.6 An Optimal Direct Mechanism
In this section, I follow Myerson (1981) [40]’s optimal auction design approach
and characterize the optimal auction under quantity externalities as a direct reve-
lation mechanism. I will show that the optimal auction can also be implemented
by introducing a sequence of reserve costs to determine supply. I next compare the
optimal reserve costs to the efficient reserve costs as well as to the optimal reserve
costs in standard auctions without quantity externalities.
3.6.1 Mechanism Design and Solution Concepts
In a direct mechanism, bidders report their private costs ci directly. An auction
mechanism (µ, t) consists of an allocation rule µi(c) and a payment rule ti(c) for










is the vector of joint
probabilities that bidder i wins a license when a total of n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K} licenses
are allocated in the auction given reported costs c ∈ [c, c̄], and ti(c) is the expected
payment of bidder i given reported costs c ∈ [c, c̄]. It is straightforward to define
the feasibility constraint in any direct mechanism as follows:
Definition 3.7. An allocation rule µ is feasible if for any supply level n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},
(1)





i ≤ n (3.23)
(2) If µ
(n)




j (c) = 0, for all n
′ 6= n, for all j.
That is, given any level of supply n, each bidder’s probability of winning must
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fall in [0, 1], the sum of winning probabilities across bidders does not exceed the
number of items to be allocated, and the total supply must be unique.

























−ti(ci, c−i) is the ex-post utility of
bidder i given reports (ci, c−i). A direct auction mechanism (µ, t) satisfies incentive
compatibility condition if the following definition holds:
Definition 3.8. A direct auction mechanism (µ, t) is Bayesian incentive compatible
(IC) and individually rational (IR) if for every bidder i, for any value of true cost























In the following analysis, I characterize the optimal auction mechanism under
quantity externalities among all Bayesian IC and IR mechanisms subject to the
feasibility constraint.
3.6.2 Characterization of the Optimal Auction Mechanism
For any possible supply level n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, define bidder i’s marginal
revenue function conditional on total supply equals n as





I also assume that the marginal revenue functions are regular: For any bidder i, for




The next lemma characterizes any Bayesian IC and IR mechanism in this model:
Lemma 3.5. A mechanism (µ, t) is Bayesian IC and IR if for every bidder i, the
following conditions hold:
(1) For any ci, c
′
i ∈ [c, c̄], if c
′















i (ci, c−i)f−i(c−i)dc−i (3.28)
(2)









i (s, c−i)dsf−i(c−i)dc−i (3.29)
(3)
Ui(c̄) ≥ 0 (3.30)
Proof. See Appendix.
The next lemma characterizes the seller’s ex-ante expected revenue in any
Bayesian IC and IR mechanism:
Lemma 3.6. For any Beyesian IC and IR mechanism that satisfies the conditions






















Let c(1) ≤ c(2) ≤ · · · ≤ c(K) denote the realizations of the lowest, the second
lowest, ..., the K-th lowest cost among the N bidders. The result of Lemma 3.6
implies that given any possible supply level of n, the optimal auction assigns n
licenses to the n lowest-costs bidders only if the n-th lowest-cost bidder’s type c(n)
satisfies




However, as the seller needs to optimize over total supply given the presence of
quantity externalities, P (n) − c(n) −
Fi(c(n))
fi(c(n))
≥ 0 is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for total supply to be n. The following analysis characterizes the optimal
reserve costs in this model. I first consider the total expected revenue from selling
a fixed number of n licenses in an optimal auction subject to no reserve price, and
then choose reserve prices that select the total supply to maximize revenue.
Given any cost profile c, the ex-post revenue of selling n licenses in an optimal










Compare R(c, n) and R(c, n − 1) for any n, given a profile of reported costs c, the
marginal increment in total revenue by selling an n-th license equals to the marginal
revenue of the bidder with the n-th lowest cost:




The marginal decrement in total revenue by selling an n-th license is the loss of
P (n− 1)− P (n) = δ in π(c(i), n− 1) for all the (n− 1) lowest-cost bidders,
MC(n) = (n− 1)δ (3.35)
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The n-th license should be sold in the optimal auction if and only if MR(c(n), n) ≥
MC(n) given the realization of costs c.
Since
MR(c(n), n) > MR(c(n+1), n+ 1) for all n
MC(n) < MC(n+ 1) for all n
(3.36)




∗ + 1) < MC(n∗ + 1)
(3.37)
Therefore, the optimal mechanism can be constructed as follows. Each bidder is
asked to report his private cost ci. Given any profile of reported costs ĉ, rank the
reported costs in an ascending order: ĉ(1) ≤ ĉ(2) ≤ · · · ≤ ĉ(N), then allocate licenses
according to the following algorithm:




≥ 0 and continue to (R2); stop the algorithm and sell zero license
otherwise;




≥ δ and continue to (R3); stop the algorithm and sell one license
otherwise;
...
(RK) allocate one license to the bidder with the K-th lowest reported cost ĉ(K) if
P (K)− ĉ(K) −
Fi(ĉ(K))
fi(ĉ(K))
≥ (K − 1)δ; sell (K − 1) license otherwise.
The following proposition gives the formal definition of the optimal direct
mechanism:
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Proposition 3.5. Suppose the marginal revenue functions MR(ci, n) satisfy the
regularity condition. For any vector of costs c ∈ RN with any N ≥ n, define Cn(c)




i (ci, c−i) =






− (n− 1)δ ≥ 0,
and MR
(
Cn+1(ci, c−i), n+ 1
)
− nδ < 0
0 else
(3.38)
for all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K − 1}, and
µ
∗(K)
i (ci, c−i) =






− (K − 1)δ ≥ 0,
0 else
(3.39)
for n = K. Any tie is broken randomly. The payment rule is given by
















i (s, c−i)ds (3.40)
Then (µ∗, t∗) is an optimal auction among all Bayesian IC and IR mechanisms.
Corollary 3.7. Let c∗n denote the optimal reserve costs conditional on selling n
licenses for all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}. Then the optimal reserve costs (c∗1, c∗2, · · · , c∗K)
are given by





= (n− 1)δ, for all n (3.41)
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Since MR(ci, n) is strictly decreasing in ci, this directly implies that given any
supply level of n ≥ 2, the optimal reserve type c∗n under the presence of quantity
externalities is strictly lower than the optimal reserve type c
′
n without the presence
of quantity externalities, in which c
′
n is given by







= 0 for all n (3.42)
Corollary 3.8. For any n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K}, the optimal reserve cost c∗n under the
presence of quantity externalities is strictly lower than the optimal reserve cost c
′
n
without the presence of quantity externalities.
The next corollary compares the optimal reserve costs (c∗1, c
∗
2, · · · , c∗K) to the
efficient reserve costs (ce1, c
e
2, · · · , ceK):
Corollary 3.9. For any n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, the optimal reserve cost c∗n is strictly
lower than the efficient reserve cost cen.
Moreover, since the optimal reserve prices (r∗1, r
∗
2, · · · , r∗K) also satisfy r∗1 <
r∗2 < · · · < r∗K , according to Lemma 3.1, Proposition 3.1, Proposition 3.2, Propo-
sition 3.4, and Proposition 3.3, it is impossible to implement the optimal revenue
in standard uniform-price auctions or ascending clock auctions, while the multi-
dimensional uniform-price auction and the Walrasian clock auction can implement
the optimal revenue using a sequence of reserve prices that correspond to the optimal
reserve costs characterized in Corollary 3.7.
Corollary 3.10. With a sequence of reserve prices (r1, r2, · · · , rK) where r∗n sat-





= (n − 1)δ for all n, the multi-
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dimensional uniform-price auction and the Walrasian clock auction can implement
the optimal revenue.
3.7 Auction Design under Consideration of Consumer Surplus
The analysis in previous sections on auction design under the objective of
maximizing producer surplus can be extended to the case when consumer surplus
is also considered. In this section, I will briefly discuss the efficient supply level
and characterize efficient reserve prices when the auctioneer cares about consumer
surplus.
Assuming there are at least K consumers in the downstream market. Each
has a positive value of obtaining the product provided by suppliers who win a license
and enter the industry. The value profile of the K highest value bidders is given
by v(1) ≥ v(2) ≥ · · · ≥ v(K), and assume v(K) > c(K). Assuming the downstream
market is allocative efficient. For every supply level n selected in the auction, the n
consumers with highest values will each make a transaction at market price P (n).





v(i) − P (n)× n (3.43)
The consumer surplus in the downstream market will be increased by v(n)−P (n) +
(n − 1)δ > 0 when an n-th license is allocated. Therefore, the auctioneer should
always allocate all K licenses when the objective is to maximize consumer surplus
in the downstream market. The consumer surplus maximizing reserve price is given
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by 0 = r1 = r2 = · · · = rK . Since the supply will not be determined endogenously
within the auction, both the standard uniform-price auction and the ascending clock
auction can implement the consumer surplus-maximizing allocation in a dominant
strategy equilibrium.
The maximized total surplus in the auction at supply level n is given by







Since v(n) > c(n) for all n, the auctioneer should always allocate all K licenses when
the objective is to maximize total surplus in the downstream market. The total
surplus maximizing reserve price is also given by 0 = r1 = r2 = · · · = rK . The
supply will be fixed at K in any total surplus-maximizing auction as well, and the
uniform-price auction and the ascending clock auction can both implement the total
surplus-maximizing outcome.
Now suppose the auctioneer cares about a weighted average of consumer sur-
plus and producer surplus. The maximized weighted surplus under supply level n
is given by













The marginal benefit of selling an n-th license is
MB(n, v, c) = ρ
[







The marginal cost of selling an n-th license is
MC(n) = (1− ρ)δ(n− 1) (3.47)
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Setting marginal benefit to marginal cost will give the efficient reserve cost under















ρv(n) + (1− 2ρ)[p(n)− δ(n− 1)]
]
is decreasing in n.
When 1 ≥ ρ ≥ 0.5, the auctioneer cares more about the consumer surplus than
the producer surplus, the weighted surplus-maximizing reserve cost c
′
n = c̄ for all n,




2 = · · · = r
′
K ,
and the auction will allocate K licenses for certain.
When 0.5 > ρ > 0, the auctioneer cares more about producer surplus than
consumer surplus. There may exist some n





the smallest integer that satisfies 1
1−ρ
[





depend on ρ, value profile v and the cost profile c. The weighted surplus-












> · · · > c′K .









< · · · < r′K . Both the multi-dimensional uniform-price auction
and the Walrasian clock auction with the weighted surplus-maximizing reserve prices
can implement the weighted surplus-maximizing allocation in a dominant strategy
equilibrium.
When ρ = 0, the auctioneer only cares about producer surplus, and 0 = re1 <
re2 < · · · < reK as shown in the previous analysis.
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3.8 Conclusions
This paper characterizes the design of efficient and optimal mechanisms in a
license auction that allocates operating permits in a regulated industry. I first show
that a sequence of reserve prices that specify minimum acceptable bids are needed
to determine supply endogenously in any efficient auction. Then I characterize the
equilibria of uniform-price auctions and ascending clock auctions after introducing
such reserve prices and show that both auctions are inefficient with any reserve
prices. I next construct a multi-dimensional uniform-price auction that can im-
plement the efficient allocation using reserve prices that correspond to the efficient
reserve costs in a dominant strategy equilibrium. Then I construct a Walrasian clock
auction that can dynamically implement the same efficient outcome as the multi-
dimensional uniform-price auction under the same reserve prices. I also characterize
the optimal auction and the corresponding optimal reserve prices. In the end of this
chapter, I provide a discussion on auction design when the auctioneer cares about
consumer surplus. I show that the multi-dimensional uniform-price auction and the
Walrasian Clock auction can implement the optimal revenue with appropriately cho-
sen optimal reserve prices and implement the weighted surplus-maximizing outcome
with corresponding reserve prices when consumer surplus is also considered in the
auction.
One implication of this paper is that in auctions that determine structure
of some downstream markets, the supply should always be endogenously deter-
mined within the auction. Moreover, the standard multi-unit auctions such as the
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uniform-price auction and the ascending clock auction are not well-performed with
endogenous supply, since introducing any binding reserve prices that can endoge-
nously determine supply will result in pooling equilibrium for both auctions. This
result implies that the standard uniform-price auctions and ascending clock auc-
tions can be suboptimal when each bidder care about the total quantity of items
allocated in the auction, and more complicated auction designs are needed from
both surplus-maximizing and revenue-maximizing perspectives.
Another implication of this paper is that both the efficient and the optimal
reserve prices are higher than their counterparts in markets without quantity exter-
nalities. Therefore, auction practitioners may want to consider increasing reserve
prices from both surplus-maximizing and revenue-maximizing perspectives after tak-
ing quantity externalities into account.
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Chapter 4: Information Provision in Procurement Auctions with En-
dogenous Investments
4.1 Introduction
Auctions are used in procurement settings to allocate contracts to suppliers
in a variety of markets such as electricity, government securities, and construction
rights. In a benchmark model of single-unit procurement auctions, bidders sell
identical products with exogenously differentiated production costs. However, many
practical procurement markets have two departures from the standard model. First,
the suppliers can be horizontally differentiated in their non-price characteristics, and
the auctioneer often has preference over non-price characteristics of the product.
Second, bidders can often engage in pre-auction cost-reducing investments. This
study is motivated by these two distinctive features in many procurement markets.
Existence of product differentiation is common in procurement auctions. Ex-
amples of non-price attributes that the auctioneer might care about include product
design, input materials, time of completion, reputation of the supplier, etc. (Asker
and Cantillon 2008 [64]). Empirical evidence of product differentiation in procure-
ment auctions is also documented in newspapers and previous studies. For example,
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when two aircraft manufacturing companies Airbus and Boeing competed for a con-
tract from Iberia Airlines, their bids were evaluated together with their product
characteristics in the procurement auction. According to the Wall Street Jounral
on March 10, 2003, Iberia has privately known preferences on several characteristics
such as fleet composition of the potential suppliers’ products, as it will affect future
maintenance cost (Thomas and Wilson 2012 [65]). Under the presence of product
differentiation, a supplier’s value in the auction not only depends on its production
cost but also depends on the auctioneer’s privately known preference.
Pre-auction investments among bidders are also common in procurements. For
example, prior to bidding for a road construction contract, suppliers can invest in
machinery and other equipments to reduce cost. Empirical evidence of pre-auction
investments can also be found in previous studies. For example, defense contractors
invest substantial resources in R & D before bidding for a government contract
(Lichtenberg 1986 [66]; Li et al. 2006 [67]).
Under these two departures from the standard procurement auction model,
suppliers face a trade-off between higher sunk investment costs and higher expected
return in the auction, and the auctioneer’s information provision policy can affect
the suppliers’ investment strategies. Since each supplier will choose the investment
level at which the marginal expected return to investment in the auction equals to
the marginal investment cost, and the expected return to investment depends on
the auctioneer’s valuation over the supplier.
It is well understood how to design an optimal auction mechanism that max-
imizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue given homogenous bidders who enter the
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auction with private exogenous monetary types (Myerson 1981 [40]). Some studies
have explored pre-auction investment incentives with homogenous products (Pic-
cione and Tan 1996 [68]; Bag 1997 [69]; Arozamena and Cantillon 2004 [70]). How-
ever, no study has examined suppliers’ investment incentives on cost reduction when
product differentiation presents. The objective of this study is to investigate the im-
pact of the auctioneer’s information provision policy on suppliers’ pre-auction invest-
ment incentives and the auctioneer’s expected revenue when product differentiation
presents among suppliers.
In this chapter, I assume that the auctioneer can commit to one of the following
three information disclosure policies: publicly disclose her private valuations over all
suppliers’ products; privately disclose her valuation over each supplier’s product; or
completely conceal her valuations. Then I analyze equilibrium investment strategy of
suppliers before entering a second-score sealed-bid procurement auction and compare
the expected revenues of auction under these three information provision schemes.
The main result of this chapter shows that pre-auction investments are strategic
substitutes among bidders, and providing more information about the auctioneer’s
preference encourages those more favored bidders to invest more, which increases
cost differentiation among bidders. The main analysis focuses on the case when there
are only two bidders and shows that disclosing more information will reduce expected
revenue by discouraging the lower quality bidder from investment and giving higher
informational rent to the higher quality bidder. I also provide a discussion of the
general case when there are more than 2 bidders and show that disclosing more
information will increase expected revenue by promoting competition among higher
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quality bidders when the number of bidders is sufficiently large.
4.2 Related Literature
This paper is connected to the literature on procurement auctions with dif-
ferentiated products. Asker and Cantillon (2008) [64] provide a systematic analysis
of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers have multi-dimensional
types. Thomas and Wilson (2012) [65] experimentally compare first-price auctions
and multilateral negotiations when horizontal product differentiation is introduced
into a procurement auction. The major difference between this chapter and the
previous studies on scoring auctions is that the existing literature on scoring auc-
tions takes product characteristics and cost as different dimensions of each bidder’s
exogenously given multi-dimensional type, while this chapter models product dif-
ferentiation as assigning each seller a subjective “quality” privately known to the
auctioneer and assumes each bidder’s cost is endogenously determined by invest-
ment.
This chapter is also related to the literature studying optimal information re-
lease of the auctioneer when the auctioneer owns private information that enters
bidders’ valuations. Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2] analyze the optimal release of
information in an auction with affiliated values and find that it is optimal for the auc-
tioneer to publicly announce her private information. On the other hand, Ganuza
(2004) [71] analyzes a horizontally differentiated market in which the auctioneer
has private information about product characteristics and bidders have horizontally
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differentiated preferences over the product space. He shows that when releasing
information is costly to the auctioneer, the auctioneer has incentives to release less
than efficient level of information. Coleff and Garcia (2014) [72] study the optimal
release of information in a procurement auction in which sellers can choose their
horizontal product characteristics according to the auctioneer’s reported preference.
They show that it is not optimal for the auctioneer to send public information to
all sellers under presence of entry cost. Closely related to this paper, Colucci et
al. (2015) [73] compare the performance of different information provision schemes
under first-score auctions and second-score auctions in a model with differentiated
bidders whose qualities are private information to the auctioneer. However, they
assume bidders’ costs are heterogenous and commonly known in the model, while
I adopt Dasgupta (1990) [74]’s production model and assume bidders’ costs are
determined by their own investment decisions and a random variable. In Ganuza
(2004) [71]’s model, the auctioneer’s information provision will alter the bidders’
perception of their own values. In Coleff and Garcia (2014) [72], the auctioneer’s in-
formation provision will alter the equilibrium profile of bidders’ horizontal locations
and the number of bidders. In Colucci et al (2015) [73], the auctioneer’s information
provision will change the bidders’ bidding strategies in the first score auction. This
study is different from the above studies in the sense that the auctioneer’s informa-
tion provision will alter the profile of bidder’s values by changing their investment
incentives.
This chapter is also closely related to the strand of literature on studying bid-
ders’ pre-auction investment incentives under different auction mechanisms. Most of
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this literature focus on studying suppliers’ investment incentives in sealed-bid auc-
tions for a homogenous product. A common goal of these studies is to compare the
equilibrium investment levels induced by the auction mechanism to the socially op-
timal investment level, and compare the performance of different mechanisms based
on their efficiency in inducing pre-auction investments (Piccione and Tan 1996 [68];
Bag 1997 [69]). However, there exists no mechanism that can uniquely implements
ex ante efficient investment when suppliers can only make investment decisions si-
multaneously prior to the auction (Arozamena and Cantillon 2004 [70]; Li et al.
2006 [67]; Hatfield et al. 2015 [75]; Tomoeda 2015 [76]). Different from these previ-
ous studies that focus on finding socially-optimal investment-inducing mechanism,
the goal of this study is to find an information provision scheme that maximizes the
auctioneer’s ex ante expected revenue in a second score auction, given the presence
of differentiated sellers and pre-auction investment opportunity.
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Environment
An auctioneer wishes to procure one unit of an indivisible product that may
come in different varieties. There areN risk-neutral potential suppliers i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
providing imperfect substitutes that feature different varieties of this product1. The
product characteristic of each supplier is exogenous and observable to the auction-
eer. The auctioneer values the specific product of each supplier differently. There
1In this paper, I use feminine pronoun for the auctioneer and masculine pronouns for bidders.
113
are two stages of the game: investment stage and auction stage. The time line of
the game is presented as below:
1. t=1: At the beginning of the investment stage, the auctioneer announces the
allocation and payment rules of a second score auction and the information
disclosure policy. The auctioneer can choose to publicly announce the entire
profile of her valuations to all suppliers, or to privately inform each supplier
her value for that supplier, or to conceal this information.
2. t=2: N suppliers enter the game. The auctioneer observes the product charac-
teristics of each supplier and privately learns her valuation over their products
{qi, }Ni=1. Each qi measures the match between the auctioneer’s private taste
over product design and supplier i’s product characteristics, and qi is called
bidder i’s quality in the remaining of this chapter. Assuming preference is
quasilinear in price, then the auctioneer’s utility from purchasing supplier i’s
product at price pi is
U(qi, pi) = qi − pi (4.1)
If the auctioneer does not disclose any information, then all suppliers have
common belief that qi is independently and identically distributed according
to distribution G(.) on [q, q̄]. Furthermore, assume q > g(0)+ η̄ and there is no
outside buying options so that it is always ex post efficient for the auctioneer
to purchase the product from one of the potential suppliers.
3. t=3: The auctioneer sends a private signal q̂i ∈ {{qi}Ni=1, qi, ∅} to every bidder
i according to the information policy chosen at t = 1.
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4. t=4: After observing the signal provided by the auctioneer, each supplier i
makes an investment ki ∈ R+ simultaneously to reduce the cost of his product
given common cost-reducing technology g(.). ki is the sunk cost of investment.
5. t=5: At the beginning of the auction stage, each supplier i receives a random
cost shock ηi that is independently and identically distributed according to a
commonly known uniform distribution H(.) on [η, η̄].
Following Dasgupta (1990) [74]’s production cost model, I assume the total
production cost of supplier i is given by
ci = c(ki, ηi) = g(ki) + ηi (4.2)
in which g′ < 0, g′′ > 0, lim
k→0
−g′(k) = ∞, and lim
k→∞
−g′(k) = 0, so the cost
reducing investment exhibits decreasing returns.
Each supplier i’s “value” vi as the total trading surplus that he can provide
by selling the product to the auctioneer is therefore given by
vi = v(qi, ki, ηi) = qi − g(ki)− ηi (4.3)
6. t=6: Each supplier submits bid bi that represents the minimum payment he
is willing to accept to provide the product in a second score auction. The
scoring rule used in the auction is
σi = qi − bi (4.4)
The auctioneer announces scores of all the bidders at end of the auction. The
highest-score bidder i wins the contract and receives a payment equals to the
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bid of the supplier j with the second highest score, adjusted by their quality
difference: pi = bj + qi − qj.
4.3.2 Equilibrium of Second Score Auction
I will first show that truth-telling is still a dominant strategy for suppliers in
the second score procurement auction when each supplier’s value depends on the
auctioneer’s information qi.
Corollary 4.1. In the second score procurement auction with differentiated suppliers
selling imperfect substitutes, it is still a dominant strategy for each supplier to bid
his true production cost ci.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since the auctionner privately knows the qualities of all bidders, by submitting
a bid bi, the value profile of all bidders {vi}Ni=1 will be revealed. Therefore, the second
score auction can be written as a direct revelation mechanism in which the arguments
of the allocation rule and the payment rule is the profile of bidders’ values {vi}Ni=1.
4.3.3 Equilibrium of Investment Stage
In this section, I will characterize each supplier’s optimal investment strategy.
At the investment stage, the suppliers choose investment levels to maximize their






∣∣q−i, k∗−i) as the distribution of the highest value among bidder
i’s (N − 1) opponents’ values at the beginning of the auction stage, before the
random cost shocks η are realized. Then F̂−i(.|q−i, k∗−i) depends on opposing bidders’
qualities q−i and equilibrium investment strategies k
∗
−i.
The incentive compatibility of the second score auction implies that the ex-
pected payoff of bidder i with value vi is given by







At the investment stage, each supplier chooses an investment level k∗i that
maximizes the expected payoff in the auction as a best response to opponents’
investments k∗−i, given the distribution of qualities and random cost shocks, and the
information provided by the auctioneer q̂i.
Definition 4.1. A profile of investments chosen at investment stage {k∗i }Ni=1 is an









∣∣k∗−i, q−i)dτ ∣∣∣q̂i]− ki (4.6)
Let V̂ (v1, v2, · · · , vN) denote the second highest value given a profile of values
{vi}Ni=1. Then V̂ (v1, v2, · · · , vN) is the auctioneer’s ex-post revenue given {vi}Ni=1.




to induce a profile of
values (v1, · · · , vN) that yields the highest ex ante expected revenue in the auction,
given that suppliers will play equilibrium investment strategy in the investment
stage given the information provided by the auctioneer.
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v1, v2, · · · , vN
)]









∣∣k∗−i, q−i)dτ ∣∣∣q̂i]− ki ∀i
(4.7)
To study the impact of auctioneer’s information provision of private valuations
qi, I will compare the suppliers’ equilibrium investment strategies and expected
revenues in the auction under concealment, private disclosure, and public disclosure.
The main analysis will focus on the case where there are only N = 2 bidders. A
discussion of the general case with N ≥ 2 bidders will be provided in the end.
4.4 Equilibrium Investment Strategies with Two Sellers
In this section, I will analyze the suppliers’ investment strategy when there
are N = 2 bidders. Let i and j denote the identity of the 2 bidders. For each bidder
i, the distribution of the opposing bidder j’s value given bidder j’s quality qj and




∣∣qj, k∗j ) = Prob(qj − g(k∗j )− ηj ≤ τ)
= Prob
(




qj − g(k∗j )− τ
)
(4.8)
Given the distribution of quality G(q), let Q1 and Q2 denote the random vari-
ables that represent the highest order statistic and the second highest order statistic
among bidders’ qualities, respectively. Let (q1, q2) be realizations of (Q1, Q2). Then
q1 = max{qi, qj} and q2 = min{qi, qj} for any realization of qualities {qi, qj}.
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∆(G) represents the expected dispersion of the auctioneer’s valuation on the two
bidders’ products, which in turn measures how much the auctioneer cares about non-
price characteristics relative to cost. Mathematically, ∆(G) represents the expected
difference between the first order statistics and the second order statistics among
2 draws given distribution G(.). Holding the expected quality constant, a greater
∆(G) implies that the expected difference between the higher quality and the lower
quality is larger, i.e., the auctioneer is willing to pay more for contracting with
the high-quality supplier instead of the low-quality supplier. When ∆(G) = 0,
q1 = q2 = E(q|G), this model turns into the standard procurement auction model
without product differentiation: the auctioneer’s valuation for any supplier’s product
equals E(q|G) and is common knowledge. There is no difference between the three
information provision schemes when ∆(G) = 0.
Since the three information disclosure policies yields the same expected revenue
when ∆(G) = 0, I will next explore how the expected revenue under the three
disclosure policies change when holding the expected quality constant and increasing
the dispersion of qualities ∆(G) in the following analysis.
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4.4.1 Equilibrium under Concealment of Quality
Under concealment of qualities, each supplier chooses investment strategy
knowing only the distribution of (qi, qj) and distribution of (ηi, ηj). Note that at the
time of investment, suppliers are ex ante identical with symmetric distribution of qi
and ηi.













qj − g(kj)− τ
)}
dτdG(qj)dG(qi)− ki (4.10)
Take the first order condition will give supplier i’s best response investment function















i ). By examining the first order condition and
the second order condition of equation (4.10), the next proposition shows that the
two bidders will chose identical investment kC in equilibrium, in which kC depends
only on the cost reducing technology g(.).
Proposition 4.1. Under concealment of quality with N = 2, both suppliers will
select an identical investment kCi = k
C
j = k
C in a subgame perfect equilibrium. kC
does not depend on G(.).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.1 comes from the ex ante symmetry across bidders at the time
when they make investment decisions. At the optimal level of investment, the
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marginal expected return from investment should equal the marginal cost of invest-
ment, given that the opponent also invests optimally. Given the ex-ante symmetry
of the bidders, the expected return of investment in auction is always equivalent
for two bidders, and the marginal cost of investment depends only on technology
g(.). Therefore, the equilibrium investment kC is identical across bidders and is
independent of the quality distribution G(q).
4.4.2 Equilibrium under Private Disclosure of Quality
Under private disclosure of quality, suppose a symmetric perfect Bayesian
equilibrium investment strategy kD : [q, q̄] → R+ exists. Each supplier’s optimal















The equilibrium investment strategy of each bidder kDi = k
D(qi) is characterized by
the first order condition of i’s objective function given in equation (4.11).
The next proposition shows that privately disclosing quality qi to each bidder
will induce ex ante high quality suppliers to invest more aggressively compared
to low quality suppliers. The symmetric equilibrium investment strategy kD(qi) is
increasing in qi.
Proposition 4.2. When there are only 2 bidders, under private disclosure of quality,
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium investment kD(qi) is increasing in qi.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Proposition 4.2 comes from the fact that the optimal investment decision of
each bidder depends on the expected return of investment in the auction. Suppliers
with higher quality products has higher expected probability of winning the auction
than suppliers with lower quality products. The former has higher expected return
for any given level of investment.
4.4.3 Equilibrium under Public Disclosure of Quality
Now suppose the auctioneer publicly announce the entire quality profile {qi, qj}
at the beginning of investment stage to all bidders. Under the public disclosure of
quality, each bidder will hold different belief over the distribution of its opponent’s
value. Given {qi, qj}, and any level of opponent’s invesment kj, each bidder i will








qj − g(kj)− τ
))
dτ (4.12)
Under public disclosure of (qi, qj) to each bidder, the best response investment
k∗i (kj; qi, qj) to opponent’s investment kj is characterized by the first order condition





denote the subgame perfect equilibrium investment profile under public disclosure
(announcement) of qualities. For any quality profile (qi, qj), the subgame perfect
equilibrium investment profile under public information disclosure (kAi , k
A
j ) is de-




j ; qi, qj) and k
A




i ; qi, qj), in which k
∗
i (.; qi, qj)
and k∗j (.; qi, qj) are each bidder’s best response function.
The next proposition shows that given the same cost reducing technology
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g(.), publicly disclosing all bidders’ qualities will further induce the high quality
supplier to invest more aggressively, and the low quality supplier to invest less
aggressively. Each bidder’s equilibrium investment kAi (qi, qj) under announcement
of entire quality profile is increasing in (qi − qj).
Proposition 4.3. When there are only 2 bidders, under public disclosure of qualities
(qi, qj), each bidder’s best response investment k
∗
i (kj; qi, qj) is increasing in (qi −
qj) and decreasing in kj. The subgame perfect equilibrium investment k
A
i (qi, qj) is
increasing in (qi − qj).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.3 comes from the fact that the higher quality bidder has higher
expected return from investment, as the expected probability of winning the auction
is higher. When the higher quality bidder knows exactly his ex ante advantage before
the auction starts, his investment incentive will be stronger, while the lower quality
bidder will be discouraged from investing given this information. This is because
the pre-auction investments are strategic substitutes between bidders, and knowing
that opponent has a low quality for certain will make the high quality bidder believe




At the beginning of auction, the expected value of bidder i with quality qi and
investment ki before the realization of random cost component ηi is given by




qi − g(ki)− ηi
)
dH(ηi)
= qi − g(ki)− Eηi
(4.13)
Define V (kL1 , q1) and V (k
L
2 , q2) as the equilibrium expected value of the high
quality supplier and the low quality supplier under information policy L ∈ {C,D,A},
in which C represents concealment, D represents private disclosure and A represents
public disclosure (announcement), at the beginning of auction, given their equilib-
rium investments kL1 , k
L
2 under realizations Q1 = q1, Q2 = q2:
V (kL1 , q1) = q1 − g(kL1 )− Eη
V (kL2 , q2) = q2 − g(kL2 )− Eη
(4.14)
Under concealment of qualities, kC1 = k
C
2 = k










and kA2 = k
A
2 (q2, q1).
The ex ante expected winner’s payoff in the auction under policy L ∈ {C,D,A}
given distribution G is given by
EΠL(G) = E[V (kL1 , q1)− V (kL2 , q2)|G] (4.15)
The ex ante expected revenue to the auctioneer under policy L ∈ {C,D,A} given
distribution G is given by
ERL(G) = E[V (kL2 , q2)|G] (4.16)
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As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, when the auctioneer does not
care about non-price characteristics and ∆(G) = 0, the three information disclosure
policy gives the same expected revenue:ERC(G) = ERD(G) = ERA(G). I will next
analyze how the expected revenues change under the three different information
provision policies as ∆(G) increases from 0 in order to compare the revenues of the
three information provision policies when ∆(G) > 0.
The next proposition shows that the expected revenues ERC(G), ERD(G) and
ERA(G) are decreasing in ∆(G) under all three information provision schemes, when
holding the expected quality constant. It can be shown that the negative impact of
increasing ∆(G) on ERC(G) is weaker than that on ERD(G) and ERA(G), at any
level of ∆(G) > 0. This implies that when there are only 2 bidders, the ex ante
expected revenue to the auctioneer is always highest under concealment of quality
among the three information schemes.
Proposition 4.4. When there are only 2 bidders, the expected revenue to the auc-














When ∆(G) = 0, ERC(G) = ERD(G) = ERA(G)
When ∆(G) > 0, ERC(G) > ERD(G) and ERC(G) > ERA(G). Both
ERC(G)− ERD(G) and ERC(G)− ERA(G) are increasing in ∆(G).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.4 implies that when there are only 2 bidders, it is always optimal
125
for the auctioneer to conceal their qualities. When the auctioneer discloses her
private values to the bidders, the lower quality bidder will be discouraged from
making investments, which leads to lower expected value of the lower quality bidder
and lower expected revenue in the auction.
The result of Proposition 4.4 comes from the fact that ∆(G) represents the
dispersion of quality distribution G. Holding the expected quality constant and
increasing ∆(G) will generate a mean preserving spread of the original distribution,
under which it is more likely to observe a high value of q1 and a low value of q2. This
is the only source that drives the fact that EΠC(G) being increasing in ∆(G) and
ERC(G) being decreasing in ∆(G) under concealment of quality, as the equilibrium
investment kC is independent of G. This source also present under private disclosure
of quality and public disclosure of quality. However, under private disclosure and
public disclosure of quality, increasing ∆(G) will not only decrease the expected
value of q2, but also decrease the expected investment of the lower quality bidder,
as the low quality bidder will be discouraged from investment by receiving a low
quality signal. Therefore, the impact of ∆(G) on expected revenue is stronger
when the auctioneer discloses her values than that when the auctioneer conceals
her values. Moreover, the difference between expected revenues under any two
information schemes is increasing in ∆(G), as the bidders’ investment incentives
will be affected by the information provided by the auctioneer more significantly
when auctioneer cares more about non-price characteristics.
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4.5 Conclusions
This chapter studies the information provision problem in a procurement auc-
tion where the auctioneer has private subjective valuations over the suppliers’ prod-
ucts, and suppliers have opportunity to invest in cost reduction prior to entering
the auction. In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium investment strategies of sup-
pliers under concealment of auctioneer’s private valuations, private disclosure of
auctioneer’s valuation, and public disclosure of auctioneer’s valuations, and provide
a revenue comparison among these three information provision schemes under the
presence of 2 bidders. The main conclusions are summarized as below:
First, disclosing the auctioneer’s private valuation over each supplier’s quality
will induce high quality suppliers to invest more aggressively and discourage low
quality suppliers from making investments. This result comes from the fact that
each bidder’s expected return from investment is increasing in his quality. Therefore,
providing more information will induce a more dispersed distribution of values in
the auction through this differentiation effect at the investment stage. When there
are only two bidders, providing more information will discourage the lower quality
bidder from investment and reduce the expected revenue. This leads to the result
that concealment gives the highest expected revenue among the three information
provision schemes considered in this paper.
Second, when one information scheme dominates the other information scheme
under given distribution G, the benefit of the better scheme over the worse scheme
increases in the dispersion of quality ∆(G). This result comes from the fact that
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∆(G) measures how much the auctioneer cares about qualities relative to costs.
When the auctioneer cares more about qualities, the impact of quality differentiation
on bidders’ investment incentives is stronger, and providing information on this
quality differentiation has greater impact on the equilibrium distribution of values.
I will next provide a brief discussion on the more general case when there are
N ≥ 2 bidders. Define ∆(G,N) = E[q1 − qN |G,N ]. Then ∆(G,N) measures the
dispersion of qualities among N bidders given distribution G(.). It is natural to
conjecture that given a fixed number of bidders N and distribution G, concealment
is optimal only if N is small enough s.t. the expected value of second order statistics
is decreasing in the dispersion of qualities. When N is large enough s.t. E(q2|G,N)
is increasing in ∆(G,N), then the rank order of expected revenues under three
information provision policies will be reversed, and public disclosure will provide
the highest expected revenue. When N approaches infinity, it is always optimal to
publicly disclose all qualities. This result is consistent with Ganuza (2004) [71]’s
finding that the optimal level of information provision is increasing in the number
of bidders. When there are only 2 bidders, competition in auction is weak, and
disclosing the auctioneer’s private information will give more informational rent to
the winner. In contrast, when the number of bidders is large, disclosing more infor-
mation will promote competition among the high quality bidders and will increase
the expected revenue. When the number of bidders approaches infinity so that the
model approaches a perfectly competitive market where each seller captures zero
informational rent, it is optimal for the auctioneer to disclose all information.
The findings in this chapter suggest a few directions for future research. First,
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this chapter assumes that participation in the auction is costless and the number
of bidders in the auction N is exogenous. Since the provision of the auctioneer’s
information also changes the ex ante expected payoff to the winner, it would be
interesting to allow endogenous entry of bidders. If the quality information is dis-
closed before bidders make entry decisions, then low quality bidders will not enter
the auction, which reduces the degree of competition and lowers the auctioneer’s
expected revenue. When disclosing more information is optimal under exogenous
entry, the positive impact of information disclosure on expected revenue through
inducing higher quality bidders investing more will be offset by the negative im-
pact through preventing low quality bidders from participating. On the other hand,
when there are very few bidders so that concealing information is optimal given this
fixed number of bidders, disclosing information will yield higher expected payoff to
the winner and therefore induce more bidders to enter, so the optimal information
disclosure scheme again becomes ambiguous. The next step of this research may
introduce entry cost to the model and study how the revenue ranking of three in-
formation provision schemes change when number of bidders is also endogenously
determined by the information provision scheme.
Second, this chapter assumes that providing information to bidders is costless
to the auctioneer, which is not a practical assumption, as communication between
the auctioneer and bidders usually comes at a cost. When providing information is
costly, the benefit of information disclosure to the auctioneer may be outweighed by
the cost of communication. When the cost of information provision is independent
of number of bidders, it would be optimal to disclose quality when N is large enough
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since the benefit of information provision increases in N . However, when the cost of
information provision also increases in N , the optimal level of information provision
becomes ambiguous, and the next step of this study may include providing a charac-
terization of the optimal level of information provision when providing information
is costly.
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Appendix A: Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1:
Proof. I first show that if an equilibrium bidding strategy in a one-dimensional as-
sortative position auction is symmetric and strictly increasing, then the equilibrium
must be efficient. Let β(x) denote the equilibrium bidding strategy. β
′
(x) > 0 im-
plies that β(xi) > β(xj) for any xi > xj. Under the assortative ranking rule, bidder
i is placed above bidder j if xi > xj, so the equilibrium allocation must be efficient.
I next show that if an equilibrium of a one-dimensional assortative position
auction is efficient, then the equilibrium bidding strategy must be strictly increasing
and symmetric across bidders. Suppose an efficient equilibrium
(
β1(x1), β2(x2), · · · , βN(xN)
)
exists in a one-dimensional assortative position auction, then a bidder who receives
signal xi must be placed above a bidder who receives a lower signal xj < xi if both
win some position in equilibrium. For an arbitrary bidder i, take any value x
′
i > xi,
then there is positive probability that some of bidder i’s opponents receive signals
between xi and x
′
i, i.e., there exists j 6= i with signal xj ∈ (xi, x
′
i). Efficiency requires
that j is placed below i when bidder i receives x
′
i, and j is placed above i when i
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i) ≤ βi(xi), then for any value of βj(xj), it is impossible for condition
(A.1) to hold, which yields a contradiction. Therefore, at any efficient equilibrium,
bidder i must bid strictly higher when receiving signal x
′
i than receiving signal xi,
i.e., for every bidder i, we must have
x
′
i > xi → βi(x
′
i) > βi(xi) (A.2)
Therefore, every bidder must use a strictly increasing bidding strategy in an efficient
equilibrium, so β
′
i(xi) > 0 for all i.
Next, suppose there exists an efficient equilibrium that is not symmetric, i.e.,
there exists i 6= j s.t. βi(x̂) 6= βj(x̂) at some x̂ ∈ [0, x̄]. Without loss of generality,
assume βi(x̂) < βj(x̂) for some x̂ ∈ [0, x̄]. Since βi(.) and βj(.) are continuous,
there exists some xi, xj ∈ [0, x̄] s.t. xj < x̂ < xi, but βi(xi) < βj(xj). Under the
assortative ranking rule, this means that bidder j who receives the lower signal xj
will get a higher position than bidder i who receives the higher signal xi > xj, which
contradicts the efficiency assumption. Therefore, if an efficient equilibrium exists in a
one-dimensional assortative position auction, then the equilibrium bidding strategy
must be symmetric across bidders, i.e., βi(.) = β(.) for all i.
Proof of Lemma 2.2:
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Proof. Define v1,2(xi, y1, y2) as bidder i’s expected value per click conditional on her
own signal equals to xi, the highest signal among her opponents Y1 equals to y1, the
second highest signal among her opponents Y2 equals to y2:
v1,2(xi, y1, y2) = E
[
vi
∣∣X = xi, Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2] (A.3)
Suppose a monotonic Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy β(.) exists. For
any arbitrary bidder i, suppose all of i’s opposing bidders follow the monotonic
Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy β(.). Let β−1(.) denote the inverse function






















in which g2,1i (y2, y1|xi) is the conditional joint density function of (Y2, Y1) given X =
xi. Let g1|2(y1|y2, xi) and g2|1(y2|y1, xi) be conditional marginal densities of Y1 given
(Y2, X) and Y2 given (Y1, X) respectively. Let g1(y1|xi) and g2(y2|xi) be conditional
marginal densities of Y1 and Y2 given X = xi respectively, then g
2,1
i (y2, y1|xi) =
g1|2(y1|y2, xi)g2(y2|xi) = g2|1(y2|y1, xi)g1(y1|xi).

















































Since β(xi) is an equilibrium, it is optimal for bidder i to bid b
∗
i = β(xi) when
her opponents follow β(.). Evaluate dΠ(bi)
dbi

































According to the definition of v1(xi, xi) and v




























Bidding b∗i = β(xi) maximizes Π(bi|xi) only if
dΠ(β(xi)|xi)
dbi
= 0. Setting equation (A.7)












This is a Volterra equation of the second kind. In the one-dimensional GSP Auction
with 2 positions, if a monotonic equilibrium bidding strategy βG(xi) exists, then
βG(xi) must satisfy the Volterra equation (A.8) for all xi ∈ [0, x̄].
Proof of Lemma 2.3:
Proof. Suppose a monotonic symmetric Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy β(.)
exists in the one-dimensional VCG auction. For an arbitrary bidder i, suppose all
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of i’s opposing bidders follow the monotonic Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy






























































Since β(xi) is an equilibrium, b
∗
i = β(xi) maximizes Π(bi|xi) for any value of
xi. For all xi ∈ [0, x̄], evaluate dΠ(bi|xi)dbi at b
∗






























According to the definition of v1(xi, xi) and v


















Bidding β(xi) maximizes Π(bi|xi) only if dΠ(β(xi)|xi)dbi = 0, which means that
bidder i cannot increase Π(bi|xi) by increasing or decreasing bid from β(xi) by any
small amount. Set dΠ(β(xi)|xi)
dbi
= 0 and rearrange the equation yields
β(xi) =
g1(xi|xi)(α1 − α2)v1(xi, xi) + g2(xi|xi)α2v2(xi, xi)
g1(xi|xi)(α1 − α2) + g2(xi|xi)α2
(A.13)
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which characterizes the unique equilibrium bidding strategy βV (xi) in the one-
dimensional VCG auction.
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
Proof. Suppose the unique equilibrium bidding strategy βG(xi) characterized in
Lemma 2.2 is continuous and strictly increasing in xi given any CTR profile (α1, α2).
First observe that since βG(.) is continuous, when xi approaches x̄, the equilibrium
































g2|1(y2|x̄, x̄)dy2 = 0 (A.16)
However, equation (A.16) yields a contradiction to the assumption that βG(xi)
is strictly increasing in xi, since for any strictly increasing function, β
G(x̄) > βG(y2)
for any 0 ≤ y2 < x̄ and βG(x̄) = βG(y2) at y2 = x̄. Therefore, it is impossible for
any strictly increasing βG(xi) to satisfy equation (A.16) at xi = x̄. Since β
G(xi)
approaches βG(x̄) when xi approaches x̄, this contradiction also applies to any xi
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sufficiently close to x̄. Therefore, it is impossible for the equilibrium βG(xi) char-
acterized by Lemma 2.2 to be strictly increasing under every CTR profile. Since
βG(xi) is the unique equilibrium bidding strategy, there exists no monotonic equi-
librium in the one-dimensional GSP auction with two positions under some CTR
profile. Given the result of Lemma 2.1, this implies that there exists some number
of positions K with some CTR profile such that no efficient equilibrium exists in
the one-dimensional GSP auction.
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
Proof. Define γ(xi;α1, α2) as the weighting factor in the equilibrium bidding func-
tion βV (xi) characterized in Lemma 2.3:
γ(xi;α1, α2) =
g1(xi|xi)(α1 − α2)
g1(xi|xi)(α1 − α2) + g2(xi|xi)α2
(A.17)
then the equilibrium bidding strategy characterized in Lemma 2.3 can be rewritten
as






Take derivative of β(xi) = γ(xi)v


















v1(xi, xi)− v2(xi, xi)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
bid-shading incentive from the “winner’s curse”
(A.19)
The first two terms in equation (A.19) capture the positive effect of greater expected
values on βV (xi) when xi increases. As xi increases, the expected values conditional
on winning both position 1 and position 2.2 increase, which causes equilibrium bid
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βV (xi) to increase. The last term captures the negative effect of the “winner’s
curse” on βV (xi). As xi increases, bidder i is more likely to win the first position
at any monotonic equilibrium, which amplifies the “winner’s curse.” When the
negative effect from the “winner’s curse” dominates the positive effect from increased




Note that given any CTR profile (α1, α2), for any xi ∈ [0, x̄], the magnitude












g1(xi|xi)(α1 − α2) + g2(xi|xi)α2
]2 > 0 (A.20)
For any CTR profile (α1, α2) satisfying 0 < α2 < α1, take limit of
∂γ(xi;α1,α2)
∂xi














When α2 is sufficiently close to α1, the denominator becomes sufficiently close
to 0 so that limxi→x̄
∂γ(xi;α1,α2)
∂xi
approaches infinity. As long as v1(xi, xi) < v
2(xi, xi),
the negative impact from “winner’s curse” will be dominant when xi is sufficiently
close to x̄ and α2 is sufficiently close to α1. Therefore, under any non-trivially
interdependent values, when there are K = 2 positions, there always exists some
CTR profile (α1, α2) in which α2 is strictly lower than but sufficiently close to α1
s.t. the equilibrium bid βV (xi) is decreasing in xi for values of xi close to the
upper boundary x̄. This demonstrates that there always exists some number of
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positions K with some CTR profile such that no efficient equilibrium exists in the
one-dimensional VCG auction.
Proof of Lemma 2.4:
Proof. It is straightforward to see that if every bidder adopts a symmetric and
strictly increasing bidding strategy for every position k in equilibrium of a K-
dimensional assortative position auction, then the equilibrium allocation is always
efficient. Let β(x) =
(
β1(x), · · · , βK(x)
)
be the symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategy. Since βk(x) is strictly increasing for every k, the bidder with the highest
signal will submit the highest bid for position 1 and win position 1. The bidder with
the second highest signal will submit the highest bid among the rest of bidders and
win position 2, etc. The equilibrium allocation will rank bidders according to their
signals and therefore is efficient.
I will next show that an equilibrium of a K-dimensional assortative position
auction is efficient only if every bidder uses a symmetric and strictly increasing
bidding strategy βk(x) for any position k. Suppose an efficient equilibrium exists
in a K-dimensional assortative auction, then a bidder who receives a signal xi must
be placed above a bidder who receives a lower signal xj < xi if both bidders receive
some position in equilibrium. Pick an arbitrary bidder i, for any position k ∈ [1, K],
take any value x
′
i > xi, then there is positive probability that there are exactly
(k−1) bidders who receive signals above x′i and one bidder j 6= i who receives signal
xj ∈ (xi, x
′
i). Efficiency requires that bidder i wins position k if bidder i receives
signal x
′
i, and bidder j wins position k if bidder i receives signal xi. With the K-
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dimensional assortative ranking rule, bidder i’s bid for position k must always be
higher than bidder j’s bid for position k when receiving x
′
i, and bidder i’s bid for







This is only possible when βik(x
′
i) > βik(xi). Therefore, for every bidder i and every
position k, we must have
x
′
i > xi → βik(x
′
i) > βik(xi) (A.23)
which means βik(xi) is strictly increasing in xi for every i and every k.
Next, I will show that any efficient equilibrium in a K-dimensional assortative
position auction must be symmetric across bidders. Suppose the equilibrium is not
symmetric, i.e., there exists some k ∈ [1, K] and i 6= j s.t. βik(x̂) 6= βjk(x̂) for some
x̂ ∈ [0, x̄]. Without loss of generality, assume βik(x̂) > βjk(x̂). Since βik(.) and βjk(.)
are continuous, there exists xi, xj s.t. xi < x̂ < xj, and βik(xi) > βjk(xj). There is
positive probability that there are exactly (k− 1) bidders other than i and j receive
signals above xj. Since xi < x̂ < xj, efficiency requires that bidder j wins position k.
However, with the K-dimensional assortative ranking rule, βik(xi) > βjk(xj) implies
that bidder j cannot win position k, which yields a contradiction. Therefore, it is
impossible to have βik(x̂) 6= βjk(x̂) for any i, j, any k ∈ [1, K], and any value of
x̂. In any efficient equilibrium, each bidder must use a symmetric bidding strategy
βik(.) = βk(.) for every position k.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3:
Proof. For any arbitrary bidder i, let g
{k}
i (yk, · · · , y1|xi) be the joint density of
(Yk, Yk−1, · · · , Y1) conditional on X = xi, according to the joint distribution of
signals F (x1, · · · , xN). Define v{k}(xi; y1, y2, · · · , yk) as bidder i’s expected value
per click conditional on her own signal X equals to xi, the highest signal Y1, the
second highest signal Y2, ..., the k-th highest signal Yk received by her opponents
equals to (y1, y2, · · · , yk):
v{k}(xi; y1, y2, · · · , yk) = E
[
vi
∣∣X = xi, Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, · · · , Yk = yk] (A.24)
Suppose all of bidder i’s opposing bidders follow the monotonic Bayesian equi-
librium bidding strategy β(.) = (β1(.), β2(.), · · · , βK(.)) in the K-dimensional GSP
auction. Let β−1k (.) denote the inverse function of βk(.). Then bidder i’s best re-
sponse bid (b1∗i , b
2∗
i , · · · , bK∗i ) maximizes








































i (y3, y2, y1|xi)dy3dy2dy1




































v{k}(xi, y1, · · · , yk)− βk(yk)
]
× g{k}i (yk, · · · , y1|xi) (A.26)
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Then the objective function (A.25) can be rewritten as
Π(bi|xi) =

























































xi, y1, · · · , yK
)
dyK · · · dy1︸ ︷︷ ︸
AK
(A.27)
Let Ak denote the k-th term in the objective function (A.27). The definitions















i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(k−1)




xi, y1, · · · , yk
)
dyk · · · dy2dy1
(A.28)
The first order condition with respect to b1i , b
2
































Since each bki enters Ak, Ak+1, · · · , AK , but does not enter any Ak′ with k′ < k.
For any 1 ≤ k ≤ K, take derivative of Ak with respect to bki and replacing bn∗i








































xi, y1, · · · , yk−1, xi
)











Take derivative of Ak+1 with respect to b
k
i , and replace b
n
i by βn(xi) for all










































xi, y1, · · · , xi, yk+1
)















Take derivative of Ak+2 with respect to b
k
i , and replace b
n
i by βn(xi) for all






























xi, y1, · · · , β−1k (b
k
i ), yk+1, yk+2
)
















xi, y1, · · · , xi, yk+1, yk+2
)
dyk+2dyk+1dyk−1 · · · dy1
=0
(A.32)
This is because the integral of any continuous function on [xi, xi] is zero. For any
143
An with n ≥ k + 2, ∂An∂bki also contains an integral on [xi, xi]. Therefore,
∂An
∂bki
= 0, ∀n 6= k, k + 1 (A.33)
Therefore, the K first order conditions of the objective function characterized in

























so the Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy for the last position K in the K-
dimensional GSP auction is
βK(xi) = v
K(xi, xi) (A.36)


























Rearranging equation (A.37) gives the equilibrium bidding strategy βk(xi) for any













, ∀k ∈ [1, K − 1]
(A.38)
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Proof of Proposition 2.4:
Proof. Suppose all of bidder i’s opposing bidders follow a monotonic Bayesian equi-
librium bidding strategy β(x) =
(
β1(.), β2(.), · · · , βK(.)
)
in the K-dimensional VCG
auction. Let β−1k (.) denote the inverse function of βk(.). Let g
{K}
i (yK , · · · , y1|xi) be
the joint density of (YK , YK−1, · · · , Y1) conditional onX = xi. Let v{K}(xi; y1, y2, · · · , yK)
be bidder i’s expected value per click conditional on her own signal X equals to xi,
the highest signal Y1, the second highest signal Y2, ... the K-th highest signal YK
received by her opponents equal to (y1, y2, · · · , yK). Define ΠVk
(















× g{K}i (yK , · · · , y1|xi)
(A.39)
Then bidder i’s best response bid (b1∗i , b
2∗
i , · · · , bK∗i ) maximizes
Π(bi|xi) =











xi, y1, y2, · · · , yK
)
















xi, y1, y2, · · · , yK
)


















xi, y1, y2, · · · , yK
)
dyK · · · dy1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3



















xi, y1, y2, · · · , yK
)
dyK · · · dy1︸ ︷︷ ︸
BK
(A.40)
Let Bk denote the k-th term in equation (A.40). B1, B2 and B3 are given in
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i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(k−1)










xi, y1, y2, · · · , yK
)
dyK · · · dy1
(A.41)
Since each bki only enters Bk, Bk+1, · · · , BK , but not enter any Bk′ with k′ < k,
the first order condition of the objective function (A.40) with respect to (b1i , b
2
































Take derivative of Bk with respect to b
k
i , and replace b
n
i by βn(xi) for all




























xi, y1, · · · , yk−1, β−1k (b
k
i ), yk+1, · · · , yK
)


















xi, y1, · · · , yk−1, xi, yk+1, · · · , yK
)
dyK · · · dy1
(A.43)
Take derivative of Bk+1 with respect to b
k
i , and replacing b
n
i by βn(xi) for all
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xi, y1, · · · , yk−1, β−1k (b
k
i ), yk+1, · · · , yK
)

















xi, y1, · · · , yk−1, xi, yk+1, · · · , yK
)
dyK · · · dy1
(A.44)
Take derivative of Bk+2 with respect to b
k
i , and replace b
n
i by βn(xi) for all
































xi, y1, · · · , β−1k (b
k





















xi, y1, · · · , yk−1, xi, yk+1, · · · , yK
)
dyK · · · dy1
=0
(A.45)
since the integral of any continuous function on [xi, xi] is zero. At the equilibrium
where bi = β(xi),
dBn
dbki
contains an integral on [xi, xi] for any Bn with n ≥ k + 2, so
dBn
dbki






























xi, y1, · · · , yk−1, xi
)































so the equilibrium bidding strategy for the last position K in the K-dimensional
VCG auction is given by
βK(xi) = v
K(xi, xi) (A.48)

























xi, y1, · · · , xi, · · · , yK
)]
















v{K}(xi, y1, · · · , xi, · · · , yK)− βk(xi)
]












Therefore, for any position above the last position K, the equilibrium bidding strat-
egy βk(xi) in the K-dimensional VCG auction is given by
βk(xi) = v
k(xi, xi), ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K − 1} (A.50)
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
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Proof. First consider the case when no bidder has dropped out. When there are more
than K bidders remaining in the auction, each bidder will not drop out until the
expected payoff from the last position K falls below zero. Suppose all the opposing
bidders adopt strategy b∗N defined in proposition 2.5, b
∗
N(xi) = v
(K)(xi, xi, · · · , xi).
When all bidders are in the auction, at any price p, bidder i wins the last position K
by dropping out right now only if there are (N−K) bidders drop out simultaneously
at this price, i.e., the lowest (N−K) value bidders have the same signal YK = YK+1 =
· · · = YN−1 = yK . Therefore, given that all opponents follow strategy b∗N(x), bidder




xi, yK , · · · , yK
)
= αKE[vi|X = xi, YK = yK , YK+1 = yK , · · · , YN−1 = yK ]
(A.51)




yK , yK , · · · , yK
)
= αKE[vi|X = yK , YK = yK , YK+1 = yK , · · · , YN−1 = yK ]
(A.52)
The expected payoff from the last position K is non-negative for bidder i if and only
if xi ≥ yK . By using strategy b∗N , bidder i will win position K or some position
above K if and only if xi ≥ yK , so b∗N is the best response bidding strategy for each
bidder i when all bidders are sill in the auction, assuming all other bidders also
adopt strategy b∗N . This is an ex-post equilibrium, since b
∗
N is bidder i’s optimal
strategy for any realization of opposing bidders’ signals x−i.
Next, consider the case when (N − n) bidders have dropped out, but n ≥
K + 1 bidders are still in the auction so that the allocation of no position has been
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determined. Similar to the case with N active bidders, each bidder will not drop out
until the expected payoff from the last position K falls below zero. However, the
expected payoff from the last position is now calculated conditional on the revealed
signals of the (N − n) drop-out bidders, Yn = yn, · · · , YN−1 = yN−1, in which
yn, yn+1, · · · , yN−2, yN−1 are inferred from b∗N(yN−1) = pN , b∗N−1(yN−2|pN) = pN−1,
b∗n+1(yn|pN , · · · , pn+2) = pn+1. Assume all the remaining opposing bidders adopt
strategy b∗n. At any price p, bidder i will win the position K by dropping out at the
current price only if the lowest-value (n−K) bidders among the active bidders drop
out simultaneously, i.e., they have the same signal YK = · · · = Yn−1 = yK . Bidder




xi, yK , · · · , yK︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−K)
, yn, yn+1, · · · , yN−1︸ ︷︷ ︸





∣∣X = xi, YK = yK , YK+1 = yK , · · · , Yn−1 = yK , Yn = yn, · · · , YN−1 = yN−1]
(A.53)




yK , yK , · · · , yK︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−K)
, yn, yn+1, · · · , yN−1︸ ︷︷ ︸





∣∣X = yK , YK = yK , YK+1 = yK , · · · , Yn−1 = yK , Yn = yn, · · · , YN−1 = yN−1]
(A.54)
Therefore, it is profitable to stay in the auction if and only if xi ≥ yK . By using
bidding strategy b∗n, bidder i will win a position no lower than K if and only if
xi ≥ yK , so b∗n is the best response bidding strategy for each bidder i when there
are K < n < N bidders in the auction. This is an ex-post equilibrium, since b∗n is
the best response given any realization of other bidders’ signals.
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Next, consider the case when n ≤ K bidders are left in the auction. When
there are n ≤ K bidders left in the auction, all the remaining bidders will win
some position, so the drop-out price of each bidder i only affect which position she
gets. In equilibrium, a bidder with signal xi should be indifferent between getting
the current lowest position n at price pn+1 and the next best position (n − 1) at
a higher price. Note that bidder i wins position (n − 1) at a higher price b only
if the lowest-value remaining bidder drops out at b. Assuming that all remaining
opposing bidders adopt strategy b∗n, bidder i’s expected payoff from winning the















































v(n−1)(xi, yn−1, yn · · · , yN)− pn+1
]
(A.57)
Subtracting equation (A.57) from equation (A.55), the expected payoff from staying
in the auction and getting position (n− 1) is higher than the expected payoff from
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dropping out right now and getting position n if and only if
EΠn−1 − EΠn = (αn−1 − αn)
[




Inequality (A.58) holds if and only if xi ≥ yn−1. Therefore, by using bidding strategy
b∗n, bidder i wins a position no lower than (n − 1) if and only if xi ≥ yn−1, so b∗n
is the best response bidding strategy for bidder i when there are n < K bidders
remain in the auction. This is an ex-post equilibrium at the time when n bidders
are left in the auction, since b∗n is bidder i’s optimal strategy for any realization of the
other bidders signals x−i. Therefore, (b
∗, · · · , b∗) characterized in Proposition 2.5
is an ex-post equilibrium in the Generalized English Auction with interdependent
values.
Proof of Proposition 2.6:
Proof. I first compare expected revenues of the K-dimensional GSP auction and
the K-dimensional VCG auction, and then compare expected revenues of the K-
dimensional VCG auction and the GEA.










2 (xi), · · · , βGK(xi)
)
denote the Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategies in the K-dimensional VCG auc-
tion and K-dimensional GSP auction, respectively. According to the characteriza-
tion of βV (xi) and β
G(xi) in Propositions 3 and 4, the expected prices for the last


















∣∣∣{YK−1 > X > YK}] = αKE[vK(YK , YK)∣∣∣{YK−1 > X > YK}]
(A.59)















= (αk − αk+1)E
[
βVk (Yk)
∣∣∣{Yk−1 > X > Yk}]+ E[pV,(k+1)]
= (αk − αk+1)E
[
vk(Yk, Yk)

















]]∣∣∣{Yk−1 > X > Yk}]
= (αk − αk+1)E
[
vk(Yk, Yk)
∣∣∣{Yk−1 > X > Yk}]+ E[pG,(k+1)]
(A.60)



























which means the expected prices for the last position K are the same, and the ex-










, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K} (A.62)
which directly implies that the K-dimensional VCG auction and the K-dimensional
GSP auction are revenue equivalent.
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Alternatively, the revenue equivalence between the K-dimensional VCG auc-
tion and the K-dimensional GSP auction can be proved by showing that the ex-
pected payments of each bidder are the same in two auctions. First consider the
case of K = 2 positions. The expected payments by a bidder with signal xi in the
K-dimensional VCG auction and the K-dimensional GSP auction are given by
mV (xi) =Pr(xi ≥ Y1)E
[
(α1 − α2) v1(Y1, Y1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βV1 (Y1)
+α2 v
2(Y2, Y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βV2 (Y2)
∣∣∣xi ≥ Y1]
+ Pr(Y2 ≤ xi < Y1)E
[
α2 v
2(Y2, Y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βV2 (Y2)
∣∣∣Y2 ≤ xi < Y1]















+ Pr(Y2 ≤ xi < Y1)E
[
α2 v
2(Y2, Y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βG2 (Y2)
∣∣∣Y2 ≤ xi < Y1]
(A.63)
The only difference betweenmV (xi) andm
G(xi) comes from the term E[v
2(Y2, Y2)|Y1 ≤
xi] in m
V (xi) and E
[
E[v2(Y2, Y2)|Y1]





∣∣∣Y1 ≤ xi] = E[v2(Y2, Y2)∣∣∣Y1 ≤ xi] (A.64)
which implies mV (xi) = m
G(xi). Similar argument applies for any K ≥ 2 positions.
Since the expected payments of a bidder with the same signal xi are the same in
two auctions, the K-dimensional GSP auction and the K-dimensional VCG auction
are always revenue equivalent.
I next compare expected revenue of the GEA and the K-dimensional VCG
auction. The expected prices for the last position K in GEA and K-dimensional
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v(K)(YK , YK ;YK+1, YK+2, · · · , YN−1)








∣∣∣{YK−1 > X > YK}]
(A.65)
According to Milgrom and Weber (1982) [2]’s Linkage Principle, E[pE,(K)] ≥ E[pV,(K)].
A formal proof is given below:
vK(xi, yK) = E
[
vi






∣∣X, YK , YK+1, · · · , YN−1]∣∣∣X = xi, YK = yK]
= E
[
v(K)(X, YK ;YK+1, · · · , YN−1)
∣∣∣X = xi, YK = yK]
(A.66)
For xi > yK , we have
vK(yK , yK) = E
[
v(K)(X, YK ;YK+1, · · · , YN−1)
∣∣∣X = yK , YK = yK]
= E
[
v(K)(YK , YK ;YK+1, · · · , YN−1)
∣∣∣X = yK , YK = yK]
≤ E
[
v(K)(YK , YK ;YK+1, · · · , YN−1)















v(K)(YK , YK ;YK+1, · · · , YN−1)
∣∣X, YK]∣∣∣{YK−1 > X > YK}]
= αKE
[
v(K)(YK , YK ;YK+1, · · · , YN−1)






so the expected price for the last position K is weakly higher in the GEA than in
the K-dimensional VCG auction.
For any position k < K, the increment in expected price between position k
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= (αk − αk+1)E
[
v(k)(Yk, Yk;Yk+1, · · · , YN−1)





= (αk − αk+1)E
[
vk(Yk, Yk)
∣∣∣{Yk−1 > X > Yk}]
(A.69)




∣∣∣{Yk−1 > X > Yk}] ≤ E[v(k)(Yk, Yk;Yk+1, · · · , YN−1)∣∣∣{Yk−1 > X > Yk}]
(A.70)
so the increment in expected price between any two adjacent positions is weakly

















, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K−1} (A.71)
Since the expected price for the last position is weakly higher in GEA, and
the increment in expected price between any two positions above the last position
is also weakly higher in GEA, the expected price for every position is weakly higher
in the GEA than in the K-dimensional VCG auction. Therefore, expected revenue
in the GEA is weakly higher than expected revenue in the K-dimensional VCG
auction.
Proof of Corollary 2.51:
Proof. The proof of Corollary 2.5 is based on two lemmas. Lemma A.1 provides a
characterization of ex-post IC and IR mechanism under affiliated signals. Lemma
A.2 characterizes the ex-ante expected revenue in any ex-post IC and IR mechanism.
1The proof of Corollary 2.5 follows from Myerson (1981) [40], Ulku (2013) [45] and Li (2017) [44].
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Lemma A.1. For any value function vi(xi, x−i) satisfying assumptions A1-A3 and
signal distribution F (x) satisfying assumptions A4-A5, a mechanism (q, p) is ex-
post IC and IR if and only if for all bidder i, for any signal profile (xi, x−i), qi(xi, x−i)
is weakly increasing in xi, and the ex-post utility ui(xi, x−i) satisfies






qi(s, x−i)ds, ∀ x−i (A.72)
ui(0, x−i) ≥ 0, ∀ x−i (A.73)
Proof. I first show that any ex-post IC and IR mechanism satisfies the characteri-
zation in Lemma A.1, then show that any mechanism satisfying the conditions in
Lemma A.1 must be ex-post IC and IR.
Suppose (q, p) is an ex-post IC and IR mechanism. According to the definition




ui(xi, x−i) ≥ qi(x
′














ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x
′














i, x−i)− vi(xi, x−i)
] (A.75)








































ds+ ui(0, x−i) (A.78)
Ex-post IR implies ui(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 for all i. Since qi(xi, x−i) is weakly increasing in xi
and vi(xi, x−i) is strictly increasing in xi, equation (A.78) implies that ui(0, x−i) ≤
ui(xi, x−i) for all xi, given any x−i, so ui(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 for all xi, given any x−i, only
if ui(0, x−i) ≥ 0 given any x−i. Therefore, any ex-post IC and IR mechanism must
satisfy equation (A.78), qi(xi, x−i) increasing in xi, and ui(0, x−i) ≥ 0.
I next show that any mechanism (q, p) that satisfies equation (A.78), qi(xi, x−i)
increasing in xi, and ui(0, x−i) ≥ 0 for any x−i must be ex-post IC and IR.
Since qi(xi, x−i) is weakly increasing in xi,
∂vi(s,x−i)
∂s








qi(s, x−i)ds, it is trivial that ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(0, x−i) for all
xi ≥ 0, given any x−i, so ui(0, x−i) ≥ 0 for all x−i implies ex-post IR.





























i, x−i)− vi(xi, x−i)
)]
(A.79)
This directly implies ex-post IC.
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The next lemma provides a characterization of the seller’s expected revenue
in any ex-post IC and IR mechanism.
























Proof. Following equation (A.78) in Lemma A.1, the ex-ante expected payoff to




































































































vi(xi, x−i)qi(xi, x−i)f(x)dx (A.82)
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The ex-ante expected revenue equals to the expected total surplus subtracted













































According to the definition of marginal revenue MRi(xi, x−i), the seller’s prob-
















subject to no reserve price, ui(0, x−i) ≥ 0 for any x−i, qi(xi, x−i) increasing in xi,
and the feasibility constraint. When MRi is strictly increasing in xi, the expected
revenue can be maximized by setting ui(0, x−i) = 0 for all x−i, and allocating higher
CTR to bidders with higher MRi. Therefore, under regularity condition R2, the
optimal allocation rule q∗ is given by
q∗i (xi, x−i) =

αk if X̂
k(x−i) ≤ xi < X̂k−1(x−i)
0 if xi < X̂
K(x−i)
(A.85)
in which [X̂k(x−i), X̂
k−1(x−i)] is the interval of value that bidder i’s signal can take
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such that bidder i has the k-th highest MRi(xi, x−i) given her opponents’ report
x−i.








ds−pi(xi, x−i) = ui(0, x−i) ≥ 0, ∀x−i
(A.86)
for all bidder i. Choose p∗i (xi, x−i) = q
∗







then p∗i (xi, x−i) satisfies both constraint. Therefore, (q
∗, p∗) is an optimal auction
subject to no reserve price among all ex-post IC and IR mechanisms.
Proof of Proposition 2.72:
Proof. To show that (q∗, p∗) characterized in Corollary 2.5 is optimal subject to
no reserve price among all Bayesian IC and IR mechanisms when bidders have
independent signals, I first characterize the optimal Bayesian mechanism subject to
no reserve price with independent signals, then show it is equivalent to (q∗, p∗). The
proof is based on two lemmas presented below:
Lemma A.3. For any value function vi(xi, x−i) satisfying assumptions A1-A3,
when bidders’ signals are independently and identically distributed, a mechanism
(q, p) is Bayesian IC and IR if for every bidder i, for any report of signals x =
(xi, x−i), the expected CTR qi(xi, x−i) is weakly increasing in xi, and the interim
2The proof of Proposition 2.7 follows from Myerson (1981) [40].
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expected utility Ui(xi) satisfies









Ui(0) ≥ 0 (A.88)
Proof. I first show that any Bayesian IC and IR mechanism can be characterized by
the conditions in Lemma A.3, then finish the proof by showing that any mechanism
satisfying the characterization in Lemma A.3 must be Bayesian IC and IR.
According to the definition of Bayesian IC mechanism, for all bidder i, for any










































































































qi(s, x−i)dsf−i(x−i)dx−i + Ui(0) (A.93)
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Since qi(xi, x−i) is weakly increasing in xi and vi(xi, x−i) is strictly increasing in xi,
equation (A.93) implies that Ui(0) ≤ Ui(xi) for all xi. Therefore, Ui(xi) ≥ 0 for all
xi ∈ [0, x̄] only if Ui(0) ≥ 0.
I next show that any mechanism (q, p) that satisfies the characterization in














is trivial that Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(0) for all xi, so Ui(0) ≥ 0 implies Bayesian IR.





































This directly implies Bayesian IC.
The result of Lemma A.3 leads to the following lemma that gives an expression
of the seller’s expected revenue in any Bayesian IC and IR mechanism.
Lemma A.4. For any Bayesian IC and IR mechanism that satisfy the conditions




















Proof. The ex-ante expected payoff to an bidder i in any Bayesian IC and IR auction
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is













































































vi(xi, x−i)qi(xi, x−i)f(x)dx (A.97)
The ex-ante expected revenue equals to the expected total surplus subtracted









































According to the definition of MRi(xi, x−i) with independent signals, the














subject to no reserve price, Ui(0) ≥ 0, qi(xi, x−i) being weakly increasing in xi, and
the feasibility constraint. Since Ui(0) is a constant, it is optimal to set Ui(0) = 0.
The expected revenue is maximized by assigning higher qi to bidders with higher
MRi(xi, x−i). Under this allocation rule, the constraint that qi(xi, x−i) being weakly
increasing in xi is satisfied if MRi(xi, x−i) is strictly increasing in xi. Therefore,
given that MRi(xi, x−i) is strictly increasing in xi, the optimal allocation rule
q(xi, x−i) is given by
q∗i (xi, x−i) =

αk if X̂
k(x−i) ≤ xi < X̂k−1(x−i)
0 if xi < X̂
K(x−i)
(A.100)
in which [X̂k(x−i), X̂
k−1(x−i)] is the interval of value that bidder i’s signal xi can
take such that bidder i has the k-th highest MRi(xi, x−i) given opponents’ report
x−i.













f−i(x−i)dx−i = Ui(0) ≥ 0
(A.101)








ds, then p∗i (x)
satisfies the joint constraint. Therefore, (q∗, p∗) is the optimal position auction
subject to no reserve price among all Bayesian IC and IR mechanisms when bidders
have independent signals.
Proof of Proposition 2.8:
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Proof. Under regularity conditions R1-R3, it is trivial that given any profile of
signals, the rank ordering of signals is equivalent to the rank ordering of values
vi(xi, x−i) as well as the rank ordering of marginal revenues MRi(xi, x−i), so for any
bidder i, given any opponents’ report x−i, we must have
x̂k(x−i) = X̂
k(x−i), ∀k (A.102)
in which x̂k(x−i) is the minimum value that bidder i’s signal can take such that i
has the k-th highest value vi(xi, x−i) given x−i, and X̂
k(x−i) is the minimum value
that bidder i’s signal can take such that i has the k-th highest marginal revenue
MRi(xi, x−i) given x−i. Therefore, the allocation rule of the optimal auction (q
∗, p∗)
defined in Corollary 2.5 is the same as the allocation rule of the Generalized-VCG
mechanism (qV , pV ). Replacing X̂k(x−i) by x̂
k(x−i) in the optimal auction (q
∗, p∗)
defined in Corollary 2.5 yields
q∗i (xi, x−i) =

αk if x̂
k(x−i) ≤ xi < x̂k−1(x−i)
0 if xi < x̂
K(x−i)
(A.103)
p∗i (xi, x−i) = q
∗







I next substitute equation (A.103) into equation (A.104) to characterize the optimal
payment rule p∗. Note that the term q∗i (s, x−i) ×
∂vi(s,x−i)
∂s
inside the integral in









if x̂k(x−i) ≤ s < x̂k−1(x−i)
0 if s < x̂K(x−i)
(A.105)
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so the integral of q∗i (s, x−i)
∂vi(s,x−i)
∂s



























if x̂k(x−i) ≤ xi < x̂k−1(x−i)













j−1, x−i)− vi(x̂j , x−i)
]
if x̂k(x−i) ≤ xi < x̂k−1(x−i)
0 if xi < x̂
K(x−i)
(A.106)
Substitute the optimal allocation rule q∗ given in equation (A.103) and the integral




j=k(αj − αj+1)vi(x̂j, x−i) if xi ∈ [x̂k(x−i), x̂k−1(x−i)]
0 if xi < x̂
K(x−i)
(A.107)
which is equivalent to the Generalized-VCG payment rule. Therefore, under regu-
larity conditions R1-R3, the Generalized-VCG mechanism is the optimal position
auction subject to no reserve price among all ex-post IC and IR mechanisms.
I next compare the expected revenue of the Generalized-VCG mechanism to ex-
pected revenues of the GEA, the K-dimensional GSP auction and the K-dimensional
VCG auction. Since expected revenue of the GEA is higher than the other two
static auctions, showing that the Generalized-VCG mechanism yields higher ex-
pected revenue than the GEA is sufficient for proving the revenue ranking provided
in Proposition 2.8.
The ex-ante expected price for the last position K in the Generalized-VCG
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vi(YK , Y1, · · · , YN−1)







v(K)(YK , YK , · · · , YN−1)
∣∣∣{YK−1 > X > YK}] (A.108)










For any position 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, the expected price in the Generalized-VCG
mechanism and GEA are given by
E
[
pG−V CG,(k) − pG−V CG,(k+1)
]
= (αk − αk+1)E
[
vi(Yk, Y1, · · · , Yk, Yk+1, · · · , YN−1)





= (αk − αk+1)E
[
v(k)(Yk, Yk, Yk+1, · · · , YN−1)
∣∣∣{Yk−1 > X > Yk}]
(A.110)


























for all position k, so the expected
revenue of the Generalized-VCG mechanism is higher than the expected revenue of
the GEA, which is in turn higher than the expected revenue of K-dimensional VCG
auction and K-dimensional GSP auction under affiliated signals.

























for all position k, so the expected revenue
of the Generalized-VCG mechanism is equivalent to the expected revenue of the
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GEA, which is in turn equivalent to the expected revenue of the K-dimensional
VCG auction and the K-dimensional GSP auction under independent signals. It
follows that the optimal revenue subject to no reserve price among all Bayesian IC
and IR mechanisms is practically implementable by the GEA, the K-dimensional
GSP auction, and the K-dimensional VCG auction under independent signals.
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Appendix B: Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Corollary 3.2:
Proof. For any bidder i, for any n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, given a profile of bidder i’s
opponents’ reported costs ĉ−i, let nmin{ĉ−i} be the n-th lowest cost among bidder
i’s opponents’ reported costs ĉ−i. Define
Ĉn(ĉ−i) = min
{
nmin{ĉ−i}, P (n)− (n− 1)δ
}
(B.1)
Suppose P (n + 1) − ĉn < nδ, so that it is not efficient to sell more than n
licenses, bidder i will win one out of n licenses in the VCG mechanism if and only if
ĉi ≤ nmin{ĉ−i}, and P (n)− ĉi ≥ (n− 1)δ (B.2)
i.e., ĉi ≤ Ĉn(ĉ−i).
The payoff of winning one out of n licenses to bidder i with true cost ci is
un(ci, ĉ−i) = P (n)− ci −max
{
P (n)− nmin{ĉ−i}, (n− 1)δ
}
(B.3)
Since un(ci, ĉ−i) ≥ 0 if and only if ci ≤ Ĉn(ĉ−i) for any n, it is a dominant strategy
to report ĉi = ci in the VCG mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
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Proof. I will first prove that given any reserve prices 0 = r1 < r2 and r2 > P (2)− c̄,
then there must exists some types of bidders bidding below r2 in equilibrium, i.e.,
r2 is binding for some bidders.
Suppose all bidders bid above r2 in equilibrium, then total supply will be
2 for certain and bidders have a dominant strategy of bidding their true value of
winning one out of 2 licenses, β(ci) = P (2)−ci. However, for any bidders with costs
ci > P (2)−r2, P (2)−ci < r2, which contradicts the assumption that all bidders bid
above r2. Therefore, if r2 > P (2) − c̄, then there must exist some types of bidders
who bid below r2 in equilibrium.
Next, I will prove that no symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategy
exists in a uniform-price auction with reserve prices (r1, r2) s.t. r1 = 0, r2 > P (2)−c̄.
Suppose a symmetric strictly decreasing Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy
β(.) exists, given that some bidders must bid below r2 in equilibrium, there must
exist some threshold type c∗ s.t. β(ci) < r2 if ci > c
∗, and β(ci) > r2 if ci < c
∗.
For any bidder i with bi < r2, the only possible winning outcome is to win
one exclusive license if the lowest-cost opponent bids β(y1) < bi < r2. Given all





[P (1)− ci − β(y1)]dG1(y1) (B.4)
where G1(y1) is the distribution of the lowest cost among bidder i’s opponents. The
first order condition shows that
β(ci) = P (1)− ci if ci ∈ (c∗, c̄] (B.5)
P (1) − ci < r2 for all ci > c∗ implies c∗ = P (1) − r2. Note that as long as bi < r2,
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increasing bi only increases the probability of winning when total supply is 1 and
has no impact on probability of winning when total supply is 2. Therefore, the
equilibrium bidding strategy is the same as the equilibrium strategy in a second-
price auction with a fixed supply of 1 license when a bidder’s cost is high enough to
satisfy P (1)− ci < r2.
When P (1)− c̄ > r2 > P (2)− c̄, then P (1)− r2 > c̄, which means c∗ = c̄ and
all bidders must bid above r2 in equilibrium, contradicting the assumption that r2
is binding for some bidders. Therefore, no monotonic separating equilibrium exists
when P (1)− c̄ > r2 > P (2)− c̄.





= r2 in equilibrium. Next, consider any bidder i with bi > r2, bidder
i will win one exclusive license only if its lowest-cost opponent submits a bid below
r2, i.e., y1 > c
∗. Bidder i will win one out of two licenses when its lowest-cost
opponent bids above r2 and the second-lowest cost opponent bids below bi. Given




























where Gn(yn) is the distribution of the n-th lowest cost. Note that bi only enters
the second term. The first order condition implies
β(ci) = P (2)− ci if ci ∈ [c, c∗] (B.7)
This is because as long as bi ≥ r2, increasing bid does not affect the probability
172
of winning when the total supply is 1 but only affect the probability of winning
when the total supply is 2, since the total supply equals to 1 only if the lowest-cost
opponent bids below r2, which is not affected by bidder i’s own bid. Therefore, the
equilibrium bidding strategy is the same as the equilibrium bidding strategy in a
uniform-price auction with a fixed supply of 2 when a bidder’s cost is low enough
to satisfy P (2) − ci ≥ r2. Set P (2) − ci = r2 yields c∗ = P (2) − r2 < P (1) − r2,
which yields a contradiction to the assumption that there exists a single type c∗ s.t.
β(ci) > r2 for all ci < c





P (1)− ci if ci ∈ (P (1)− r2, c̄]
P (2)− ci if ci ∈ [c, P (2)− r2]
(B.8)
There exists no bidding strategy for ci ∈ (P (2)− r2, P (1)− r2] such that β(ci) can
be strictly monotonic over [c, c̄].
Proof of Lemma 3.3:
Proof. For bidders with costs ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2,min{P (1)− r2, c̄}
]
, winning a license
when total supply is 2 yields a non-positive payoff. Since increasing bid when bi ≥ r2
only increases probability of winning when total supply is 2 and does not affect
probability of winning when total supply is 1, any bid bi > r2 is dominated by
bidding bi = r2.
On the other hand, winning a license when total supply is 1 yields a positive
payoff for these bidders. Since total supply equals to 1 only if β(y1) < r2, P (1) −
ci − r2 > P (1) − ci − β(y1) > 0 for all ci < min{P (1) − r2, c̄}. As long as bi < r2,
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decreasing bid does not affect probability of winning when total supply is 2 but only
decreases probability of winning when total supply is 1, so any bid bi < r2 − ε for
some arbitrarily small ε is dominated by bidding bi = r2 − ε.
Therefore, bidders with costs ci ∈
[
P (2)− r2,min{P (1)− r2, c̄}
]
will only bid
r2 or r2 − ε in equilibrium. Pooling must occur for these bidders.
Proof of Lemma 3.4:
Proof. For bidder with costs ci ∈
(
P (2)−r2,min{P (1)−r2, c̄}
]
, either r2 or r2−ε is
an optimal bidding strategy according to Lemma 3.3. Moreover, there is a trade-off
between bidding r2 and r2 − ε. Compared to bidding r2 − ε, bidding r2 improves
the probability of winning Π1(ci) = P (1) − ci − r2 + ε > 0 when the total supply
is 1 and the highest bid among opponents equals to r2 − ε, while also improves the
probability of winning Π2(ci) = P (2) − ci − β(y1) < P (2) − ci − r2 < 0 when the
total supply is 2 and the highest bid among opponents is no lower than r2.
Note that both Π1(ci) and Π2(ci) are decreasing in ci, so the gain from winning
when total supply is 1 is diminishing while the loss from winning when total supply
is 2 is increasing when ci is greater.










P (2)− ci − r2 = 0
(B.9)
so the gain from winning when supply equals to 1 is strictly positive while the loss
from winning when supply equals to 2 is zero. The expected payoff from bidding r2
is strictly higher than expected payoff from bidding r2 − ε.
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P (2)− ci − r2 = P (2)− P (1) = −δ < 0
(B.10)
so the gain from winning when supply equals to 1 is zero while the loss from winning
when supply equals to 2 is strictly negative. The expected payoff from bidding r2 is
strictly lower than expected payoff from bidding r2 − ε.
If P (1)−r2 > c̄, note that all bidders bidding at least r2 is never an equilibrium,
since the total supply will be certain to be 2, and all bidders with ci ∈
(
P (2)− r2, c̄
]
will suffer a loss Π2(ci) < 0 and will have incentive to deviate to bidding r2 − ε.
Since Π2(ci) is decreasing in ci, those bidders with costs ci sufficiently close to c̄ will
bid r2 − ε in equilibrium.




bidding r2−ε is not an equilibrium,
since bidding r2 will increase the probability of winning Π1(ci) when total supply
equals to 1. Since Π1(ci) is decreasing in ci, those bidders with costs ci sufficiently
close to P (2)− r2 will bid r2 in equilibrium.
Therefore, there must exists ĉ ∈
(
P (2) − r2,min{P (1) − r2, c̄}
]
such that
all bidders with costs ci ∈
(
P (2) − r2, ĉ
]
bid r2 and all bidders with costs ci ∈[
ĉ,min{P (1)− r2, c̄}
]
bid r2 − ε in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
Proof. Consider the equilibrium drop-out price of some arbitrary bidder i when
there are k ≥ 2 bidders left in the auction. When the current clock price p < r2,
bidder i will win at the current clock price p only if all the rest of (k − 1) bidders
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drop out simultaneously at p, which gives him a payoff of P (1) − ci − p, since all
(k − 1) opponents dropping out at a price p < r2 implies the total supply is 1.
Therefore, when p < r2, a bidder will stay in the auction as long as the
value of winning one exclusive license is above the current price. If P (1) − r2 ≥ c̄,
then no bidder will drop out before r2 − ε. If P (1) − r2 < c̄, bidders with costs
ci ∈
(
P (1) − r2, c̄
]
will drop out before price reaches r2 and bidders with costs
ci ∈ [c, P (2) − r2] will stay in the auction while p < r2. The optimal drop-out
strategy for all these bidders is P (1)− ci.
However, for bidders with costs ci ∈
(
P (2) − r2,min{P (1) − r2, c̄}
]
, winning
when total supply equals to 2 yields a negative payoff, and winning when total
supply equals to 1 yields a positive payoff. To maximize probability of winning
when p < r2 and minimize probability of winning when p ≥ r2, these bidders will
either drop out at p = r2 − ε or at p = r2. Since the gain from winning when
total supply is 1 is decreasing in bidder’s cost, and the loss from winning when total
supply is 2 is increasing in bidder’s cost, there always exists some ĉk2 such that a
bidder i with cost ci = ĉ
k
2 is indifferent between dropping out at r2 − ε and r2 given
that there are k ≥ 2 bidders left in the auction at price of p < r2.
A similar proof can be applied to any n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K}. When the clock price
p ∈ [rn, rn+1), all bidders with costs ci ≥ P (n) − rn have dropped out. Only the
equilibrium dropping out strategy of bidders with costs ci < P (n)− rn needs to be
discussed.




, a bidder will win by dropping out at p only if all the
other (k − 1) bidders drop out simultaneously at p, which gives him a payoff of
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P (n)− ci. Therefore, bidders with costs ci ∈
(
P (n)− rn+1, P (n)− rn
]
will drop out
at P (n) − ci when p ∈ [rn, rn+1). Bidders with costs ci ∈
[
c, P (n + 1) − rn+1
]
will
stay in the auction while p < rn+1. Their optimal drop out strategy is also P (n)−ci.
For bidders with costs ci ∈
(
P (n+1)− rn+1, P (n)− rn+1
]
, winning when total
supply equals to (n + 1) yields a negative payoff, while winning when total supply
equals to n yields a positive payoff. There exists ĉkn+1 such that a bidder i with cost
ci = ĉ
k
n+1 is indifferent between dropping out at rn+1 − ε and rn+1 given that there
are k ≥ 2 bidders left in the auction at a price p ∈ [rn, rn+1).
When the clock price p ≥ rK , only bidders with ci ∈
[
c, P (K) − rK
]
are still
active. Since the total supply will be K for certain, it is a dominant strategy for
the remaining bidders to bid P (K)− ci.
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
Proof. For all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, let Πni (bi, b−i) denote bidder i’s payoff from auction
given bidding profile (bi, b−i) conditional on total supply S = n. Let P
n(bi, b−i)




∣∣bni ≥ rn) denote the probability that total supply S = n given bidding
profile (bi, b−i) conditional on b
n
i ≥ rn. Then




∣∣bni ≥ rn)× 1{bni ≥ rn} (B.11)
Each bidder i’s objective function is to maximize
K∑
n=1
Πni (bi, b−i)× P n
(
bi, b−i
∣∣bni ≥ rn)× 1{bni ≥ rn} (B.12)
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For any possible level of supply n at which rn > P (n) − ci, Πni (bi, b−i) ≤ 0 for all
(bi, b−i). It is a dominant strategy to bid b
n
i = 0 when ci ∈
(
P (n)− rn, c̄
]
.
For all possible level of supply n at which rn ≤ P (n)− ci, each bidder i needs
to maximize Πni (bi, b−i)× P n
(
bi, b−i
∣∣bni ≥ rn)× 1{bni ≥ rn}.
Let N denote the set of all bidders. Let Sn denote the set of bidders who win
a license between rounds (R1) to (Rn). Then N \ Sn−1 is the set of bidders whose
bids bni will be considered in round (Rn). Consider the unconditional probabilities
P n(bi, b−i) first.
For n = 1,
P 1(bi, b−i) =





For all n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K − 1},
P n(bi, b−i) =

1 if max{bkj}j∈N\Sk−1 ≥ rk ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, and
max{bn+1j }j∈N\Sn < rn+1
0 else
(B.14)
For n = K,
PK(bi, b−i) =

1 if max{bkj}j∈N\Sk−1 ≥ rk ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}
0 else
(B.15)
Note that conditional on bni ≥ rn, changing bni does not affect P ñ(bi, b−i) for





∣∣bni ≥ rn) is not affected by bni . Moreover, conditional on winning a license
before round (Rn), strategically bidding bni < rn also does not affect P
n(bi, b−i), as
bni is not counted in round (Rn) if bidder i wins a license before round (Rn), so the
bidders cannot strategically shade their bids for higher supply levels to lower the
final supply level conditional on winning.
Each bidder’s problem becomes choosing bni to maximize Π
n
i (bi, b−i) if rn ≤
P (n) − ci, and choosing bni = 0 otherwise. Since Πni (bi, b−i) denote the payoff from
winning a license conditional on S = n, each bidder’s dominant strategy is to bid
his or her true value P (n)− ci conditional on S = n.
Proof of Proposition 3.4:
Proof. For all n ∈ {K,K − 1, · · · , 1}, first consider each active bidder’s bidding
strategy if k(rn) ≥ n s.t. the auction ends in round (Rn). When k(rn) = n,
the market clearing price is rn and the auction ends immediately, so there is no
need to discuss bidders’ strategies. When k(rn) > n, the auction is equivalent to
an ascending clock auction with fixed supply of n identical items and k(rn) bidders
with single-unit demands. It is well known that dropping out at true value P (n)−ci
is a dominant strategy for each bidder.
I will next analyze each bidder’s strategy at the beginning for each round n,
at the time of which the clock price is set to be p = rn. Each bidder needs to decide
whether to state “in” or “out” in the auction. For each bidder i, participating in
round (Rn) implies that bidder i will pay at least a price of rn conditional on winning
in round (Rn) when the total supply is n. First, consider the strategy for any bidder
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i with cost ci > P (n)− rn:
• If there are less than (n − 1) opponents stating “in” at clock price p = rn,
then stating “in” and “out” yields the same payoff of zero in (Rn) since no
allocation occurs in (Rn) in both cases and the auction will proceed to (Rn-1)
with the same starting price.
• If there are exactly (n− 1) opponents stating “in” at clock price p = rn, then
bidder i wins a license with a negative payoff of P (n)− ci − rn < 0 by stating
“in” and gets payoff of zero by stating “out” in (Rn).
• If there are more than (n − 1) opponents stating “in” at clock price p = rn,
then bidder i gets a non-positive payoff by stating “in” and gets a zero payoff
by stating “out” in (Rn), since the auction will end in (Rn) with a price strictly
higher than rn.
Therefore, for bidders with costs ci > P (n)− rn, stating “out” at clock price p = rn
in a weakly dominant strategy. Next, consider the strategies for any bidder with
cost ci ≤ P (n)− rn:
• If there are less than (n − 1) opponents stating “in” at the price of rn, then
stating “in” and “out” in round (Rn) yields the same payoff since no allocation
occurs at round (Rn) in both cases.
• If there are exactly (n − 1) opponents stating “in” at the price of rn, that
implies there are (n− 1) opponents with costs cj ≤ P (n)− rn, since no bidder
with costs cj > P (n) − rn will state “in” as proved above. If bidder i state
180
“in” at p = rn, the auction ends immediately and bidder i gets a payoff of
P (n)−ci−rn ≥ 0. If bidder i state “out” at p = rn, the auction will proceed to
round (Rn-1). Bidder i will get a payoff of zero if not participating in (Rn-1).
Suppose bidder i participate. Since all bidders who state “in” at p = rn are
required to remain in the auction when p = rn−1, all of these (n − 1) active
bidders will be active in round (Rn-1) and the auction will end in (Rn-1) with
probability of one. Let yn−1 denote the cost of the bidder who has the highest
cost among those (n− 1) active bidders in (Rn), then yn−1 ≤ P (n)− rn. This
bidder’s drop out price is P (n− 1)− yn−1 in round (Rn-1). If bidder i drops
out before P (n−1)−yn−1, then bidder i gets zero payoff. If bidder i drops out
after P (n− 1)− yn−1 and wins one out of (n− 1) licenses, then bidder i gets
payoff of yn−1−ci. However, since yn−1 ≤ P (n)−rn, yn−1−ci ≤ P (n)−ci−rn.
Therefore, bidder i is weakly worse off by stating “out” than by stating “in”
under every possible situation when there are exactly (n−1) opponents stating
“in” at p = rn.
• If there are more than (n − 1) opponents stating “in” at clock price p = rn,
then bidder i will gets a non-negative payoff by stating “in” at p = rn and gets
a zero payoff by stating “out” at p = rn, since the auction will end in round
(Rn). Bidder i has a positive probability of winning and gets a positive payoff
in (Rn) by stating “in” and will be eliminated from auction by stating “out”.
Therefore, for bidders with costs ci ≤ P (n)− rn, stating “in” at clock price p = rn
in a weakly dominant strategy. When rn = (n − 1)δ for all n, the Walrasian clock
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auction implements the efficient allocation.
Proof of Lemma 3.51:
Proof. I will first show that any Bayesian IC and IR mechanism must satisfy the
characterizations in Lemma 3.5, then I will show that any mechanism satisfying the
characterizations in Lemma 3.6 must be Bayesian IC and IR.
Suppose (µ, t) is a Bayeisan IC and IR mechanism. According to the Bayesian
IC and IR condition, for any bidder i, for any true cost profile (ci, c−i) and bidder














































































































1The proof of Lemma 3.5 follows from Myerson (1981) [40].
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The inequalities imply that if c
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i > ci. Divide both sides by (c
′
i − ci) and take limit:
U
′

















i (ci, c−i)f−i(c−i)dc−i < 0 (B.19)
Therefore, the Bayesian IC condition implies



























i (ci, c−i)f−i(c−i)dc−i (B.21)
Since U
′
i (ci) < 0, the Bayesian IR condition Ui(ci) ≥ 0 for all ci ∈ [c, c̄] implies
Ui(c̄) ≥ 0 (B.22)
Therefore, any Bayesian IC and IR mechanism must satisfy the characterization in
Lemma 3.5.
I will next show that any mechanism (µ, t) that satisfies the characterization
in Lemma 3.5 must be Bayesian IC and IR.
Equation (B.20) and inequality (B.21) implies that Ui(c̄) ≤ Ui(ci) for all ci ≤ c̄.


















































According to inequality (B.17), this condition implies Bayesian IC.
Proof of Lemma 3.6:























































































i (ci, c−i)π(ci, n)
]
f(c)dc (B.25)
The seller’s revenue can be derived by subtracting the total payoff of bidders
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Proof of Proposition 3.5:




































subject to Ui(c̄) ≥ 0 and feasibility constraint. It is optimal to set Ui(c̄) = 0. For
every possible supply level n, it is optimal to allocate one license to each of the n
highest marginal revenue bidders. Since MR(ci, n) is decreasing in ci, it is equivalent
to say that conditional on supply level being equal to n, it is optimal to allocate one
license to each of the n lowest cost bidders.





− (n − 1)δ, to determine the optimal level of supply n∗, we need to
185










− nδ < 0
(B.28)
Therefore, the optimal allocation rule is
µ
∗(n)
i (ci, c−i) =






− (n− 1)δ ≥ 0,
and MR
(
Cn+1(ci, c−i), n+ 1
)
− nδ < 0
0 else
(B.29)
for all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K − 1}, and
µ
∗(K)
i (ci, c−i) =






− (K − 1)δ ≥ 0,
0 else
(B.30)
where Cn(ci, c−i) is the n-th lowest cost given a profile of reported costs (ci, c−i).
Any tie is broken randomly.




























Set t∗i (ci, c−i) to be














Then (µ∗, t∗) is an optimal mechanism among all Bayesian IC and IR mechanisms.
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Appendix C: Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of Corollary 4.1:
Proof. Let bi denote the bid submitted by bidder i. Since qi is known to the auc-
tioneer, define the adjusted bid of i as v̂i = qi − bi. The true value of bidder i is
given by vi = qi − ci. Reporting bi > ci will lead to v̂i < vi and losing the auction
when the supplier could have profitably won the auction with v̂i = vi. Reporting
bi < ci will lead to v̂i > vi and winning the auction with negative payoff when
vi − v̂j < 0. Therefore, as in standard second-price auctions, it is a dominant strat-
egy for each supplier to report true value vi by submitting bid equals to marginal
cost ci truthfully.
Proof of Proposition 4.1:











1−H(qj − g(k∗j )− τ)
}
dτdGj(qj)dGi(qi)− ki (C.1)
















Given the symmetry of the two bidders, the first order condition for the bidders is
symmetric, which means we must have k∗i = k
∗
j in equilibrium.
Since bidders are ex ante identical, in any symmetric equilibrium, the ex-ante


















− 1 = 0
− g′(k∗i ) = 2
(C.4)
The symmetric equilibrium investment under concealment of quality kC = k∗i = k
∗
j
is therefore independent of the distribution G(.) and H(.). For any given cost
reducing technology g(.), the equilibrium investment kC under quality concealment
is identical across bidders and identical under any distribution of quality G.
Proof of Proposition 4.2:











qj − g(kD(qj))− τ
)}
dτdG(qj)− ki (C.5)











− qi + g(kDi ) + Eηi
)}
dG(qj)− 1 = 0 (C.6)
Suppose SOC < 0 s.t. an equilibrium exists. kDi = k
D(qi) characterized by FOC
is the equilibrium investment strategy of supplier i with quality qi. Take total
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since H ′(.) > 0, −g′(.) > 0, and the denominator < 0 by second order condition.
Therefore, the equilibrium investment kDi is increasing in each supplier’s quality qi
when the auctioneer discloses qi at the investment stage.
Proof of Proposition 4.3:
Proof. Under public disclosure of qualities, the objective function for bidder i given








qj − g(kj)− τ
)}
dτ − ki (C.8)
Each bidder i’s best response investment k∗i (kj; qi, qj) to any level of opponent’s





qj − g(kj)− qi + g(k∗i ) + Eηi
)}
− 1 = 0 (C.9)

















since H ′(.) > 0, −g′(k∗i ) > 0, and SOC < 0. Therefore, the best response investment
of i to any investment level of j will shift to the right when quality difference (qi−qj)
increases.
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since H ′(.) > 0, −g′(k∗i ) > 0, g′(.) < 0, and SOC < 0. So the best response
investment of i is decreasing in the opponent’s investment kj under any announced
quality (qi, qj).
The intersection of k∗i (kj; qi, qj) and k
∗
j (ki; qi, qj) gives the equilibrium invest-
ments (kAi , k
A
j ). For each bidder i, assuming the opponent is playing the equilibrium
kAj , then k
A





qj − g(kAj )− qi + g(kAi ) + Eηi
)}
− 1 = 0 (C.12)
Suppose SOC < 0 s.t. an equilibrium exists. Take total differentiation of FOC with
















since H ′(.) > 0, −g′(kAi ) > 0, and SOC < 0. Therefore, the equilibrium investment
of supplier i is increasing in the announced quality difference (qi − qj).
Proof of Proposition 4.4:
Proof. The expected revenue under concealment of quality is given by
ERC(G) = E
[
V (kC , q2)
∣∣∣G] = E[q2 − g(kC)− Eη∣∣∣G] (C.14)




















V (kD2 , q2)
∣∣G] = E[q2 − g(kD(q2))− Eη∣∣∣G] (C.16)
Holding the expected quality constant and increasing the dispersion ∆(G) will de-
crease the expected value of the low quality and decrease the expected investment




























Since 1− g′(kD2 )kD
′







i.e., the negative impact of increased dispersion in G on ERD is greater than on








which also implies that the difference in expected qualities under concealment and
under private disclosure is increasing in ∆(G).
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The expected revenue to the auctioneer under public disclosure of quality is
ERA(G) = E
[
V (kA2 , q2)
∣∣∣G] = E[q2 − g(kA2 (q2, q1))− Eη∣∣∣G] (C.20)
Holding the expected quality constant and increasing the dispersion ∆(G) will in-
crease the expected difference (q1− q2) and decrease the expected investment of the






































, and the difference in expected revenues is increasing
in ∆(G).















ERC(G) > ERD(G), and ERC(G) > ERA(G) (C.24)
for any distribution G(.) that satisfies ∆(G) > 0 when there are 2 bidders, and the
difference in expected revenues is increasing in ∆(G).
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